d. **Emergency Preparedness.** EP is considered a part of DOD’s overall preparedness activities. It spans HD, CS, and HS and includes DOD’s lead, support, and enabling functions. Mobile command centers and DOD aviation support to the US Secret Service are just two examples of how DOD prepares for and supports EP operations.

*For further information on the overarching Homeland Security framework, see JP 3-26, Homeland Security.*

### 3. The Civil Support Operational Framework

a. The DOD organizational construct to support the HS mission, through its warfighting and CS missions, is characterized by: prepare, detect, deter, prevent, defend, respond and recover. While DOD’s CS focus is on preparation and response, DOD may provide critical support to US civil authorities in all areas of this framework. The following paragraphs address the CS focus under the HS framework.

1. **Prepare.** DOD prepares to respond across a range of activities by developing, sustaining, and improving operational capabilities to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from domestic
incidents, whether HD, HS, or CS. It is a continuous process to identify threats, determine vulnerabilities, and identify required resources.

(2) **Detect.** Although DOD does maintain a statutory responsibility under Title 10 US Code (USC), Section 124 to serve as the lead agency of the USG for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States, DOD supports civil authorities in the detection of all transnational threats desiring entry to the homeland by land, maritime, or air conveyance. DOD routinely supports federal LEAs’ efforts to detect transnational threats on all borders using unique military capabilities. However, a federal LEA will always be the primary agency for efforts to detect transnational threats along the borders.

(3) **Deter.** DOD may support civil authorities’ efforts to deter threats to the homeland. Overt support to DHS or other federal and state LEAs may have a deliberate or inadvertent deterrence effect. DOD conducts missions in support of, and at the request of, LEAs to deter threats along the borders and within the homeland. The mere presence of DOD assets operating in support of law enforcement along the borders or in the airspace adjacent to our public lands can deter transnational threat actors such as foreign terrorist organizations, drug trafficking organizations, and alien smuggling organizations from attempting entry into the United States or from pursuing illegal cultivation or processing of narcotics on our public lands. Even the presence of DOD engineers on the southwest border — whose principal engineering support task might be to construct roads or bridges to enhance LEA mobility on the border — can deter illegal trafficking in that area.

(4) **Prevent.** In certain cases DOD performs CS to assist LEAs to prevent threats to the homeland. Ideally, this will occur as far forward as possible, prior to any threat reaching the homeland. An example in the Commander, US Northern Command’s (CDRUSNORTHCOM’s) area of responsibility (AOR) is DOD’s support to LEAs as members of the US country teams in Mexico and Canada. Primarily through intelligence analytical support, DOD is assisting supported LEA by detecting threats, which can then be prevented through interdiction by US and partner nation law enforcement and/or military assets. DOD also supports civil authorities’ efforts to prevent threats by providing similar analytical support to key law enforcement centers within the continental US (CONUS) such as the joint terrorism task forces, field intelligence groups, and high intensity drug trafficking areas headquarters. The Civil Air Patrol (CAP) (as Air Force Auxiliary) assists the US Customs Service, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the US Forest Service in their counterdrug (CD) efforts by flying air reconnaissance and providing transportation and communications support.

(5) **Defend.** Both passive and active actions may be taken to weaken or stop a threat. Passive actions may include creating barriers, obstacles, or hardened sites. Active measures would be shorter-range, close or immediate in time. Defend also includes individual, crew, and facility protective measures to block out damage from an incident, to include taking medicines and antidotes promptly upon being attacked.

(6) **Respond and Recover.** Response, as it relates to CS activities, is the ability to rapidly and effectively support civil authorities in providing appropriate support to LEAs, and assistance in managing the consequences of disasters and catastrophes, including natural, man-made, or terrorist incidents. DOD provides CS as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense (SecDef) to provide
support to civil authorities. DOD provides CS in order to reduce suffering, save lives, prevent or mitigate the destruction of property, manage the consequences of an attack or a disaster, or prevent terrorist incidents by supporting law enforcement. Civil authorities are more likely to request DOD support when civilian response capabilities are overwhelmed or exhausted, or when DOD’s unique capabilities and operations can offer an essential, decisive, time-critical contribution in order to achieve the USG’s desired outcome to threat or incident.

b. Although the leads for HD (DOD) and CS (e.g., DHS and DOJ) are different, the distinction between the two operational activities may not easily be defined or discerned. There may be cases where HD and CS events take place concurrently, or the main threat and therefore the agency lead, transitions from one agency to the other. Therefore, the need to establish workable and effective interagency relationships and partnerships, in advance of a crisis or contingency, is critical. For example, DOD may support DHS activities in the maritime domain, requiring continuous coordination between department-level, operational, and tactical organizations conducting operations. The MOTR Plan acts to mitigate overlap issues between HD and HS activities by providing a method for interagency integration. To fully develop and verify such relationships and partnerships, an active interagency coordination program, backed-up by annual joint and interagency exercises or operations, is required.


a. National Response Plan. The National Response Plan (NRP) was a result of HSPD-5: a single, comprehensive approach to domestic incident management built on the template of National Incident Management System (NIMS) (see below). The NRP is an all-hazards plan that provides the structure and mechanisms for national-level policy and operational direction for incident management to ensure timely and effective federal support. The NRP is applicable to all federal departments and agencies that have primary jurisdiction for or participate in operations requiring coordinated federal response. The NRP identifies how federal departments and agencies will respond to state, tribal, and/or local requests for assistance (RFAs). The NRP and the NIMS are designed to improve the Nation’s incident management capabilities and overall efficiency. During incidents of national significance or other incidents requiring significant federal support, the NRP (based on the NIMS) works to integrate the capabilities and resources of various governmental jurisdictions, incident management and emergency response disciplines, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the private sector into a cohesive, coordinated, and seamless national framework for incident management. A basic premise of both the NIMS and the NRP is that incidents are generally handled at the lowest jurisdictional level possible. In the vast majority of incidents, local resources and local mutual aid will provide the first line of emergency response and incident management.

(1) The NRP provides the framework for most, but not all DOD support to civil authorities and describes the policies, planning assumptions, concept of operations, response and recovery actions, and responsibilities for 31 federal departments and agencies, and the American Red Cross (ARC). DHS is the executive agent for the NRP coordination, management and maintenance. The NRP is
(3) When both local and state resources and capabilities are overwhelmed, governors may request federal assistance; however, the NIMS is designed so that local jurisdictional authorities retain command, control, and authority over response. Adhering to the NIMS will allow local agencies to better utilize incoming coordinated resources.

A detailed discussion of the NRP and NIMS is contained in Appendix D, “Overview of the National Response Plan and National Incident Management System.”

5. Incident Management

The definition of the term “incident,” as used in this publication, is provided below:

**INCIDENT**

“An occurrence, caused by either human action or natural phenomena, that requires action to prevent or minimize loss of life or damage to property and/or natural resources.”

**SOURCE:** Department of Homeland Security Lexicon
September 13, 2006

a. Responsibilities

(1) The Federal government provides assistance when requested. When situations are beyond the capability of the state, the governor requests federal assistance from the President. The President may also direct the Federal government to provide supplemental assistance to state and local governments to alleviate the suffering and damage resulting from disasters or emergencies. One of the key objectives of the Department of Defense Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support is to support civil authorities in minimizing the damage and recovering from domestic chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive (CBRNE) mass casualty attacks. The strategy affirms DOD’s primary responsibility for protecting the US homeland from attack, and establishes that the second priority is to support civil authorities in minimizing the damage and recovering from domestic CBRNE mass casualty attacks.

(2) Emergencies, disasters, and terrorist attacks may be of national importance, but they always occur locally. The initial response to such circumstances is by citizens and nongovernmental entities, local authorities, and state governments. Law enforcement entities have critical authorities and responsibilities concerning potential and actual terrorist attacks and incidents. As affirmed and clarified by The Homeland Security Act of 2002: primary responsibility for investigating and prosecuting acts of terrorism shall be vested not in DHS, but rather in federal, state, and local LEAs with jurisdiction over the acts in question. At the federal level, the principal law enforcement investigation and prosecution agency is the DOJ.

(3) Incidents are managed at the lowest level possible. Federal support is provided in response to requests from state or local officials through the state coordinating officer (SCO) to the federal coordinating officer (FCO). The FCO coordinates for DOD support through the defense coordinating
officer (DCO). DOD may provide support to DHS which has the lead in managing the federal response to a domestic incident. Domestically, DHS has responsibility for overall incident management and the NRP provides the framework for federal interaction with state, local, and tribal governments; the private sector; and NGOs in the context of domestic incident prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery activities. DOD support to this response will be initiated through a formal RFA or mission assignment process.

b. **Requests for Assistance.** Initial requests for assistance are made to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Executive Secretariat. If approved by the SecDef, DOD designates a supported combatant commander (CCDR) for the response. The supported CCDR determines the appropriate level of command and control for each response and usually directs a senior military officer to deploy to the incident site. The DCO serves as DOD’s single point of contact in the joint field office (JFO). Requests will be coordinated and processed through the DCO with the exception of requests for United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) support, National Guard (NG) forces operating in state active duty or Title 32 USC status (i.e., not in federal service), or, in some circumstances, DOD forces in support of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

c. **Crisis and Consequence Management.** The HSPD-5 and the NRP adopt the concept of incident management as including both consequence management (CM) and crisis management (CrM), while DOD continues to categorize CS operations using these two terms. The application of CrM and CM is unique and separate in the context of planning and conducting military operations. Non-DOD actors, including local civil authorities and first responders, are generally not familiar with US military terms, definitions, and doctrine. When working with non-DOD actors/partners, especially in an emergency situation, clear, effective, and mutually understandable communication is essential. DOD elements will be able to work much more seamlessly, efficiently, and productively by employing operational concepts and terms that other departments, agencies, and authorities already understand. The main sources of these concepts and language include the NRP, NIMS, and other federal and national standards.

1. CrM is predominantly a law enforcement response, normally executed under federal law. DHS is responsible for preventing terrorist attacks, reducing the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism, minimizing the damage, and assisting in the recovery, from terrorist attacks.

2. The NRP defines CM as an emergency management function which includes measures to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of terrorism.

