CHAPTER 15

STRATEGIC ART: THE NEW DISCIPLINE FOR 21st CENTURY LEADERS

Richard A. Chilcoat

Dramatic changes in the international system have forced us to reevaluate old strategies and look for new reference points amid the still unsettled debris of the Old World order. At issue for strategic leaders and strategists is the role of the United States in the world and our capabilities to defend and promote our national interests in a new environment where threats are both diffuse and uncertain, where conflict is inherent, yet unpredictable. These new patterns of uncertainty combined with declining resources pose difficult challenges to national security.

Meeting these challenges requires an integrated, systematic approach to the formulation and execution of strategy. This *article is an appeal to strategists to match the success in the development of operational art and joint doctrine with an equally comprehensive approach to strategic art.*[1] *If* operational art is an effective guide for the employment of force, strategic art can be equally effective in guiding the formulation of national security strategy, national military strategy, and theater strategy, thereby linking the use of military forces to the larger political-military context in which wars occur. In other words, strategic art must establish the relationships between military power and other instruments of power. It must also guide combatant and theater commanders in fulfilling their strategic responsibilities.

Strategic leadership is the effective practice of the strategic art. Strategists can think about and help devise strategies, but it is the strategic leader who practices the art and makes it happen. A successful search for strategy and the mastery of strategic art by our senior leaders, military and civilian, are vital to the nation. Identifying and mastering the components of strategic art offer no panaceas, but elevating the importance and ensuring the visibility of these steps in the national security debate can serve as constructive counterpoints to such tendencies as political isolationism, militant economic protectionism, military unpreparedness, and emotion-based interventions.

This essay is not intended to provide a strategy or even an ideal process for formulating or mastering strategic art. Its purpose rather is to emphasize that the search itself is important, permanent, and worth our best efforts and attention at a time when familiar landmarks have vanished and no new strategic vision has attracted a national consensus. Said another way, we have come a long way towards mastery of the tactical and operational arts—the time is now to strive for mastery of the strategic art.

Simultaneous revolutions in military affairs, technology, and information, and a reordering of the international system, have shattered traditional boundaries, merging the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war into a single, integrated universe in which

Reproduced from U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE GUIDE TO STRATEGY, Eds. Joseph R. Cerami and James F. Holcomb, Jr. February 2001; Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA; pg. 203-219.

action at the bottom often has instant and dramatic impact at all levels. Never in history have so many strategic burdens confronted the entire chain of command, ranging from the President in the White House all the way down to the individual rifleman at a security checkpoint in Macedonia. We have, in Vice Admiral Jerry O. Tuttle's words, "entered the *'visual era'—our rules of engagement are new, dominated by the risk that parents will see their sons and daughters killed in real—time on TV—or that mothers and babies—churches and mosques—temples and hospitals—will be blown away in full color before us in our living rooms. . . .* "[2]

These dramatic changes require an integrated approach to strategy and operations, an approach that conceptually combines the levels of war—strategic, operational, and tactical—with all the instruments of power in the national security strategy (see Figure 1).

Figure 1.

Before the national security strategy can become a coherent plan for action, strategic art must first be invoked to coordinate all the instruments of power available to a nation or coalition to attain clearly defined and agreed-upon objectives and end states. For this reason, we can no longer afford isolated or uncoordinated approaches among the domains of strategy—military, diplomatic, economic, or informational—which often, as Gregory Foster has observed, "manifest themselves operationally as costly bureaucratic and institutional barriers to unity of thought and action."[3] Churchill's genius was rooted in his understanding of this reality. Like a painter, he tells us, the strategist must have an "all-embracing view, which presents the beginning and the end, the whole and each part, as one instantaneous impression retentively and untiringly held in the mind."[4] Churchill was the classic example of both the

strategist and the strategic leader. His leadership made the difference in translating words into deeds, ideas and concepts into action. He was a master of the strategic art.

Unity of thought and action requires strategic leaders in uniform to understand disciplines outside their own professional expertise, and civilian strategic leaders must likewise comprehend the broader consequences of policy on the national security and national military strategies. Trade, for example, if pursued for maximum economic benefits to the U.S. economy, may include the transfer of technologies that put U.S. military superiority at risk. Conversely, by erecting trade barriers we may cause conflict with other nations, again putting our security at risk. These are difficult choices that can be mediated only by leaders who are able to balance short-term against long-term benefits and regional against global interests, and who are able to reconcile the collective effects of all components of strategy in promoting and defending *all U.S.* interests. Mastering strategic art requires close, cooperative, interagency relations and leaders with vision to see over and beyond the bureaucratic barriers.