3. Historically, much of DOD’s CS mission set has involved CM operations. This is due to legal restrictions which generally preclude DOD from participating in CrM law enforcement investigations and operations. The Space Shuttle disaster which involved a single Service task force (TF), and Hurricane Katrina which involved a large joint task force (JTF) were both DOD CM operations in support of another agency. In a catastrophic situation, if significant DOD forces are requested, DOD would likely provide a JTF or multiple JTFs, which command and control (C2) Title 10 USC forces that are conducting CS operations in support of civil authorities.
“Although the national response to Hurricane Katrina was the largest of its kind in US history, the delay of several days in providing large scale assistance to New Orleans — and the initial absence of a unified strategy for dealing with the disaster — contributed to the suffering of the people left in the city and caused considerable anguish throughout the country. When a catastrophic event occurs, the effort required of policemen, firemen, emergency management workers, and other first responders skyrockets. However, at the point of impact these first responders often become victims or lose the capability to effectively respond.”

1. General

   a. Introducing federal forces into an otherwise civil response situation requires a clear understanding of authorities and their limits. Because the public, media, and perhaps local and state officials, may not clearly understand Constitutional limits, expectations must be managed and communicated. This distinction is especially important because both federal and NG forces wear the same uniform. Military units tasked to support civil authorities during domestic disasters enable rapid and effective response operations that limit loss of life, mitigate suffering, and curtail further significant property damage. The challenge remains integrating military and civil capabilities within a disaster stricken operating environment with little intact infrastructure while urgently and efficiently executing relief operations.

   b. Authority over and control of DOD forces/capabilities shall be maintained by the President, as Commander in Chief, through the SecDef and the chain of command as established by law.

   c. When emergency conditions dictate, and when time does not permit approval from higher headquarters, local military commanders and responsible DOD component officials are authorized to respond to requests from local authorities and to initiate immediate response actions to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage under imminently serious conditions. Higher headquarters must be informed promptly.

   d. DOD resources are normally used only when state and local resources are overwhelmed and/or non-DOD resources of the Federal government are insufficient or unable to meet the requirements of local and state civil authorities.

   e. All DOD actions shall be performed consistent with the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) (Title 18 USC, Section 1385), the Enforcement of the Laws to Restore Public Order (Title 10 USC, Chapter
2. Requests for Assistance

   a. **General.** Requests for DOD assistance may occur under Stafford Act or non-Stafford Act conditions. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Public Law 93-288) (Title 42 USC, Section 5121), authorizes the Federal government to help state and local governments alleviate the suffering and damage caused by disasters. A non-Stafford Act incident is essentially all of the other emergencies that occur each year and do not necessarily overwhelm state and local authorities. However, the NRP recognizes that state and local governments experiencing a non-Stafford Act event would benefit from federal assistance and coordination. For instance, while Hurricane Katrina was an incident of national significance, an accidental airline crash may not be an incident of national significance. However, an airline crash may create circumstances for which state and local authorities may benefit from the use of federal resources.

      (1) At the regional level, interagency resource coordination and multiagency incident support are provided by the regional response coordination center (RRCC). The RRCC coordinates regional response efforts, establishes federal priorities, and implements local federal program support until a JFO is established.

      (2) The Secretary of Homeland Security is responsible for overall coordination of Federal Stafford and non-Stafford incident management activities. An FCO is appointed to manage and coordinate federal resource support activities related to Stafford Act disasters and emergencies.

      (3) When requested, DOD normally will deploy a regionally-assigned DCO to the JFO in order to assist the FCO in coordinating DOD support, as required. A defense coordinating element (DCE) consisting of appropriate staff elements and military liaison officers (LNOs) may also be requested to assist the DCO in facilitating and coordinating potential DOD support.

   b. **Stafford Act Assistance.** A Stafford Act incident is one in which state and local authorities declare a state of emergency and request federal assistance. This type of emergency is an incident of national significance for which the Stafford Act establishes programs and processes for the Federal government to provide major disaster and emergency assistance to states, local governments, tribal nations, individuals, and qualified private nonprofit organizations.

      (1) The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act authorizes the Federal government to establish programs and processes for the Federal government to provide major disaster and emergency assistance to states, local governments, tribal nations, individuals, and qualified private nonprofit organizations.

      (2) In some circumstances, Stafford Act requests may originate from the state emergency operations center (EOC), FEMA RRCC, or the FEMA NRCC and pass directly to the Joint Director of Military Support (JDOMS) or the DOD Office of the Executive Secretary, rather than routing though a DCO. These RFAs are processed the same as non-Stafford Act requests, with JDOMS and the
operational headquarters conducting parallel coordination and providing a recommendation to Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs (ASD(HD&ASA)) and the SecDef for approval or disapproval. In all these cases, the supported CCDR and the affected DCO must be notified to limit redundant coordination of resources.

c. **Non-Stafford Act Assistance.** A non-Stafford Act incident is essentially all of the other emergencies that occur each year and do not necessarily overwhelm state and local authorities, and where the event would benefit from federal assistance and coordination.

   (1) In non-Stafford Act situations, a federal department or agency acting under its own authority may request the assistance of the Secretary of Homeland Security to obtain support from other federal departments and agencies. DHS may designate a federal resource coordinator (FRC). Support in those situations may be requested and reimbursed under the authority of the Economy Act. DHS may establish a JFO for “federal-to-federal” support when an incident is managed by one or more federal agencies. The Secretary of Homeland Security is represented by the PFO and/or the FCO. The PFO/FCO is normally positioned at and coordinates through the JFO.

   (2) In non-Stafford Act requests, the RFAs are processed with JDOMS and the operational headquarters conducting parallel coordination and providing a recommendation to ASD(HD&ASA) and the SecDef for approval or disapproval. In all these cases, the supported CCDR and the affected DCO must be notified to limit redundant coordination of resources.

d. **Request for Assistance Process.** Federal agencies or state governors request DOD capabilities to support their emergency response efforts by using a formal RFA process. How DOD handles RFAs depends on various factors, such as: Stafford or non-Stafford Act situation, urgency of the incident, establishment of a JFO, if a DCO or JTF has been appointed, and originator of the request (incident command, state, regional, or national). It is important to note that not all CS is provided via the RFA process. Other processes for obtaining and/or providing support are covered in more detail in Chapter III, “Operations.”

   (1) Civil authorities may request other CS activities in writing through various means established by the appropriate DOD policy documents. For example, support for military fly-overs may be requested using DD Form 2535 as described in DODD 5410.18, *Public Affairs Community Relations Policy*.

   (2) In general, the RFA process is conducted as shown in Figure II-1. The FCO at the incident site receives RFAs from civil authorities and submits them to the Office of the Executive Secretary of the Department of Defense, who forwards them to the ASD(HD&ASA) and to the JDOMS for validation and order processing, respectively. When a DCO is at the incident site, RFAs are submitted directly to ASD(HD&ASA). Once the SecDef approves the request, an order is issued to combatant commands, Services, and/or agencies to accomplish the mission. The decision process differs significantly for approving Stafford and non-Stafford RFAs (see Figure II-2). Requests are validated at all levels within the chain of command. JDOMS prepares an order and coordinates with necessary force providers, legal counsel, and ASD(HD&ASA) to ensure asset deconfliction and recommendation concurrence. DOD evaluates all requests by US civil authorities for military assistance against six established criteria, including:
Figure II-1. Request for Assistance

(a) Legality. Is the support in compliance with laws, Presidential directives?

(b) Lethality. Is use of lethal force by or against DOD personnel likely or expected?

(c) Risk. Safety of DOD forces. Can the request be met safely, or can concerns be mitigated by equipment or training?

(d) Cost. Who pays, and what is the impact on DOD budget?

(e) Appropriateness. Is the requested mission in the interest of DOD to conduct? Who normally performs and is best suited to fill the request?

(f) Readiness. What is the impact on DOD’s ability to perform its primary mission?
(3) The DCO and supporting DCE assigned to the FEMA regional office may function as part of the RRCC or the JFO (when established). Upon receipt of the RFA, the DCO evaluates the request to determine if it meets DOD’s screening criteria using the same criteria shown above.

Figure II-2. Request for Assistance Process Decision Matrix
(4) The DCO should ensure the RFA is readily understandable and clearly describes the requirement and necessary support. Agencies should not make requests for specific capabilities, as they may not be available within DOD at the time and a similar capability may be able to satisfactorily provide the requested support. If the RFA does request a specific capability, the DCO, with the support of the DCE, should coordinate with the requesting agency and recommend appropriate language to fulfill the request on a timely basis. If the DCO determines the RFA does not meet the evaluation criteria or is unable to support the request, the RFA should be returned to the requesting agency with an explanation as to why it is not being supported.

(5) After the DCO validates the RFA, a copy of the RFA is forwarded to the supported headquarters’ operations center along with a recommendation for action if the requested support has been previously approved, or, to be forwarded to the JDOMS and ASD(HD&ASA) for assessment and approval/disapproval. This recommendation is also provided to the FCO who will ultimately decide if the request must be forwarded to the RRCC and NRCC, as required.

(6) The DCO and DCE will coordinate with the NG joint force headquarters (JFHQ) or state JTF headquarters element and federal military operational headquarters (JTF, contingency support group, operational command post, joint force commander [JFC], etc.), supporting the response effort to determine if non-federalized and federal military forces already deployed are capable and available to provide the assistance requested. The requested support should be within the scope of the original mission statement, as well as cost allocations. Upon validation and if approved by SecDef, if forces are available, and the RFA is going to be approved, they may be directed to immediately provide the requested support while the RFA is being processed through the operational headquarters to JDOMS. Normally JDOMS will coordinate the RFA with the supported combatant command, supporting combatant commands, Military Departments and applicable combat support agencies. Once coordination is complete, JDOMS sends the RFA to ASD(HD&ASA) where it undergoes a final review and, if recommended, the action is coordinated with the National Guard Bureau (NGB) to ensure that there is no duplication of effort between them and the Active Component (AC). The ASD(HD&ASA) then passes the RFA to the SecDef for decision (a separate execute order (EXORD) will not be issued for this).

(7) In some circumstances, Stafford Act requests may originate from the state emergency operations center (EOC), FEMA RRCC, or the FEMA NRCC and pass directly to the JDOMS or the DOD Office of the Executive Secretary, rather than routing though a DCO. These RFAs are processed the same as non-Stafford Act requests, with JDOMS and the operational headquarters conducting parallel coordination and providing a recommendation to ASD(HD&ASA) and the SecDef for approval or disapproval. In all these cases, the supported CCDR and the affected DCO must be notified to limit redundant coordination of resources.

(8) Upon SecDef approval, the JDOMS releases an EXORD to designate supported and supporting CCDRs, and to task force providers to provide the necessary support.