Political and military leaders must work closely together, interacting with one another on desired end states, objectives, courses of action, capabilities, and risks, for there is no clear threshold between peace and war marking the point where political and military leaders hand off responsibility. *Both must be masters of strategic art, and the subordination of military to civilian leadership does not lessen the importance of military counsel and advice to political authorities, or the responsibilities of both to communicate and coordinate at every level of strategy and during all phases of conflict. This is the essence of strategic art.*

DEVELOPING A WORKING DEFINITION OF STRATEGIC ART.

Good definitions should be brief, yet broad in scope and sufficiently specific to inform action. Strategic art entails the orchestration of all the instruments of national power to yield specific, well-defined end states. Desired end states and strategic outcomes derive from the national interests and are variously defined in terms of physical security, economic well being, and the promotion of values. Strategic art, broadly defined, is therefore: *The skillful formulation, coordination, and application of ends (objectives), ways (courses of action), and means (supporting resources) to promote and defend the national interests.*

Several definitions of strategic art considered for inclusion here were overly restrictive, limited in scope to military art. While it is indisputable that the nation's military leadership bears the responsibility to fight and win the nation's wars, it is equally true that strategic art includes the mastering of other instruments of power and understanding their contributions and limitations within the national security strategy. Just as diplomacy absent supporting military and economic power may be impotent, even dangerous, military strategy absent political direction and a strong economic foundation may suffer the same disabilities.

The planning and execution of strategy require a paradigm understood by military and civilian leaders alike. The strategy paradigm comprised of "ends, ways, and means"—which has almost universal applicability—defines objectives, identifies courses of action to achieve

them, and provides the resources to support each course of action.[5] The relationships among these elements of strategy allow for planning and the debating of alternative strategic visions, calculations, and assessment of risk. This paradigm and its application to national strategy and to military strategy are taught to senior military officers at every senior service college.

Strategic leaders in uniform must simultaneously be able to comprehend and operate at the levels of national security strategy, national military strategy, and theater strategy. At the highest or grand strategy level, one of the principal tasks of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, his staff, and often the theater or regional commanders in chief (CINCs) is to assist the Secretary of Defense in the formulation of national security strategy. This difficult task requires a grasp of how all the elements of power comprising national strategy might be applied either singly or in concert. Strategic leaders translate national security guidance into a focused military expression through the formally articulated Defense Planning Guidance and the National Military Strategy. It is at this level and in this process that differences between strategic art and operational art are most pronounced.

Operational art does not establish the strategic context, but instead flows from the policy decisions and strategy made at the national and theater levels. Operational art in the middle overlaps with and bridges strategy and tactics and translates theater strategy into military action by integrating the key activities of all levels of warfare (see Figure 2). It is more strictly focused on the employment of military forces to attain the aims set by strategy through the design and execution of campaigns and major operations.

Figure 2.

Combatant commanders play a complex and multifaceted role as the integrators and translators of strategy into the operational level. Of necessity they are practitioners of both forms of art. Their responsibility is to assist in the formulation of national security strategy and national military strategy as required, as well as to formulate a theater strategy to implement national policy and guidance. Theater strategy integrates concepts and courses of action to secure the aims of national or multinational strategy. It is the conceptual wellspring from which operational art flows in application. The CINC stands precisely at the critical junction where multiple levels of strategy are translated into operational designs for unified action that link tactical operations to strategic objectives.

In practice, CINCs and their staffs often deal directly with nonmilitary agencies involved in implementing the broader national security strategy. This requires the military professional to deal with all the instruments of national power as presented in a bewildering array of options, requirements, and constraints. These often represent competing interests in an interagency system or in a coalition as ad hoc in makeup as it is in command arrangements. In this complex political environment, military expertise and traditional command and leadership skills must be supplemented by a keen understanding of underlying political, military, and economic issues, peer leadership and consensus-building skills, and the ability to secure the cooperation of organizations and personalities beyond one's direct influence and control.

MASTERING STRATEGIC ART.

According to the definitions of strategic art thus far developed, strategic leadership—in the context of national security affairs—requires that senior leaders be able to skillfully formulate, coordinate, and apply ends, ways, and means at hand to promote and defend the national interests. This definitive relationship is shown at Figure 3.

Masters of the strategic art are those alone who can competently integrate and combine the three roles performed by the complete strategist: the *strategic leader, strategic practitioner, strategic theorist.* These roles, each with a distinctive set of skills, form the defining competencies of the person who is the master of the strategic art. These roles and skills, all quite complex, are depicted in Figure 4.[6] It will be seen that the three skill groupings overlap to some degree, but each is coherent and they are all mutually supportive. The competencies depicted in Figure 4 are developed by the master of the strategic art during the course of a lifetime of education, service, and experience:

- The *Strategic Leader* provides vision and focus, capitalizes on command and peer leadership skills, and inspires others to think and act.

- The *Strategic Practitioner* develops a deep understanding of all levels of war and strategy and their interrelationships, develops and executes strategic plans derived from interagency and joint guidance, employs force and other dimensions of military power, and unifies military and nonmilitary activities through command and peer leadership skills.



Figure 3.



Figure 4. Roles and Skills of the Master of the Strategic Art.

- The *Strategic Theorist* studies the history of warfare, develops strategic concepts and theories, integrates them with the elements of national power and with the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy, and teaches or mentors the strategic art. The distinction between a strategic theorist and a strategic leader is similar to the one psychologist Howard Gardner draws between direct and indirect leaders. Direct leaders influence others intentionally. Their major tools are messages, themes, concepts, or visions; their most important skill is effective communication. The audience of direct leaders is broad, and may include the nation as a whole. Indirect leaders affect others through their work—often theories or treatises.[7]

The three roles are shown here separately for the purposes of analysis, but the master strategist integrates and plays each role simultaneously as he executes his responsibilities. The senior leader exercises strategic leadership, most completely, when he is competent in each of the three roles. Often it is position or function that determines which of the three roles are dominant at any given time. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the service chiefs, for example, embody the role of the strategic leader, while a CINC, his staff, or a joint task force commander are more focused on the functions of the strategic practitioner. Commandants of the senior service colleges and high-level planners within the OCJCS and NSC place a high premium upon their facility as strategic theorists.

Mastery of the strategic art is not the same as so-called "strategic genius." True strategic genius—a transcendent ability to read the enemy state's center of gravity and then to devise the most effective and efficient combination of means for attacking or threatening that center of gravity—is probably too much to expect of any individual at the dawn of the 21st century, because the total spectrum of elements of national power has grown so astonishingly broad and complex.[8] The activity of the individual strategic prodigy as manifested in centuries past is today a corporate endeavor within governments. Realistically, the complex interagency structure of national security requires military leaders to develop complementary and overlapping expertise, as well as understanding that building organizations and developing strategies and plans reflecting all three competencies of strategic art are as important as striving for individual mastery. The trends that are likely to define the 21st century will demand strategic leaders who can integrate and synchronize organizations and policies simultaneously in all three areas.

Some skills are common to all three components of strategic art. For instance, all strategists must be able to think holistically, meshing the different instruments of national power and understanding the strengths and weaknesses of the various organizations and agencies involved in national security. They must also be able to think conceptually because strategy is distinguished from other activities by its expanded timeframe. Strategy deals with the relationship of the present to the future, with balancing short-term and long-term considerations. Conceptual thinking is the gateway to long-range planning. Finally, all strategists must be able to think normatively. Value judgments are the heart of strategy. Strategists must be able to decide not only what is attainable, but also what is preferable. This is always a difficult process. Military officers must constantly make normative choices, but at the tactical level these are simplified by formal guidance such as doctrine, SOPs, rules of engagement, the Code of Conduct, and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. At the

strategic level, many normative choices entail trade-offs. To promote democracy or promote stability? To feed starving Africans or rebuild American inner cities? And so on. This normative complexity places great demands on strategists. To succeed, they must build and constantly refine a coherent ethical framework. In the end, no strategist is stronger than his ethical foundation.[9]

Other groups of skills are particular to one or another of the three roles played by the master strategist. Acting primarily as strategic theorists and teachers, for instance, the masters of strategic art must have a full grasp of the political, military, economic, social, ethical, and cultural spirit of their time—what the Germans call *Zeitgeist.* They must be able to think in abstractions, to understand dilemmas, possibilities, and relationships that may not be obvious to casual observers. And, most of all, they must be creative, able to see beyond the limitations of the present, to sense new opportunities, and then to propose means to attain them. They must, in other words, inspire others to think about the future.