(9) The operational headquarters will provide a supporting operation order (OPORD), implementing a concept plan (CONPLAN), if available, and establish command relationships to provide task, purpose, and coordinating instructions to the supporting force.
(10) Since CS missions may involve lifesaving responses, this process will be rapidly executed to expedite the prompt movement of forces and support. DOD cannot provide support without SecDef approval of an official request from state or federal agency or direction from the President, or unless specifically authorized in existing policy or regulation.

(11) If a disaster is of such proportions to generate mass casualties in need of evacuation, DOD supports the primary agency(ies) for this function under the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) (once the NDMS has been activated and an official request for patient evacuation has been submitted by proper state authorities).

(12) The CCDRs responsible for CS (CDRUSNORTHCOM; Commander, US Pacific Command [CDRUSPACOM]; and Commander, US Southern Command [CDRUSOUTHCOM]) incorporate plans for CS by task organizing their commands to accomplish CS missions as well as other assigned missions. DOD is a signatory to numerous response plans as well as various memoranda of understanding and memoranda of agreement with other agencies; therefore, DOD may play a critical role in CS and may be relied upon by many agencies.

(13) The response measures taken by DOD will be in accordance with (IAW) the unmet demands of the incident, its capabilities, current laws, Presidential directives, executive orders (EOs), and DOD policies, directives, and orders.

3. Immediate Response

a. Under imminently serious conditions, when time does not permit approval from higher headquarters, any local military commander, or responsible officials of other DOD components may, subject to any supplemental direction provided by their higher headquarters, and in response to a request from civil authorities, provide immediate response to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage.

b. In the case of a requirement for an immediate federal response to a serious situation in the maritime domain, the MOTR plan allows rapid response to short-notice threats and directs interagency partners to begin coordination activities (MOTR conference calls) at the earliest possible opportunity. It also provides guidance in predesignating federal agencies with lead responsibilities, clarifying interagency roles and responsibilities, and establishing protocols and procedures that are utilized for a coordinated response to achieve the USG’s desired outcome. MOTR lead and supporting roles are developed from the following criteria:

(1) USG desired outcome.

(2) Agency authorities.

(3) Agency capabilities.

(4) Agency capacities.
(5) Magnitude of the threat.

c. Immediate response is situation-specific and may or may not be associated with a declared or undeclared disaster, civil emergency, or attack.

d. While civilian authorities are marshalling the necessary relief assets to respond to the emergency, the local military commander, who is ready and capable of rapidly responding on a no-notice basis, can immediately begin the relief effort following receipt of a RFA. This participation should be of a short duration, lasting only until sufficient local and state assets arrive on the scene and assume control. Consequently, immediate response authority is not a blanket authority to provide unlimited military assistance any time and any where for any length of time.

e. As soon as practical, the military commander, or responsible official of a DOD component or agency rendering such assistance, shall report the request, the nature of the response, and any other pertinent information through the chain of command to the National Military Command Center.

4. Roles and Responsibilities

a. The Department of Defense. Principal and supporting DOD participants involved in the execution of CS missions may include SecDef; ASD(HD&ASA); Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (ASD[HA]); Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (ASD[RA]); Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS); CDRUSNORTHCOM; CDRUSPACOM; Commander, US Special Operations Command (CDRUSSOCOM); Commander, US Strategic Command (CDRUSSTRATCOM); Commander, US Transportation Command (CDRUSTRANSCOM); and Commander, US Joint Forces Command (CDRUSJFCOM).

   (1) Secretary of Defense. SecDef has overall authority for DOD and is the President’s principal advisor on military matters concerning CS. SecDef retains approval authority for the use of forces, personnel, units, and equipment. SecDef has the primary responsibility within DOD to provide the overall policy and oversight for CS in the event of a domestic incident. SecDef retains sole authority to waive reimbursement for DOD assets.

   (2) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs. ASD(HD&ASA) serves as the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on CS matters. ASD(HD&ASA) coordinates all CS mission matters with other executive departments and federal agencies. ASD(HD&ASA) ensures that DOD strategy is consistent with and fully supports the National Strategy for Homeland Security effort. ASD(HD&ASA) assists SecDef in providing guidance (through the Joint Staff) to CCDRs for supporting civilian LEAs and conducting coordination with DHS.

   (3) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs. ASD[HA] is a critical component in the Services’ activation of the federal coordinating centers (FCCs). FCCs are DOD and Veterans
Affairs medical facilities responsible for locating civilian medical facilities willing to provide disaster support in their geographic location. They are also responsible for arranging the reception and staging of arriving patients, followed by their distribution to those supporting facilities.

(4) **Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.** ASD(RA) is responsible for monitoring Reserve Component (RC) readiness. ASD(RA) provides policy regarding the appropriate integration of RC forces into CS response efforts.

(5) **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.** CJCS has numerous responsibilities relating to CS. These include advising the President and SecDef on operational policies, responsibilities, and programs; assisting SecDef in implementing operational responses; and translating SecDef guidance into OPORDs to provide assistance to the federal agency with lead responsibility. CJCS ensures that CS plans and operations are compatible with other military plans. Within the CS mission, CJCS serves as the principal military advisor to the President and SecDef in preparing for and responding to CBRNE incidents, ensures that military planning is accomplished to support the federal agency with lead responsibility for CrM and CM, and provides strategic guidance to the CCDRs for the conduct of CD operations. CJCS also assists CCDRs in meeting their operational requirements for providing CS that has been approved by SecDef.

(6) **CDRUSNORTHCOM** is responsible for conducting CS operations (including CM operations) IAW US laws within the established AOR. CDRUSNORTHCOM is also responsible for the creation and maintenance of plans to provide CS, as directed. Within the US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) AOR, CDRUSNORTHCOM is the DOD designated planning agent and the supported commander for CS missions. USNORTHCOM organizes and executes its missions through assigned Service components, designated functional components, and subordinate standing JTFs.

(a) **Standing Joint Force Headquarters North (SJFHQ-N).** A standing joint force headquarters is a full-time joint C2 element within USNORTHCOM’s headquarters. It provides the commander with a trained and equipped standing joint C2 capability specifically organized to conduct planning and develop enhanced situational understanding in support of CS operations in the USNORTHCOM AOR. When directed by SecDef to conduct a CS mission, CDRUSNORTHCOM can deploy SJFHQ-N to enable the rapid stand-up of a JTF headquarters.

(b) **Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS).** JTF-CS is a standing JTF assigned to CDRUSNORTHCOM dedicated to planning and integrating DOD domestic CBRNE consequence management support for incidents or accidents. When directed by SecDef, CDRUSNORTHCOM deploys JTF-CS as a CBRNE CM headquarters to establish C2 of designated DOD forces at the CBRNE incident site and to provide CS to save lives, prevent injury, and provide temporary critical life support. If the CBRNE event occurs outside the USNORTHCOM AOR, JTF-CS may be attached to CDRUSPACOM or CDRUSSOUTHCOM to provide domestic CBRNE support.

(c) **Joint Task Force North (JTF-N).** As directed, JTF-N employs military capabilities to support LEAs and supports interagency synchronization within the USNORTHCOM AOR in order to deter and prevent transnational threats to the homeland.
(d) **Joint Force Headquarters National Capital Region (JFHQ-NCR).** JFHQ-NCR plans, coordinates, and maintains situational awareness, and as directed, employs forces for HD and CS in the National Capital Region’s (NCR’s) operational area to safeguard the Nation’s capital.

(e) **Joint Task Force Alaska (JTF-AK).** JTF-AK is comprised of forces from Alaskan Command, a subunified command of US Pacific Command (USPACOM), and is under the operational control (OPCON) of USNORTHCOM for HD and CS missions to assist federal, state, local, and tribal authorities within the Alaska joint operations area (JOA).

(f) **US Army North (ARNORTH) JTFs.** ARNORTH, the Army Service component command of US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), has two deployable TFs and dual JTF capability. The TF/JTFs have the mission to deploy anywhere in the USNORTHCOM AOR for C2 of Title 10 USC forces in HD and CS missions. Commander, ARNORTH and Commander, US Marine Forces North have the mission to serve as a joint force land component commander for USNORTHCOM.

(7) **Commander, US Pacific Command.** CDRUSPACOM is responsible for CS within the USPACOM AOR, and is also responsible for the development and maintenance of plans to provide CS within the assigned AOR. CDRUSPACOM organizes and executes its missions through Joint Task Force Homeland Defense (JTF-HD), assigned Service components, and designated functional components. JTF-HD is a standing JTF, established by USPACOM, which synchronizes, plans, and executes CS missions within the domestic portion of USPACOM AOR.

(8) **Commander, US Southern Command.** CDRUSSOUTHCOM provides CS within the AOR to include Puerto Rico and US Virgin Islands. However, CDRUSNORTHCOM will provide defense support of civil authorities for Puerto Rico and US Virgin Islands.

(9) **Commander, US Strategic Command.** CDRUSSTRATCOM is responsible for planning, integrating, and coordinating intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support of strategic and global operations. CDRUSSTRATCOM is also responsible for integrating and synchronizing DOD-wide efforts in support of the combating weapons of mass destruction (WMD) mission. CDRUSSTRATCOM also serves as the supporting commander to USNORTHCOM, USPACOM, and US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) for CS missions within their AORs.

(10) **Commander, US Special Operations Command.** CDRUSSOCOM serves as a supporting commander to CDRUSNORTHCOM, CDRUSPACOM, and CDRUSSOUTHCOM within their respective AORs when requirements exceed a CCDR’s forces’ capabilities and additional special operations forces expertise is needed. When directed by the President or SecDef, CDRUSSOCOM conducts special operations and provides special operations forces as required in support of CS operations. CDRUSSOCOM may also provide LNOs and other assistance to the supported CCDRs as required.
(11) **Commander, US Transportation Command.** CDRUSTRANSCOM is responsible for providing transportation and common-user port management for the DOD as well as non-DOD agencies upon request. United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) coordinates the efforts of its three subordinate transportation component commands (Air Mobility Command, Military Sealift Command, and Surface Deployment and Distribution Command) with the supported and supporting combatant commands. The integration of the intertheater and intratheater movement control systems is the shared responsibility of USTRANSCOM and the supported combatant command.

(12) **Commander, US Joint Forces Command.** CDRUSJFCOM’s role in CS is to provide support to other combatant commands as the joint force provider, joint force integrator, and joint force trainer.