Acting as the strategic leader, the element of individual psychology is important. The master requires the ability to sense and compensate for his own weaknesses, to understand the strengths and weaknesses of others, and to craft symbiotic relationships among individuals to create an effective team.[10] No strategist is equally skilled in all dimensions of his craft but psychologically-aware leaders can overcome this. For example, George Marshall had, in General Shalikashvili's words, "a rare intuition, a nearly flawless inner sense for other men's strengths that allowed him to seek the spark of leadership in others, and when he saw that spark, to place such men into key assignments and then to fully support their efforts."[11]

In a more modern vein, the strategic foundation of the Gulf War victory arose from the blending of the diverse talents of George Bush, Dick Cheney, Colin Powell, and Norman Schwarzkopf. The ability to make a penetrating assessment of personal strengths and weaknesses of all the main players is thus a requisite skill for strategic leaders. But that is not all they need. Strategic leaders must have the same ability to inspire great efforts that leaders need at every level. Patton, for instance, "had an innate knack for inspiring soldiers to fight beyond all limits of their endurance.[12] Where strategic theorists and teachers must be able to inspire others to think, strategic leaders must be able to inspire others to think and act. Strategic leaders must not only be able to transcend old conceptual limitations themselves, but also encourage and empower others to do the same. Additionally, strategic leaders must be skilled at the fine art of focusing, for this allows them to prioritize, to distinguish the vital from the important, the important from the irrelevant, and the urgent from the routine. Finally, in modern strategy, leaders must be as skilled in peer leadership as in directing subordinates. This is a special talent never mastered by some officers who were outstanding at the tactical level. In strategy, then, there is a time to dictate, order, and demand, but also a time to persuade, cajole, and build consensus. Strategic leaders must understand the difference and know the time for each.

Acting in the capacity as strategic practitioners, the masters must be particularly strong in understanding cause-and-effect relationships and the orderly phasing of activities. They must have an astute grasp of the operational and tactical levels, including the relationship of military and nonmilitary activity in these venues. They must understand not only the

application of force, but also other methods of using military power such as psychological operations and nation assistance. And they must have impeccable communication skills. Where strategic leaders and strategic theorists and teachers seek to inspire and thus build their written and spoken communication for hortatory purposes, strategic practitioners translate inspiration into practical plans and attainable goals. Clarity as well as inspiration are the criteria by which they are measured. The master of the strategic art must be able to do it all.

One method of measuring success and failure in strategic art is to look at history for examples of both. A representative reading list would surely include great *theorists* (Thucydides, Sun Tzu, Clausewitz), *leaders* (Marshall, Eisenhower, Churchill), and *practitioners* (Patton, Rommel, Ridgway). The master of strategic art should be a student of history, studying the successful traits that these and other equally talented figures had in common. We must not, however, ignore failures, including some that may seem at first successful, but upon closer examination are not. Napoleon, for example, is often remembered as a master of strategic art—Martin Van Creveld has called him the most competent human being who ever lived. Examination of Napoleon's reputation for military genius, however, illuminates the boundaries between operational and strategic art. His genius lay primarily in his innovations in operational art—his brilliant campaigns and leadership on the battlefield.

When judging Napoleon's skills as a master of strategic art, we must keep in mind Clausewitz's warning that "the effects of genius show not so much in novel forms for action as in the ultimate success of the whole."[13] By this standard, which has even greater resonance today, Napoleon was a strategic failure whose legacy included the death of several million Frenchmen, the occupation of his country by three armies, the restoration of the monarchy, a century of British dominance, and his own exile.[14] Similarly, German brilliance at the tactical and operational levels on the battlefield in World War II did not prevent the virtual devastation of Germany and occupation by the allies. In spite of demonstrated operational genius, these are not records that aspiring masters of strategic art would seek to emulate.

Jomini's works provide another useful example in distinguishing operational from strategic art. Jomini's legacy lies in his effort to bring clarity and predictability to war by making operational art more scientific. His focus, however, ignores the larger political context for which wars are conducted. He reduces the problem of war to the professional and operational concerns of military commanders, thereby reinforcing the view that in war military objectives and authority should not be subordinated to political objectives and political authority.[15] This view is the antithesis of both strategy and strategic art as we will know and experience it in the 21st century. Two contemporary examples illustrate the complexity of reconciling all elements of national security strategy with military strategy and operations.

First, in the Gulf War, much of the hindsight criticism centers on the proposition that the American-led offensive was halted too soon. More of the retreating Iraqi army should have been destroyed, many commentators argue; others imply, or state outright, that we should have pressed on to Baghdad, killed or captured Saddam, and established a new, presumably democratic, government. Saddam's continued presence in power, this argument goes, serves

as a daily reminder that our policy failed, or, at the very least, that our victory was "hollow." It now appears that the offensive capability of Iraqi forces was not as completely destroyed as appears to have been militarily desirable. From a political perspective, however, the suspension of hostilities was timed about right, and every senior leader, military and civilian, concurred in the decision. Prolongation—even for a few hours—of what was increasingly seen by some, as a high-technology massacre of Muslims would not have been received well in hostile (or even friendly) Middle East capitals.