(13) **US Army Corps of Engineers.** USACE conducts its emergency response activities under two basic authorities: the Flood Control and Coastal Emergency Act and the Stafford Disaster and Emergency Assistance Act. Under the Flood Control and Coastal Emergency Act, USACE provides disaster preparedness services and advanced planning measures designed to reduce the amount of damage caused by an impending disaster. Under the Stafford Act, USACE supports DHS/FEMA in executing the NRP, which calls on 30 federal departments and agencies to provide coordinated disaster relief and recovery operations. Emergency responses usually involve cooperation with other federal agencies in support of state and local efforts. Within the NRP, DOD designated USACE as the primary agency for planning, preparedness, and response under the ESF #3, “Public Works and Engineering.” ESF #3 provides lifesaving or life protecting assistance to augment efforts of the affected state(s) and local response efforts following a major or catastrophic disaster. Public works and engineering support includes technical advice and evaluations, engineering services, construction management and inspection, emergency contracting, provision of emergency power, emergency repair of wastewater and solid waste facilities, and real estate support.

b. **Reserve Component.** NG and reserve forces are collectively referred to as RC forces. They are also an essential part of the CS operational force when mobilized and consist of the Army National Guard of the United States (ARNGUS), the US Army Reserve (USAR), the US Navy Reserve (USNR), the US Marine Corps Reserve (USMCR), the Air National Guard of the United States (ANGUS), the US Air Force Reserve (USAFR), and the US Coast Guard Reserve. Guidelines for the utilization of RC forces when called to federal active duty are found in Title 10 USC.

(1) **Reserve Forces.** Each member of the RC is structured and operated in a manner similar to its respective AC counterpart. Unlike the ARNGUS and ANGUS, the remaining four RC organizations (USAR, USNR, USAFR, USMCR) operate under the same C2 relationships in both peacetime and wartime and do not have state-specific relationships. When called to active duty, RC forces conduct HD and CS missions under Title 10 USC guidelines exactly as AC forces. While on active duty, members of the USAR, USNR, USAFR, and USMCR are subject to the provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Reserve forces are called to active duty through the mobilization/demobilization process. Title 10 USC reserve forces are able to execute CS missions in involuntary annual training if the unit has not completed this training during the fiscal year. Reserve forces can also serve on CS missions in a volunteer status.
(2) **National Guard.** The NG is both part of the RC of the United States military and a constitutionally authorized organized militia. Traditionally the NG serves its states, and local communities, under the militia clause and serves as a strategic, and operational, reserve of the United States. The Army National Guard (ARNG) and the Air National Guard (ANG) of the United States (ARNGUS and ANGUS respectively) are federal reserve components and are federally funded to meet federal service specific training requirements. Every National Guardsman belongs to both their respective State ARNG or ANG and the corresponding federal component as well (ARNGUS or ANGUS.) The NG is a critical resource in domestic emergencies and is an effective force multiplier to civil authorities in responding to disasters or acts of terrorism at the state and local level.

(a) The Army and Air NG are established in 54 states and territories, including the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Territory of the US Virgin Islands, the territory of Guam, and the District of Columbia. With the exception of the District of Columbia whose head is the “Commanding General” and reports through channels ultimately to the President of the United States, the head of the NG in each state is the adjutant general (TAG), who reports to the governor.

(b) Unlike the federal reserve, a member of the NG may serve in one of three statuses:

1. **Title 10 USC status – federal active duty.** The member is ordered to active duty under various sections of Title 10 USC. Pay and allowances are federally funded, and the member is under federal command and control and subject to the UCMJ.

2. **Title 32 USC status.** This status is used for both training and certain operational missions. A member’s pay and allowances are federally funded, but the member is under state C2 and subject to the state military code versus the UCMJ. For training, this status includes weekend drills, annual training, and certain other types of training paid out of reserve force appropriations. Operationally, this status is used for CD missions, HD activities, and the WMD CS teams. Title 32 USC status has also been used to secure strategic facilities, such as airports, pharmaceutical labs, nuclear power plants, and border crossings.

3. **State Active Duty status.** Under provisions of state law a member can be ordered to state active duty under the C2 of a governor. Pay and allowances are state funded and the member is subject to the state military code versus UCMJ. This status is typically used for state responses to natural and man-made disasters and civil disturbances.

(c) Unless activated in federal service (Title 10 USC), the NG is under state or territorial control. Title 32 USC confirms the state or territorial control over the NG in peacetime without the restraint of the PCA and is the preferred status for domestic employment and is consistent with the NRP for CS operations.

(d) The NG in state active duty or Title 32 USC status is likely to be the first military force to provide support for a CS incident. Under the command of a governor, NG actions are closely coordinated with those of state agencies, state political subdivisions, tribal governments, neighboring and supporting states, NGOs, and federal agencies, to include DHS and DOD. In many states, TAG
is the state Director for Emergency Management and Director of HS, and as such, not only directs the response of the state’s NG forces, but also directs the state’s response to CM. Figure II-3 depicts the various TAG roles.

(e) The NG, along with the rest of the US Armed Forces is transforming to meet the challenges of the 21st Century. It is vital to recognize the NG capabilities that will interact with and be operating in a disaster area during CS operations. The following NG initiatives highlight the major programs DOD should be familiar with because state and federal military forces will work closely together to coordinate support, minimize the duplication of effort, and establish unity of effort. Pursuant
to recent changes to Title 32 USC, Section 502(f), the NG can also perform operational missions authorized by the President or SecDef.

1. Joint Force Headquarters State (JFHQ-State). Each state has a JFHQ-State, which integrates Army and Air NG resources. The JFHQ-State provide a focal point to operate jointly with combatant commands and any federal JTFs that may perform HD or CS missions within a state’s boundaries.

2. Joint Task Force State (JTF-State). The NG of each state is capable of establishing a JTF-State to facilitate the joint employment of state NG resources under the JFHQ-State for operational missions in support of a civil emergency in either a state active duty or Title 32 USC status. These JTFs are tailored to the operational requirements and NG JTF commanders will be certified by DOD to simultaneously command both federal and state military forces.

3. National Guard Reaction Force (NGRF). The NGRF provides rapid reaction forces to each state that, at the request of the governor or the President, is capable of supporting local or state LEAs in support of missions such as securing critical infrastructure.

4. Weapons of Mass Destruction – Civil Support Team (WMD-CST). The WMD-CST provides specialized capabilities designed to support civil authorities at a domestic CBRNE terrorist incident site by identifying CBRNE agents/substances, assessing current and projected consequences, advising on response measures, and assisting with appropriate requests for state support.

5. CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package (CERFP). The NG CERFPs provide a regional response capability comprised of existing traditional NG units task organized to respond to WMD attacks and are capable of performing search and extraction, casualty/patient decontamination, mass medical triage, and treatment at a CBRNE incident.

c. Combat Support Agencies

(1) Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). DTRA provides services and support to DOD components for combating threats to national security. DTRA offers a range of capabilities relating to CBRNE.

(a) DTRA’s Operations Center maintains situational awareness and serves as a point of contact for access to a variety of support including:

1. Secure communications.

2. Technical reach-back for warfighters and first responders, on a 24-hour, 7-day per week basis, in the form of subject matter experts on DTRA computational tools.

3. Liaison and coordination of assistance from CCDRs and other federal agencies in response to an accident or incident.

4. Data on effects of radiation on electronics.
5. Modeling/simulation for CBRNE analysis and hazard/consequence prediction. DTRA has the Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability and Consequence Assessment Tool Set to forecast damage such as blast, heat, radiation, and hazardous material release and the effects of unpredictable phenomena such as natural or man-made disasters. 

Note: The Interagency Modeling and Assessment Center provides atmospheric hazard predictions in support of the federal response.

6. Information on location and capabilities of specialized DOD and Department of Energy assets capable of responding to accidents or incidents involving radioactive materials.

7. Nuclear forensics for domestic nuclear event attribution.

8. Support to law enforcement investigations.

(b) DTRA has the capability to deploy the following kinds of support assets:

1. **Liaison Officers.** While already on-site at certain combatant commands, additional LNOs could be dispatched to other commands as required.

2. **CM Advisory Teams.** Teams of two to nine experts, including planners, modelers, lawyers, public affairs (PA) specialists, CBRNE specialists, radiation physicians, and health physicists.

3. **Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment Teams.** Assess mission, personnel, and installation vulnerability to terrorist attack.

4. **Balanced Survivability Assessment Teams.** Assess essential mission systems and critical infrastructure survivability.

5. **Technical Support Teams.** Provide on-site and direct technical support of DTRA computational tools to warfighters supporting their full spectrum of mission areas.

(2) **National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)**

(a) NGA is a combat support agency which provides geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) in support of DOD, the national intelligence community and federal decision makers. GEOINT is the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on the Earth. GEOINT consists of imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information. Combatant commands directly task NGA to provide GEOINT for planning and crisis and consequence management. GEOINT also supports civil authorities in their ability to rapidly respond to threats by providing geo-referenced visual and data products that serve as a foundation and common frame of reference for any operation. NGA also support national special security events (NSSEs) and man-made or technological disasters. NGA provides direct analytical support through the lead federal agencies and/or combatant commands primarily through the deployment...
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of team specialists in response to natural disasters, to include earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, and wildfires. The standard production includes imagery-derived initial damage or recovery mitigation assessments, analytical reporting through NGA intelligence briefs and geospatial situational awareness products. Analytical support and reachback capability is also supplemented by NGA specialists embedded within the combatant command’s intelligence center.

(b) NGA also provides support in the form of the Domestic Mobile Integrated Geospatial-Intelligence System (DMIGS). DMIGS is a mobile self-contained vehicle that integrates GEOINT analysis hardware and software with a robust communication system, enabling deployed analysts to receive and send data instantaneously to NGA facilities, allowing other NGA analysts to collaborate remotely on analysis and products. The DMIGS allows NGA analysts to work directly at the site of the crisis or special event and provide time critical information on demand.

d. Civil Air Patrol/Air Force Auxiliary. The CAP is a nationwide voluntary organization supported by the Air Force that serves as the Air Force Auxiliary. CAP is ideally suited to perform a variety of CS tasks such as air and ground search and rescue, disaster relief, and CD. Its members fly more than 95 percent of the inland search and rescue missions directed by the Air Force Rescue and Coordination Center. CAP assists the US Customs Service, Drug Enforcement Administration, and Forest Service in their CD efforts. CAP aircraft fly CS missions such as surveillance of critical infrastructure, airborne communications relay, and airlift of critical cargo. During Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005, CAP provided near real time aerial imagery of flood damaged areas for civil authorities as well as ground missions such as house to house searching of neighborhoods and passing out emergency supplies. CAP has 52 wings — one wing for each state, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia. Wings are subdivided into groups and squadrons.

e. The Department of Homeland Security. DHS leads the unified national effort to secure America. They prevent and deter terrorist attacks and protect against and respond to threats and hazards to the nation and will ensure safe and secure borders, welcome lawful immigrants and visitors, and promote the free-flow of commerce.

For more information on DHS, see Appendix E, “Department of Homeland Security.”

f. The US Coast Guard (USCG) is a Military Service within the DHS dedicated to protecting the safety and security of the United States. As such, it operates globally; on the high seas and in US territorial waters, and has certain federal law enforcement authorities ashore. It is a federal LEA and an Armed Force of the United States whose Service secretary is the Secretary of DHS. It is the lead agency for maritime drug interdiction and the co-lead agency for air drug interdiction operations, along with US Customs and Border Protection. The USCG defends the United States’ seaward frontier against illegal drugs and illegal immigrants. The USCG is also the lead agency for maritime search and rescue. The USCG is the lead agency for coordinating all maritime security planning and operations in the ports and inland waterways, including all efforts to prevent attacks and to mitigate the consequences of an attack should one occur. The USCG’s counterterrorism teams are ready to intercept terrorists before they ever reach the homeland. In time of war, the USCG could be transferred to the Department of the Navy for operations. In its maritime law enforcement role, USCG has jurisdiction in both US waters and on the high seas. In this capacity, the USCG may make inquiries, examinations,
inspections, searches, seizures, and arrests upon the high seas and waters over which the US has jurisdiction, for prevention, detection, and suppression of violations of laws of the US. **It is unique among the Services in that it has statutory law enforcement authority.** DOD through the US Navy provides CS to DHS(USCG) in the maritime domain through existing EXORDs and the *Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security for Department of Defense Support to the United States Coast Guard for Maritime Homeland Security*.

g. **Interagency Partners.** CS missions require detailed planning and interagency coordination to develop operational relationships with other federal departments and agencies. In certain circumstances DOD’s dependence on non-DOD organizations, information, assets and infrastructures could be critical in the accomplishment of CS missions.

(1) **Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).** EPA serves as the ESF #10, “Oil and Hazardous Materials Response,” Coordinator and as a support agency to the FBI for technical operations, and a support agency to DHS/FEMA for CM. EPA provides technical personnel and equipment to the federal agency with lead responsibility during all aspects of WMD incidents. EPA assistance may include threat assessment; domestic emergency support team (DEST) and regional emergency response team deployment; federal agency with lead responsibility advisory requirements, technical advice, and operational support for chemical, biological, and radiological releases; agent identification; hazard detection and reduction; environmental monitoring; sample and forensic evidence collection and analysis; identification of contaminants; feasibility assessment; clean-up; and on-site safety, protection, prevention, decontamination, and restoration activities. EPA and USCG share responsibilities for response to oil discharges into navigable waters and releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, and contaminants into the natural and physical environment. EPA provides the predesignated federal on-scene coordinator for inland areas while USCG coordinates resources for the containment, removal, and disposal activities and resources during an oil, hazardous substance, or WMD incident in coastal areas.

(2) **Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS).** DHHS serves as the ESF #8, “Public Health and Medical Services,” Coordinator. DHHS assistance supports threat assessment, DEST deployment, epidemiological investigation, and lead federal agency advisory requirements, and technical assistance requirements. DHHS serves as a support agency to the FBI for technical operations, and a support agency to DHS/FEMA for CM. DHHS provides technical personnel and equipment to the federal agency with lead responsibility during all aspects of an incident. DHHS can also provide regulatory follow-up when an incident involves a product regulated by the Food and Drug Administration. Operational support to DHS/FEMA may include mass immunization, mass prophylaxis, mass fatality management, pharmaceutical support operations (Strategic National Stockpile), contingency medical records, patient tracking, and patient evacuation and definitive medical care provided through the NDMS.

(3) **United States Department of Agriculture (USDA).** USDA serves as the ESF #4, “Firefighting,” and ESF #11, “Agriculture and Natural Resources,” Coordinator, a support agency, and a primary agency to DHS/FEMA by identifying food assistance requirements, and securing and arranging for the transportation of food assistance to affected areas. USDA/Forest Service manages and coordinates firefighting activities by providing personnel, equipment, and supplies in support of firefighting operations.
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4. General Services Administration (GSA). GSA serves as the ESF #7, “Resource Support,” Coordinator and primary support agency to DHS/FEMA during disaster relief and CM operations. GSA provides emergency supplies, space, office equipment, telecommunications, contracting services, transportation services, and security services.

5. American Red Cross. The ARC serves as a primary agency for coordinating mass care support during disaster relief and CM operations. Support may include shelter, feeding, emergency first aid, disaster welfare information, bulk distribution, supportive counseling, blood, and blood products.

6. Department of State. DOS serves as the primary agency for coordinating support and donations from foreign sources (including intergovernmental organizations). DOS established the “US Entry Guide” website (www.useg.org or www.useg.net) which identifies US diplomatic clearance and landing authorization requirements for foreign state aircraft entering the US and lists DOS and Service requirements, and clearance requirements for international and domestic civil aircraft to use DOD installations in US territory. In coordination with the Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance and/or the United States Agency for International Development, DOD may be required to establish locations to receive international in-kind donations (including foreign military donations).

5. Command and Control

a. Supported Combatant Commander. For CS operations, SecDef designates a supported CCDR. Ordinarily, this will be CDRUSNORTHCOM for CS missions in CONUS and Alaska; CDRUSSOUTHCOM in Puerto Rico or the US Virgin Islands; or CDRUSPACOM for Hawaii and the Pacific region. JDOMS publishes an EXORD to further delineate support relationships, available forces, end state, purpose and SecDef approved scope of actions.

b. Joint Task Force. The supported CCDR designates a C2 headquarters to execute the CS operations. Based on the severity of the situation the supported CCDR may deploy a JTF to the JOA for CS operations in support of a primary or coordinating agency.

1. Deployment of a JTF is not contingent on a request from the primary or coordinating agency.

2. A catastrophic event may dictate the deployment of multiple JTFs.

3. The NRP states that if a JTF is established, consistent with operational requirements, its command and control element will be collocated with the PFO at the JFO to ensure coordination and unity of effort. The collocation of the JTF command and control element does not replace the requirement for a DCO/DCE as a part of the JFO coordination staff and it will not coordinate request for assistance for DOD. The DCO is the DOD single point of contact at the JFO.

4. Either a standing JTF or one configured for specific missions provides emergency assistance across all lines of support. The JTF may require greater proportions of support units and capabilities than required in a combat deployment.
(5) The JTF will usually exercise OPCON/tactical control of DOD forces attached in support of the federal effort within the JOA.

(6) All classes of supply and all types of services may be required. Close coordination between the JTF and ESF coordinator is required. Interface for coordination is through the DCO.

c. **Defense Coordinating Officer.** The DCO is the DOD single point of contact at the JFO. RFAs are validated through the DCO and forwarded through designated DOD reporting chain.

(1) DCOs, assigned to ARNORTH, are permanently stationed in the ten FEMA regions, at or near the FEMA RRCCs. Additional DCOs may be required for multiple JFOs.

(2) C2 of DCOs is directed by the supported CCDR in an EXORD for CS missions. They may report directly to the supporting CCDR or to a TF/JTF.

(3) The DCO is supported by the DCE, an administrative and support staff consisting of five permanently assigned personnel.

(4) Augmentation to DCE within a JFO is generally required from a defense coordinating unit consisting of emergency preparedness liaison officers (EPLOs), specialty staff augmentees, and additional personnel from the Services.

(5) A DCO can also have limited C2 of DOD forces that are operational in the JOA for CS missions, based on the EXORD. A TF or JTF would likely be deployed for C2 of larger numbers of DOD forces.

d. **Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers.** EPLO positions are authorized in each FEMA region and state (see Figure II-4). Regional EPLOs provide DOD liaison with FEMA regional organizations and agencies; facilitate planning, coordination, and training for military support to civil authorities and national security emergency preparedness; advise federal agencies and organizations on DOD capabilities and resources; advocate mutual support required by DOD; and, on order, augment DOD response for CS.

(1) They are administered by and report to program managers within their respective Services who ensure EPLOs are trained, equipped, and maintain current proficiency on the NRP, NIMS, CS procedures and readily available Service capabilities.

(2) They are activated and employed by their Services at the request of the supported CCDR. They are trained in disaster preparedness and CS operations. EPLOs advise civil authorities on military resources and capabilities and facilitate coordination between civil authorities and DOD during state or federal exercises or CS operations.
(3) Once activated, EPLOs are assigned/attached to the supported combatant command and then could be directed by the DCO upon the DCO’s arrival in the area. Support of the DCO operation in each region is a priority for all of the Services. Army EPLOs will be assigned/attached to ARNORTH and will most likely be directed by the DCO and assigned wherever needed.

(4) State emergency preparedness liaison officers (SEPLOs). SEPLOs habitually support the DCO, but can be located pre-event at the RRCC and then move forward to the JFO once established with the DCO. SEPLOs primarily support the DCO but are oriented towards the state EOCs and NG JFHQs. SEPLOs also work with the DCO in the JFO as required. EPLOs of all types and Services have historically demonstrated a vast aptitude at making significant contributions in a wide range of CS operations and they can be found working in the DCO operation, as LNOs to the ESFs, state EOCs, NG JFHQs, JTFs, ARNORTH operational command posts (1 and/or 2), base support installation (BSI), JDOMS and other places where their services are required.
For more information on EPLO, refer to DODD 3025.16, Military Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer (EPLO) Program.

6. Interagency Coordination

   a. For CS operations, DOD must coordinate with a variety of other government agencies (OGAs), including LEAs. Agreements between DOD and OGAs may help in defining the scope of support to be provided either routinely or in an emergency. However, these agreements may not constitute SecDef preapproval of DOD support for all CS missions.

   b. Synchronization, coordination, and integration of all instruments of national power are required to ensure the successful execution of CS missions. The challenges facing the Nation are increasingly complex and will require the skills and resources of many organizations. Some guidelines for interagency coordination are listed below:

      (1) Identify CS mission capabilities compliant with NIMS Incident Command System and governing federal statutes, policy, guidelines, and best practices.

      (2) Identify DOD agencies and organizations potentially involved in the operation.

      (3) Identify key elements of information that various agencies can share.

      (4) Identify required resources.

      (5) Establish interagency assessment teams.

   c. Challenges of Interagency Cooperation and Coordination during CS Operations.