Whether the destruction of the Iraqi military could have proceeded much further without depriving Baghdad of the means of forcibly holding the country together after the cease-fire is a question that can never be definitively answered. What does seem clear is that it is in the interest of the United States to see Iraq survive as a regional power in the Gulf, particularly as a potential counterbalance to resurgent Iran. As ruthless and despicable as Saddam's crushing of the Shiite and Kurdish rebellions was, future stability in the Gulf is better served by an intact Iraq than by an Iraq splintered into Shiite, Sunnite, and Kurdish sectors.

American strategic leaders were confronted with forging and maintaining a fragile political coalition, the challenge of projecting a formidable military capability great distances, maintaining the political support of the American people, and leaving a credible regional balance of power in the region where Iran, more than Iraq, may be the major threat in the future. Balancing these elements of near and long-term strategy, the Bush administration enunciated four objectives: (1) unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait; (2) restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government; (3) safety of U.S. citizens in the area; and (4) reestablishment of stability and security in the Gulf. Four out of four is not bad strategic artistry.[16]

A second example is U.S. participation in multilateral peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, especially those inspired by ethnic conflict as in Bosnia.[17] In these conflicts, military leaders play a major role in the interagency decisionmaking process. Ideally, this process assesses U.S. interests and objectives against the risks and costs of intervention. The risks from military intervention in deeply rooted, and in some cases intractable, ethnic conflicts (often driven by emotional rather than material interests) are substantial. Economic and political incentives may neither satisfy nor deter the combatants. The risk of escalation is high, especially when ethnic combatants have kinsmen or patron states in the region. Escalation may also entail terrorism directed against the United States. Military objectives and centers of gravity in such conflicts are difficult to identify and difficult to attack, and may lie beyond imposed political constraints.

This last point lies at the heart of civil-military decisionmaking. Civilian leadership identifies the broad political objectives and acceptable levels of cost and risk. Military leadership is responsible for a military strategy to achieve political objectives. Reconciling the two requires a clear delineation of political constraints and an equally clear assessment of military objectives and centers of gravity that must be attacked to achieve both military and political objectives. If centers of gravity, the most vital military targets, lie beyond the political constraints imposed by the nation's leadership, military intervention is unlikely to succeed.

If external political, economic, or military support is a center of gravity (Serbia's support of Bosnian Serbs, for example), then regional escalation of a conflict must be contemplated. If land forces are the center of gravity, then the United States must tally the level of effort, including American casualties, required to defeat or destroy those forces. If local support for ethnic combatants is a center of gravity, then economic and other targets that are punitive to noncombatants must be considered.

The difficult reconciliation process between political or economic constraints on war and military objectives is vital to the formulation of effective military strategy if military force is to be the principal means for conflict termination. Reconciliation is equally important whether in war—situations in which military force is the principal means to achieve national objectives—or in operations other than war—situations in which military power is available but subordinate to political or economic power in conflict resolution. This process is strategic art in practice; its complexity requires both interagency coordination and expertise beyond one's organizational responsibilities.

HOW WILL STRATEGIC ART CHANGE?

As with many human skills, strategy combines immutable elements that remain constant across time with more fluid components that vary according to place and condition. The constants are defined by strategic culture.[18] For instance, 21st century American strategists—like their predecessors—will still need to minimize the human costs of applying power in pursuit of national interests, and to mobilize and sustain public support. Synchronizing the instruments of national power will also be a constant. Future strategists will continue to struggle with obstacles posed by the American strategic culture such as impatience, a tendency to seek economic and technological solutions to strategic problems, and difficulty understanding the perceptions, attitudes, and motives of others. And, most important, future strategists will continue to reflect core American values such as respect for the individual, reverence for basic civil and political rights, and the imperative to minimize violence whenever possible.

But within this framework of constants, future American strategists will be forced to cultivate some new skills or, at least, to place greater emphasis on some that were formerly less central. For instance, as stressed above, horizontal or peer leadership will become increasingly important. In the 21st century, strategy will almost always be interagency and multinational. Military strategists must thus be able to exercise peer and cross-cultural leadership as often as vertical or command leadership. The two require different skills. For horizontal leadership, a command personality and ability to impose the leader's will are less relevant than the ability to negotiate, persuade, and build consensus. Horizontal leadership will also place increased stress on the ability to communicate and understand cross-culturally (including cross-institutional cultures). Phrased differently, future strategists must have a sophisticated understanding of the psychology of cross-cultural leadership.

Given the rapidly accelerating rate of change that characterizes the modern era, 21st century strategists also will be required to build new task-oriented organizations in relatively

short periods. Innovativeness, conceptual thinking, a willingness to accept risk, the ability to exploit rapid and persistent change, openness to continuing education, and general mental flexibility will separate masters of strategic art from apprentices. Also needed is the ability to quickly and accurately assess the strengths and weaknesses of others, and to build balanced, complementary intra-team relationships. The complexity of 21st century strategy will demand strategic leaders who can build the right leadership *team* for a specific task within a rapidly evolving politicalmilitary environment.

Finally, facility in quick and accurate *information assessment will* become a central strategic skill. If the 21st century is to be the "information age," one of the foremost skills strategists must have is the ability to select and extract vital information from the great mass of useless information provided. Acquiring information will not be a problem. If anything, future strategic leaders will be overwhelmed with information, and winnowing out what is useful will be the challenge. Skill at this must be carefully and deliberately cultivated.

How, then, can 21st century strategists develop the complex skills their profession will demand? Until fairly recently, the process of mastering strategy was informal and often ad hoc. With the establishment of the service war colleges and the development of strategic studies as an academic discipline in the 20th century, efforts have been made to formalize and improve this process. These efforts must continue into the 21st century as the formal mechanisms for cultivating strategic skill are reassessed and modified.

Three trends are particularly important. One is improved *understanding of the adult learning process.* In the past, some candidate strategists were lucky enough to find a skilled mentor. Dwight Eisenhower, for instance, gained much of his initial grasp of strategy at the hand of Brigadier General Fox Conner.[19] There were probably those with promise of strategic skill who never found a mentor, and thus did not reach their full potential. Now with better institutional understanding of adult learning, few, if any, truly talented strategists should fall through the cracks. One challenge for the Army is honing its methods of identifying strategic skill. Currently, admission to the war colleges is based mostly on tactical level success, particularly in command. This may or may not be the best possible criterion, but it certainly warrants further study and debate.

A second trend is increased *utilization of technology.* Information technology can help strategists develop mentor and peer relationships; simulations technology can help strategists test their decisionmaking skills; and, computer technology can help them acquire and assess information. Anyone who aspires to master the strategic art must understand the challenges and opportunities afforded by technology.

A third important trend, pointing toward the need to learn from other disciplines and translate their accumulated wisdom into a form usable by strategists, is *expanding conceptual horizons.* From the business community, for instance, strategists can learn methods for assuring organizational flexibility and quality of product.[20] From psychologists and sociologists, strategists can develop sophisticated notions of how human societies function, allowing them to craft the most effective strategies possible for coercing enemy societies or repairing friendly ones. From cyberneticists, strategists can develop a better

understanding of information systems, thus maximizing the effectiveness of their own while eroding that of opponents. And from moral philosophers, strategists can come to a better understanding of the ethical choices that form the foundation of their efforts. The key is a continuous but critical "looking outward" to decide what wisdom from other disciplines is relevant for strategy and what parts are inapplicable.

Strategic skills are developed over the course of a career through formal and informal education and self-development, and additionally through professional experience. Senior service colleges have traditionally made their main contribution by offering curricula emphasizing the theoretical aspects of strategic art.[21] But theoretical education is only part of the process. If we accept the notion that strategic art is more something we do than something we *know,* it is natural that we should exercise it in the classroom in expectation that we can enhance students' application of strategic art beyond the classroom and increase their value as a resource to their individual service or agency and to the nation. This expectation for strategic preparation is consistent with the extensive past efforts dedicated to tactical and operational simulations, exercises, and wargames and our perception that praxis enhances real-world performance. The unfortunate fact is, however, that strategic wargarming emphasizing political, economic, and informational instruments of power has traditionally not been exercised in the classroom nearly so much as its tactical and operational counterparts.

The practice of the strategic art in the classroom has received less attention because, like strategy itself, it is quite difficult. Politico-military relationships and their many related factors are not nearly so neat or quantifiable, as are the operational and tactical issues so familiar to military leaders; as a result, these issues fall outside the individual's comfort zone and often end up in the "too hard" category. Moreover, many officers have relatively little exposure to the political and interagency processes at the highest levels of our own government, let alone the complex web of relationships among nations and alliances, although service, as a general officer almost always requires familiarity with the interagency and intergovernmental processes. As a result, the services' officer corps—and the Army's officer corps in particular—are far more comfortable and experienced with operational and tactical wargames and simulations. Thus, a very real challenge in exercising strategic art in the classroom is one of raising students' sights and exposing them to these higher-level processes before they actually have to deal with them in the real world.