      (1) CS is conducted in a complex environment with literally thousands of different jurisdictions and agencies (federal, state, tribal, and local). CS may at times involve neighboring countries due to the proximity of an event to national borders and the interconnectedness of nations. This complex environment necessitates coordinated and integrated operations with agency partners to enable rapid mutual aid, in response to natural or man-made disasters or during national emergencies.

      (2) DOD actions in CS operations may require rapid response to mitigate the impact of a disaster on US domestic population and critical infrastructure. Legal and policy constraints, guidelines, intensive media coverage, multiple jurisdictions, and the competing demands by various levels of political authorities may complicate the effectiveness of DOD response. This environment necessitates an effective interagency and PA process and program.

      (3) Interagency coordination can at times be a significant challenge and take considerable effort, yet it also provides numerous benefits and “force multipliers” for DOD and its CS partners. Expanded information sharing and the interaction with agency liaison personnel prior to and during CS
exercises and operations significantly enhance real-time information sharing and coordination activities and improve CS related response capabilities.

(4) US military forces performing CS missions will work through the primary agency in support of state, local, and tribal governments and agencies. Interagency cooperation and coordination is essentially a USG construct, and state, local and tribal partners may be unfamiliar with its structure and processes, or even constrained on how they can participate by their own laws, regulations, and/or political direction. Commanders must exercise flexibility and ingenuity in order to achieve unity of effort in this complex domestic environment.

d. The combatant command interagency process complements and supports the higher level or strategic interagency process, and may involve such key elements as joint interagency coordination groups (JIACGs); theater security cooperation programs, plans and initiatives; country team interaction and coordination; and annex V (Interagency Coordination) to formal operation plans and CONPLANs; all designed to enhance information sharing, effective joint and interagency planning, and maximize coordinated operations.

e. **Elements for Interagency Coordination**

(1) **Joint Interagency Coordination Group.** The JIACG is an interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners. Composed of USG civilian and military experts accredited to the CCDR and tailored to meet the requirements of a supported CCDR, the JIACG provides the CCDR with the capability to collaborate at the operational level with other USG civilian agencies and departments. It is the CCDR’s primary interagency forum to share information, analyze ongoing activities, and anticipate future interagency actions, implications, and/or consequences.

(2) **Agency Representatives and Command Representatives.** Subject matter experts (SMEs) and LNOs from key partner agencies and commands facilitate effective two-way communication, coordination, and cooperation. A formally established liaison and representative link between the combatant command and the partner agency is beneficial to both organizations. Specific focus should be on agency or command LNOs whose organizations play a key part in successful and seamless execution of CS operations. Regardless of mission, having key partner agency and command representatives will be essential for the CCDR conducting operations on US territory. Equally important, combatant commands may locate a command representative or LNO at key partner agencies commensurate with their operational requirements. Agency representatives or command LNOs are more effective when they have access to command leadership, key staff, and key working groups. “On-the-ground” agency representatives and command LNOs located at a combatant command should typically be located where they will be most usefully engaged, supportive of command activities, and beneficial to their parent agency or command. However, they also need to have an ongoing interface with the combatant command JIACG. This maximizes their participation in and support of the interagency process and benefit to their particular agency or combatant command.
Within the JIACG, some commands can create an IACG/IPC. The IACG is the interagency incident management group for the JIACG during contingencies, and provides a 24x7 capability if required. The IACG is formed by members from the JIACG (which provides people, resources, and reach-back capability for additional subject matter expertise) and is augmented by available and required agency representatives and command LNOs. These personnel collaborate to provide the CCDR and staff a clear picture of interagency activities and their implications. The IACG mission is to integrate and synchronize interagency activities to ensure mutual understanding, unity of effort, and full spectrum support. A group similar to the IACG is the IPC, which is activated upon receipt of CJCS’s warning or alert order or at the direction of the CCDR. The IPC is established to provide timely advice to the CCDR about the capabilities/resources of other agencies in the CS effort. An IPC will enable coherent and efficient coordination through the participation of interagency SMEs. Whether an IACG or an IPC, this element provides the CCDR an interagency action cell focused on contingencies that can assist and enhance the command’s execution of the CS effort.

For further reference, see JP 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations (Vols. 1 & 2).

7. Information Environment

The “information environment” is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information, and the information itself. CS missions require combatant commands to share data and information among DOD and non-DOD mission partners. One of the challenges is to ensure DOD systems can accommodate this operational necessity, able to interface and interoperate with communications systems that exist outside of DOD, in a secure and seamless manner. Three components of providing an available and effective information environment are a reliable, robust communications system, information sharing among mission partners, and assuring and defending our critical information infrastructure against threats and aggression.

a. Communications System. A reliable, robust communications system enables centralized planning and the coordinated and mutually supporting employment of forces and assets. It includes command centers, operations centers, processing and distribution centers and associated systems, deployed systems, and data sources. Sharing systems, information and the decisions generated by them among mission partners ensures a synchronized effort and facilitates decentralized execution in a dynamic environment.

(1) Traditional Communications. Traditional communications systems will serve as the backbone in support of CS operations. They must be interoperable, mobile, secure, and capable of supporting voice, data, and video to most effectively contribute to C2. Planning for the integration of spectrum resource allocation will enable the DOD, federal, state, tribal, and local responders to interoperate.
(2) **Nontraditional Communications.** Infrastructure may be damaged, thus DOD must identify capabilities to bridge the gap until infrastructure is restored. Nontraditional systems that are scalable, interoperable, and complementary with those used by coalition and civilian partners may be essential and should also support the dissemination of voice, data, and video information.

(3) **Network Operations.** The combatant command communications system directorate is responsible for providing the communication system needed to support reliable and timely information flow in support of joint operations by providing theater guidance and priorities. Theater guidance and priorities are executed through the theater network operations control center which monitors status of critical communications systems and coordinates with communities of interest within the AOR.

b. **Information Sharing.** The need to share information is an operational necessity to minimize the potential for operational gaps. The overall goal is seamless access to trusted information throughout the response effort.

(1) To ensure flexibility and interoperability with mission partners, information must be shared to the maximum extent possible.

(2) An information synchronization group enables the collaborative environment by employing information liaisons who fuse operationally relevant information across all levels of command. This organization is vital to effective information sharing and must transcend organizational, policy, and technical barriers.

c. **Critical Information Infrastructure Protection.** HSPD-5, *Management of Domestic Incidents*, and HSPD-7, *Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization and Protection*, establish national policy for managing threats and incidents in cyberspace. The NRP implements policy to eliminate vulnerabilities and strengthen capabilities to prevent/mitigate, prepare for, respond to, and recover from the consequences of cyberspace incidents.

(1) The DHS National Cyber Response Coordination Group (NCRCG) is the principal interagency mechanism for managing cyberspace incidents of national significance or having significant cyberspace consequences. The NCRCG of which DOD is a member, facilitates federal coordination of response to a cyberspace incident. DOD has a statutory role to protect critical information infrastructure and key assets.

(2) When directed by the President or SecDef, DOD will provide protection of DOD and non-DOD critical networks against threat and aggression.

(a) The Defense Critical Infrastructure Program supports physical protection efforts of DOD components and non-DOD mission partners.

(b) CDRUSSTRATCOM uses network operations (NETOPS) to support the NCRCG and to operate and defend the Global Information Grid (GIG). NETOPS operators perform functions to sustain operational readiness of the GIG, provide integrated network visibility
and end-to-end management of networks, global applications and services in support of DOD’s warfighting, intelligence, and business missions. The scope of NETOPS includes infrastructure, organization, personnel, procedures, and components that collect, process, store, transmit, display, disseminate, and act on information.

8. **Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-yield Explosives Environment**

   a. The Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support identifies as one of its priorities CM support of civil authorities for domestic CBRNE mass casualty attacks.

   b. CBRNE incidents may be deliberate or unintentional. Not all domestic CBRNE incidents will necessitate a federal or military response. The potential for multiple simultaneous CBRNE attacks on US territory that would result in mass casualties must be considered in operational CS planning and training.

   c. Individual characteristics, effects, and planning considerations of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, toxic industrial materials, and detonation of high-yield explosives must each be approached separately. Each of these has unique physical characteristics, specific target sets against which they would be most appropriate from a terrorist point of view, and different CS requirements.

9. **Legal and Policy Considerations**

   a. Legal Considerations. The legal authorities governing the employment of US military forces in CS operations consist of federal laws, executive directives, DOD plans and policies, and other directives, instructions, and regulations, making a comprehensive legal review of CS plans essential. Commanders will ensure that the application of military capabilities and resources is within the constraints of the law. Accordingly, commanders will seek legal advice regarding CS plans, policies, and operations from their staff judge advocates to ensure conformity with legal requirements.

   For more information on authorities see Appendix F, “Key Civil Support Legal and Policy Documents.”

   b. Policy Considerations. Military commanders ensure that DOD resources are used judiciously while conducting CS operations by adhering to the evaluating criteria discussed earlier and IAW the following supporting principles:

   (1) DOD resources are provided only when response or recovery requirements are or will be beyond the capabilities of local, state, and federal civil authorities, and when they are requested by a federal agency with lead responsibility and approved by SecDef. An exception to this is in the case of immediate response authority (see DODD 3025.15, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities). When requested by civil authorities, or as outlined in the MOTR Plan for all maritime threats regardless of type or location, local commanders can respond to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage under imminently serious conditions.
(2) SecDef retains control of assigned Title 10 USC military forces providing CS.

(3) The NG, due to local presence, will likely be the first military responder during a civil emergency. The early employment of NG will usually be in either a state active duty status or Title 32 USC status, both are under the supervision of the adjutant general and the direction of the governor. There are many advantages associated with employment of the NG in either state active duty or Title 32 USC status. Most notably are the ability to assist law enforcement without Posse Comitatus restrictions, quicker reaction times, established community and interstate emergency management relationships, and an in-depth understanding of the operating environment. To ensure operational continuity, most, if not all, deployed NG forces engaged in supporting a response will remain in state active duty or Title 32 USC status throughout an event. Therefore, the military response to extraordinary events that requires DOD CS will be a coordinated effort between the NG in state active duty or Title 32 USC status and Titles 10 and 14 USC forces.

(4) DOD components do not perform any function of civil government unless authorized.

Refer to DODD 5525.5, DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials, for DOD policy on providing military support to LEAs, including personnel and equipment.

c. Intelligence Support to Law Enforcement Agencies and Intelligence Oversight. Commanders and staffs must carefully consider the legal and policy limits imposed on intelligence activities in support of LEAs, and on intelligence activities involving US citizens and entities by intelligence oversight regulations, policies, and EOs. See Chapter III, “Operations,” regarding intelligence support to law enforcement, and Chapter IV, “Supporting and Sustaining Activities,” for guidance on intelligence oversight.
CHAPTER III
OPERATIONS

“Our job will be to preserve the Nation’s security by defending the American people where they live and work, and support civilian authorities as needed. We will also prepare for the inevitability of uncertainty and surprise. This will be a team effort from start to finish.”

General Ralph Eberhart, USAF

1. Categories and Types of Operations

CS operations, for the purposes of this publication, are divided into the three broad categories of domestic emergencies, designated law enforcement support, and other activities, based on the CS definition. These categories, in many cases, can overlap or be in effect simultaneously, depending on the particular circumstances of the incident. Under the categories, there are broad types of CS missions, with examples illustrated in Figure III-1. This figure provides the structure for discussion and understanding of CS.

a. Disasters and Declared Emergencies. DOD support in a domestic disaster or a Presidential declaration of emergency is in support of the primary or coordinating agency(ies). Military commanders and responsible DOD civilians may, under certain conditions, respond under immediate response authority in order to save lives, prevent suffering, and mitigate great property damage under imminently serious conditions. Requests for support could come with some advance notice (weather forecasts and hydrology surveys), with short notice (intelligence indicators and geological activity indicators), but may also occur without notice.

(1) Presidential Declarations. Under Stafford Act authority, two types of actions may be taken, summarized as follows.

(a) Major Disaster. The President issues a major disaster declaration after receiving a request from the governor of the affected state. Major disaster declarations may be issued after a natural catastrophe or, “regardless of cause, fire, flood, or explosion.” A declaration authorizes DHS to administer various federal disaster assistance programs for victims of declared disasters. Each major disaster declaration specifies the type of incident covered, the time period covered, the types of disaster assistance available, the counties affected by the declaration, and the name of the FCO.

(b) Emergency. The declaration process for emergencies is similar to that used for major disasters; the President may, however, issue an emergency declaration without a gubernatorial request if primary responsibility rests with the federal government. An emergency declaration may be issued on “any occasion or instance” in which the President determines that federal assistance is required. Under an emergency declaration, the federal government funds and undertakes emergency response activities, debris removal, and individual assistance and housing programs. Disaster relief fund expenditures
for an emergency are limited to $5 million per declaration unless the President determines that there is a continuing need; Congress must be notified if the $5 million ceiling is breached.

(2) Operation types under this category could include:
(a) **Natural Disasters.** As a signatory to the NRP, DOD may be asked to provide assistance to DHS/FEMA in an attempt to save lives, protect property, and lessen the threat of a catastrophe in the US. When natural disasters occur and military assistance is anticipated, DHS/FEMA will request a DCO who serves as the DOD point of contact. Capabilities with a global focus, such as airlift and space assets, will normally be provided in support rather than the SecDef authorizing a change in OPCON. Events of this type could include wildland fires, tornadoes, earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, typhoons, cyclones, tidal waves, tsunamis, volcanic eruptions, landslides, mudslides, avalanches, blizzards, drought conditions, etc.

(b) **Man-made Disasters.** A technological disaster threatens the viability of the technological system, causes massive loss of life or property, and may endanger the social environment in which it occurs. Technological disasters can have a global impact, such as the Chernobyl nuclear power plant explosion. Events of this mission type could include accidental or intentional releases of oil or other hazardous materials, power grid outage, terrorist attacks on critical infrastructure, etc.

(c) **CBRNE Incidents.** The implications of a deliberate or unintentional large release of a CBRNE are potentially catastrophic. A CBRNE event or attack may occur with little or no warning and may overwhelm the response capabilities and resources of local and state jurisdictions requiring a federal response. Therefore, specific attention has been focused on task-organizing within DOD to plan for and integrate its support to the NRP primary or coordinating agencies to manage the consequences of a domestic CBRNE event. An installation’s CBRNE CM response under DOD Instruction (DODI) 2000.18, Department of Defense Installation Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive Emergency Response Guidelines, is primarily force protection and continuity of operations, but may transition to a CS mission depending on the scale and nature of the incident and level of support provided. Events of this type could include the use of high-yield explosives, biological attack or accidental release, chemical attack or accidental release, nuclear power plant explosion or malfunction, etc.

*For further reference, see JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management.*

(3) Non-declared emergencies are those emergencies that may require a response by DOD, but for which a Presidential disaster declaration has not been issued. These may include situation-specific emergency conditions that require support under existing agreements or laws such as flood control, wildland fires, and hazardous materials spills. DODI 6055.6, DOD Fire and Emergency Services Program, provides specific guidance disaster preparedness for the fire and emergency services aboard installations. Military involvement under this category might include:

(a) Presidential direction of DOD support with Title 10 USC forces. Without a disaster declaration, the President may also direct DOD to support the response to a disaster or emergency for a period not to exceed 10 days.

(b) Local commanders providing “immediate response.”
(c) Installation commanders supporting and assisting US civil authorities in CM activities under the guidance of DODI 2000.18, *Department of Defense Installation Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive Emergency Response Guidelines*.

(d) USACE responding per ESF #3, “Public Works and Engineering,” or per ESF #6, “Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services,” or operating under the authority of Public Law 84-99 (Title 33 USC, Sections 467n and 701n).

(e) Response directed by SecDef in response to a governor or primary agency RFA. Directed response may range from providing a DCO to providing a single or multiple TFs or JTFs depending on the situation and level of requested support. When possible, assessment elements from USNORTHCOM, USPACOM, or USSOUTHCOM will deploy to the anticipated operational area prior to the event.

(f) Response from Civil Air Patrol (Air Force Auxiliary). The CAP/Air Force Auxiliary provides emergency services including air and ground search and rescue, disaster relief, aerial reconnaissance, light airlift, and communications support to civil authorities. Unlike Title 10 USC forces, Air Force policy allows for CAP/Air Force Auxiliary employment supporting civil authorities without SecDef approval.

b. **Support and/or Restore Public Health and Services, and Civil Order.** DOD support may include augmentation of local first responders and equipment. It may include law enforcement support, continuity of operations/continuity of government measures to restore essential government services, protect public health and safety, and provide emergency relief to affected governments, businesses, and individuals. Responses occur under the primary jurisdiction of the affected state and local government, where the Federal government provides assistance when required, or support to Federal law enforcement agencies in the execution of their own responsibilities. When situations are beyond the capability of the state, the governor requests federal assistance through the President. The President may also direct the Federal government to provide supplemental assistance to state and local governments to alleviate the suffering and damage resulting from disasters or emergencies. Requests for DOD support to restore civil order, restore public services, or reestablish a “normal” state to meet societal expectations may be received with short or no notice. Military involvement under this category might include the following types of operations.

   (1) **Civil Disturbance Operations.** The President has the authority to deploy troops within the United States to enforce the laws. The Enforcement of the Laws to Restore Public Order, Chapter 15 of Title 10 USC (formerly Insurrection Act) authorizes the President to employ the Armed Forces of the US, including the NG, within the United States to restore order or enforce federal law after a major public emergency (e.g., natural disaster, serious public health emergency, or terrorist attack) when requested by the state governor or when the President determines that the authorities of the state are incapable of maintaining public order. The President normally executes his authority by ordering the dispersal of those obstructing the enforcement of the laws. The President may act unilaterally to suppress an insurrection or domestic violation without the request or authority of the state/governor and to exercise his “major public emergencies” authority to direct the SecDef to provide supplies, services, and equipment necessary for the immediate preservation of life and property. Such supplies, services, and equipment
may be provided: only to the extent that the constituted authorities of the state or possession are unable to provide them; only until such authorities and other departments and agencies of the United States charged with such responsibilities are able to provide them; and only to the extent that their provision, in the judgment of the SecDef, will not interfere with the preparedness of ongoing military operations or functions. Responsibility for the coordination of the federal response for civil disturbances rests with the Attorney General. Any DOD forces employed in civil disturbance operations shall remain under military authority at all times. Forces deployed to assist federal and local authorities during times of civil disturbance follow the use-of-force policy found in CJCS Instruction (CJCSI) 3121.01B, *Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces*.

(2) **Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Support.** DOD provides support to other federal agencies in border security and in the event of a mass migration emergency. Historically, this law enforcement support is in the form of technical assistance, services, and facilities and only on a temporary basis. Geographic CCDRs can expect to be designated as the supported commander for the provision and management of installations and services associated with housing migrants while US Citizenship and Immigration Services screens them for admission and other administrative requirements. DOJ may also be involved as it retains the lead status for any law enforcement response or action associated with immigration emergencies. Additionally, the National Guard has an ongoing Title 32 USC operational support mission, called Operation Jump Start, providing significant assistance to securing the US borders. In support of US Border Patrol efforts, National Guard members assist with surveillance, installing fences and vehicle barriers, and providing training.

(3) **Equipment and Other Support to Law Enforcement.** Most of these requests are for loan, maintenance and occasionally the operation of military equipment, or the information obtained from use of the equipment. The use of the military in civil law enforcement roles is strictly regulated by statute and implementing DOD authorities. Military forces performing in this role will normally work in support of a primary agency (e.g., DHS or DOJ/FBI). Depending on the circumstances, and with SecDef approval, units providing this support may be armed. When armed, forces will adhere to the standing rules for the use of force (SRUF) found in CJCSI 3121.01B, *Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces*, unless SecDef has approved mission-specific rules for the use of force (RUF). Military support to civilian LEAs may include, but is not limited to, support for combating terrorism, CD operations, maritime security and training, and the loan of equipment, personnel, facilities, or expertise (e.g., ISR capabilities). Requests for loans of equipment, facilities, or personnel made by LEAs, shall be made and approved IAW DOD policy and instructions for requesting civil support, and require approval by the SecDef.

(4) **Counterterrorism Operations.** The Attorney General, acting through the FBI and in cooperation with the heads of other federal departments, agencies, and military criminal investigative organizations (MCIOs), coordinates domestic intelligence collection and the activities of the law enforcement community to detect, prevent, preempt, and disrupt terrorist attacks, and to identify the perpetrators and bring them to justice in the event of a terrorist incident. If there is a credible threat, DOD may also be requested to support LEAs in a pre-positioning of forces, or in the case of an imminent threat to life or severe property damage, take direct action until responsible authorities (DOJ, DHS, etc.) can respond (in the maritime domain it is likely to be directed by a MOTR action). Under this type of support, specific RUF must be established and approved. In the absence of preexisting
RUF, requests for RUF for CS missions will be sent through the supported CCDR and JDOMS for development and to the SecDef for approval. Mission-specific RUF may be required depending on the situation. **Military responses to a credible threat and acts of terrorism may require both CrM and CM operations, which often overlap.** DOJ/FBI is the primary agency in preventing or resolving threats involving terrorism and for crisis response throughout a terrorist threat or act. DHS/FEMA leads CM operations and is the coordinating agency with overall responsibility for emergency response actions to lessen or mitigate the consequences of attacks or incidents. In some situations, CM may include pre-event planning for one incident while conducting post-event operations for another. DOD direct support for CM is provided to DHS/FEMA or an NRP primary agency. Under these circumstances, supporting elements should coordinate, integrate, and synchronize their activities and operations.