The greatest challenge in providing practice in strategic art in the classroom is in creating a reasonably representative politico-military environment in which the players must operate. Beyond the lack of familiarity of many military officers with that environment, many other impediments have existed in the past. Realistic scenario development has always involved political sensitivities (signal sending) and risked giving offense to friends and allies, and provocation to enemies. This has led to the generation of artificial scenarios and geographic settings, often referred to as "synthetic theaters of war," for use in simulations. Also, it has often been difficult to obtain the participation of experienced key individuals from the national and international political arenas to replicate their roles in relatively low-level simulations. In such cases, simulations conducted by the military often resorted to the use of military personnel who lacked the requisite expertise, with the result that significant

distortion was introduced into the fabric of the simulations. Further, there is the tendency of many military officers, even in strategic simulations involving the interagency process and international and coalition-building issues, to focus nonetheless on lower-level issues more appropriate to operational and tactical simulations with which they are more familiar.

To overcome such problems, the Army War College's annual Strategic Crisis Exercise has been designed expressly to confront students with practice at all levels and in all components of strategic art.[22] Among the many lessons learned is that the information age challenges us to think beyond our traditional conception of the classroom—moving us towards the concept of a "virtual classroom" in which we can bring high-level experts, policymakers, and representatives of various player organizations into our exercises without their ever having to leave their offices. This capability greatly enhances the realism and dynamism of strategic, politico-military simulations.

The first Strategic Crisis Exercise confirmed our anticipation of the need for enhanced representation of various commands and non-Defense agencies, better representation of foreign nations—both friendly and hostile—and better portrayal of nongovernmental and private entities such as the Red Cross and various relief and humanitarian organizations. Also, it was evident that the student officers were more comfortable dealing with tactical and operational issues than the complex mix of political, economic, and military issues. One surprising development during the exercise was the underestimation of computer requirements for automated simulations. In the information age, "if you are not able to go on line at will, you virtually do not exist."

The various lessons learned from exercising strategic art in the classroom coalesce in the following conclusion: The combined revolutions in technology and global affairs have shattered traditional boundaries between levels of strategy and levels of war, merging them into a single integrated system that must be mastered by all strategic leaders, both military and civilian. Military leaders will be relied upon for their ability to fight and win the nation's wars. But it is equally important that they see, plan, and act with the knowledge that military art is but one component in a broad, dynamic strategy for national defense.

CONCLUSIONS.

The beginning of the Cold War marked the first time in American history that strategic leaders were forced to deal with the essential paradox of grand strategy faced by the Roman Empire and other great powers in the intervening centuries: *Sivis pacem, para bellum*—if you want peace, prepare for war. Good strategy does not recognize the concept of permanent victory. There are no such victories; there are only phase lines in a permanent struggle to promote and defend our national interests. At each phase line threats are defeated or recede; the international system reconfigures as old powers decline and new powers rise; and, at home, resources are redistributed in support of new priorities. Only the nation's interests remain relatively constant, requiring new strategies and competencies for their promotion and defense in new environments.

The foregoing realities persist for the United States in the post—Cold War transition period in which the National Security Strategy of global engagement and enlargement is supported by a National Military Strategy focused on regional contingencies and operations other than war. The key to the success of these strategies remains the creation of linkage among national ends, ways, and means. And what constitutes "credible" in terms of national security in the coming years will depend, as it always has in American history, on our ability to reconcile the often conflicting demands of domestic and international politics. This means, in turn, that civilian and military strategic leaders will face even greater challenges in this transition period in building a consensus among the American people with regard to the increasingly complex concept of national security.

Clausewitz was prescient on this issue. He did not discuss bureaucratic politics, interagency process, or the separation of power in a constitutional democracy. He did, nevertheless, clearly anticipate the necessity to achieve political consensus at home before victory in war was possible. Patience, perseverance, and endurance in the face of protracted conflict without prospects for clear and final victory are assuredly likelihoods for which the strategist and the public alike must prepare.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 15

1. Through the mid-1980s, Army doctrine and service instruction introduced and emphasized operational art for the employment of military forces to attain strategic objectives. Since 1986 (Goldwater-Nichols), joint and other service doctrine has rapidly emerged. Joint doctrine has been remarkably successful in integrating a wide range of ideas and concepts for the systematic conduct of war at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. However, national security strategy and military strategy are only briefly addressed. Treatment of the strategic responsibilities of the combatant or theater commanders is still maturing and not yet adequately developed as a coherent frame of reference. For the history of operational art in the U.S. Army see Richard M. Swain, "Filling the Void: The Operational Art and the U.S. Army," paper presented at Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston, Ontario, Canada, March 22—25, 1995.

2. Vice Admiral Jerry O. Tuttle, "Information Warfare," speech presented at OSD Information Wargame, Washington, DC, December 6, 1993.

3. Gregory D. Foster, "A Conceptual Foundation for a Theory of Strategy," *Washington Quarterly,* Winter 1990, p. 51.

4. Quoted in Elliot Cohen, "Churchill and Coalition Strategy in World War II," *Grand Strategies in War and Peace,* ed. Paul Kennedy, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991, p. 66.

5. The most succinct and applicable discussion of this concept is in Art Lykke, "Toward an Understanding of Military Strategy," in *Military Strategy. Theory and Application,* ed. Art Lykke, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1993, pp. 3-8.

6. Figure 4 is derived in part from LTC Ted Davis, "Potential Roles of Military Strategists," unpublished working paper, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, February 1995.

7. Howard Gardner, *Leading Minds: An Anatomy of Leadership,* New York: Basic Books, 1995, pp. 6-13.

8. For the possibilities of information war, see Mark Thompson, "If War Comes Home," *Time,* August 21 1995, p. 45.

9. This was the theme of Secretary of Defense William Perry in a speech, "The Ethical Use of Military Force," delivered at the U.S. Naval Academy, April 18, 1995, reproduced in U.S. Department of Defense, *Defense Issues, Vol. 10,* No. 49.

10. For elaboration of the concept of collective strategic genius, see Steven Metz, 'The Mark of Strategic Genius," *Parameters, Vol.* 21, No. 3, Autumn 1991, pp. 55-57.

11. John M. Shalikashvili, "The Three Pillars of Leadership," remarks at the George C. Marshall ROTC Award Seminar, Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, VA, April 12, 1995, reprinted in *Defense Issues*, Vol. 10, No. 42, p. 2.

12. Shalikashvili, p.

13. Clausewitz, *On War*, eds. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 177.

14. This critique of Napoleon is developed by Stephen M. Wait, "The Search for a Science of Strategy, A Review Essay," *International Security,* Summer 1987, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 142-143.

15. John Shy's conclusions in "Jomini," *Makers of Modern Strategy. From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age,* ed. Peter Paret, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986, pp. 161, 167.

16. In his biography, General Powell describes the decision to suspend hostilities in detail. He was strongly influenced by the strategic risks of fighting beyond the coalition's stated political objectives. See, *My American Journey,* Random House: New York, 1995, pp. 512-523. For a reasoned account of the "War Ended Too Soon" school, see Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor's The *General's War,* Little Brown and Company: New York, 1995, pp. 405-439.

17. This example is summarized from William A. Stofft and Gary L. Guertner's "Ethnic Conflict: The Perils of Military Intervention," *Parameters,* Vol. XXV, No. 1, Spring 1995, pp. 37-39.

18. See Frederick M. Downey and Steven Metz, "The American Political Culture and Strategic Planning, *Parameters,* Vol. 28, No. 3, September 1988, pp. 34-42.

19. Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower, Volume One: Soldier, General of the Army, President-Elect, 1890-1952,* New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983, pp. 76-78; and David Eisenhower, *Eisenhower. At War, 1943-1945,* New York: Vintage, 1987, p. 62.

20. Examples of this include General Gordon R. Sullivan's "Business Outreach Program" administered by the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute.

21. In addition, of course, to opening paths to continuing education and self-development. The information revolution makes it possible for senior service colleges to stay in direct contact with graduates, providing information, studies, and new developments appropriate for and relevant to their post-war college assignments.

22. In March 1995, the Army War College undertook an effort to exercise strategic art in the classroom with its first College-wide Strategic Crisis Exercise (SCE). The SCE involved the entire U.S. student body and faculty and numerous players from outside the College in a 2-week exercise involving six near-simultaneous crises set in the year 2005. Scenarios ranged from a Western Hemisphere disaster relief effort, through several minor crises involving the deployment of military forces to various world regions, to a major regional conflict in North Africa. Throughout the exercise, the players were challenged to examine U.S. interests in each region, consider the full range and implications of political, economic, and military options, and, where appropriate, develop a campaign plan for the employment of military forces. Student players, assigned to one of four groups playing the same scenario and crises, played roles including the National Security Advisor, the CJCS, the Joint Staff,

Service Chiefs, and Specialized and Unified Commanders. They were forced to formulate, defend, and execute their recommendations under the scrutiny of the interagency process, the press, and congressional oversight.