(5) **Counterdrug Operations.** CD/counternarcotics operations are conducted under the authority delegated in CJCSI 3710.01B, *DOD Counterdrug Support.*

(6) **Postal Services.** During postal work stoppages or natural disasters and disruption of mail service on a national, regional, or local basis, DOD may be required to provide assistance. This may take the form of **materials, supplies, equipment, services, and personnel sufficient to permit the United States Postal Service to safeguard, process, and deliver the mail** in those areas in which normal mail service has been impaired.

(a) Legal authority for the employment of military resources to reestablish and maintain essential postal service is found in Title 39 USC, Section 411. **DOD provides postal augmentation under an interdepartmental transfer of services.** The declaration of a national emergency is a sufficient condition for the selective mobilization of RC forces to support the US Postal Service.

(b) Task organization, operations, logistics, personnel, PA, command relationships, alert notification procedures, and reports are set forth in DOD Postal Augmentation Plan GRAPHIC HAND.

(7) **Animal/Plant Disease Eradication.** DOD may provide assistance to USDA to contain and eradicate an actual or imminent outbreak of plant diseases or any menacing animal diseases. USDA's Administrator for Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) may request DOD assistance if an emergency arises from the introduction of a foreign animal or plant disease and/or pest.

(a) USDA, DOD, and GSA signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that provides a mechanism for USDA to request and receive priority support if the presence of animal or plant diseases or pests constitutes an emergency, as declared by USDA.

(b) Through a federal TF, USDA's APHIS coordinates, directs, and conducts the federal response to control and eradicate animal and plant diseases and pests, reimbursing DOD for actual costs incurred. GSA provides supplies and equipment. Given SecDef approval where required, JDOMS designates appropriate commanders, Services, or agencies to conduct the operation and coordinates Service and other federal agency support. The Services and other supporting commanders may provide installations for bases of support, provide resources, and identify and provide technically qualified personnel to assist USDA as directed by JDOMS. DOD Veterinary Support Activity may appoint a veterinary support officer to coordinate with the regional animal disease eradication officer TF for any required
veterinary support. When directed by the appropriate supported commander, US Army Health Services designates and deploys military specialists trained in foreign animal disease diagnosis, epidemiology, microbiology, immunology, entomology, pathology, and public health.

(8) **Assistance to District of Columbia in Combating Crime.** The employment of DOD military resources to civil authorities in combating crime in the District of Columbia will be limited to:

(a) Military and civilian technicians to perform non-law enforcement functions.

(b) Training facilities, such as classrooms, rifle ranges, and pistol ranges.

(c) Military equipment and supplies.

(d) Such other assistance, as directed by the President.

c. **National Special Security Events.** Special events are categorized by the DHS Special Events Working Group (SEWG). Usually, other military operations will have priority over these missions, unless directed otherwise by the SecDef. These events will be assigned a priority by the SEWG and will normally be monitored by the combatant command responsible for the AOR in which they are conducted. NSSE is a designation given to certain special events that, by virtue of their political, economic, social, or religious significance, may be the target of terrorism or other criminal activity. The Secretary of Homeland Security, after consultation with the Homeland Security Council (HSC), shall be responsible for designating special events as NSSEs. When a special event is designated as an NSSE, the United States Secret Service, as part of DHS, assumes the role of primary agency for the design and implementation of the operational security plan. Events in this category are normally large events, generally with sufficient time for planning (except state funerals). Multiple federal and state agencies may be involved, and will have well-defined situation and operational areas. Planning for possible transition to disaster support is inherent in these operations. Special events requiring DOD support could include the following types of operations (note that any of these special events could be designated as NSSEs): World’s Fair, Super Bowl, Olympics, World Series, and NASCAR events. Special events that will likely be designated as NSSEs include: Presidential inaugurations, State of the Union addresses, Group of Eight summit meetings, World Trade Organization Meetings, United Nations General Assembly meetings, Democratic and Republican Party national conventions, and State funerals.

d. **Periodic Planned Support.** Periodic planned support is conducted to enhance civil military relations within local communities. Examples of military involvement are listed following request guidelines.

(1) All requests for periodic planned support should adhere to the following guidelines:

(a) Responsible agency should request support from NG first. All states have established processes for community relations support requests, generally through their public affairs offices.

(b) DOD capabilities requests should be submitted to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Attn: Directorate for Community Relations and Public Liaison as Community Relations/Public Affairs support (DODD 5410.18, Public Affairs Community Relations Policy) using
RRR Form 2535, Request for Military Aerial Support, or DD Form 2536, Request for Armed Forces Participation in Public Events. Either form can also be submitted to Army, Navy, Marine, or Air Force public affairs offices for processing.

(2) **Sensitive Support Operations.** Sensitive support to special activities provided under DODD S-5210.36, *Provision of DOD Sensitive Support to DOD Components and Other Departments and Agencies of the US Government.*

(3) **Military Training Exchanges.** This support can be provided incident to training as innovative readiness training under DODD 1100.20, *Support and Services for Eligible Organizations and Activities Outside Department of Defense.* Military training support can also be provided to local first responders by military mobile training teams, installation personnel, or exercises preparation and conduct. Civil authorities can request local installation commanders to provide combat service support (CSS) (medical, transportation, supply, maintenance) or combat support (engineering or security). Installations can provide support when it meets the requirements of innovative readiness training/support as incidental to military training. (Title 10 USC, Section 2012).

(4) **Community Relations.** This support is provided under DODD 5410.18, *Public Affairs Community Relations Policy.* This includes military bands, marching units, static displays as well as requests for fly-overs, rotary wing support, Golden Knights, Blue Angels, or Thunderbirds aerial demonstration support, and military support to ceremonies in the NCR. This support may cover voluntary participation in community and civic activities by DOD personnel when they participate in a personal capacity in an off-duty status. See DOD 5500.7-R, *Joint Ethics Regulation,* for additional guidance regarding off-duty or personal capacity activities. All requests for periodic planned support should adhere to the following guidelines:

(a) Responsible agency should request support from NG first. All states have established processes for community relations support requests, generally through their public affairs offices.

(b) DOD capabilities requests should be submitted to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, Attn: Directorate for Community Relations and Public Liaison as Community Relations/Public Affairs support (DODD 5410.18, *Public Affairs Community Relations Policy*) using DD Form 2535, Request for Military Aerial Support, or DD Form 2536, Request for Armed Forces Participation in Public Events. Either form can also be submitted to Army, Navy, Marine, or Air Force public affairs offices for processing.

(5) **Military laboratory support** and/or testing and evaluation in DOD facilities can be provided to civil authorities by agreement and is categorized as CS.

(6) **Military working dog support** provided per DODI 5525.10, *Using Military Working Dog Teams (MWDTs) to Support Law Enforcement Agencies in Counterdrug Missions.*

(7) **Support provided to the US Secret Service** under Title 18 USC, Section 112, “protection of foreign officials, official guests and internationally protected persons” which authorizes the Attorney General to request the assistance of the armed forces to perform this function.
(8) **Civil Air Patrol/Air Force Auxiliary support** provided to Civil Authorities. Requests for this support are submitted to and approved by Commander, Air Force North (AFNORTH).

(9) **Aerial Damage Assessment.** Aerial damage assessment (ADA) should be performed by DOD assets only when such actions cannot be performed by local entities or other federal agencies in a timely manner. Yet if tasked, ADA asset use should be efficient, effective, and utilize the least intrusive, least costly means to accomplish the support mission within necessary timelines. Use of DOD intelligence component capabilities in conjunction with aerial reconnaissance may be subject to intelligence oversight for intelligence activities (foreign intelligence or counterintelligence collection), or may be subject to operational parameters and limitation specified by the SecDef, if used for a mission other than an intelligence activity, such as search and rescue, damage assessment, or incident awareness and analysis.

(10) **Civilian Critical Infrastructure Protection**

(a) America’s critical infrastructure includes a number of interrelated sectors that provide the goods and services essential to the Nation (see Figure III-2). Our institutions of government guarantee our national security and freedom and administer key public functions. Our defense industrial base provides essential resources for military capabilities to help safeguard our population from external threats and support force projection and sustainment. Our information and telecommunications sectors

![Figure III-2. Examples of Critical Infrastructure](image-url)
enable economic productivity and growth, and are particularly important because they connect and help control many other critical infrastructure assets. Our energy, transportation, banking and finance, chemical industry, agricultural, and postal and shipping sectors help sustain our economy and touch the lives of Americans daily. Because many of the assets associated with the critical infrastructure of the US are interrelated or part of an integrated system (see Figure III-3), a successful attack on one critical node could have a devastating impact on others and the country overall. While DOD is responsible for the defense critical infrastructure, there may be instances where the President and SecDef will instruct DOD to provide support to another agency. This support can take many forms but is normally associated with disasters, emergency relief, and CrM and CM activities.

(b) The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act defines critical infrastructure as those “systems and assets, critical to the national economy and national security.” Specifically, it states that critical infrastructure are those assets so vital to the United States that their incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on national security, economic security, and/or public health or safety. Within this scope, the Department of Defense further identifies infrastructure essential to our capability to execute the national military strategy, project power, and defend the homeland. The defense industrial base is critical to the preservation of this capability.

Figure III-3. Critical Infrastructure Protection Framework
whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.” Critical infrastructure protection framework is detailed in Figure III-3. In addition to our critical infrastructure, our country must also protect a number of key assets — individual targets whose destruction would not endanger vital systems, but could create local disaster or profoundly damage our Nation’s morale or confidence. Key assets include symbols or historical attractions, such as prominent national, state, or local monuments and icons. In some cases, these include quasi-public symbols that are identified strongly with the United States as a nation, and fall completely under the jurisdiction of state and local officials or even private foundations. Key assets also include individual or localized facilities that deserve special protection because of their destructive potential or their value to the local community.

See DODD 3020.40, Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP), for additional information on roles and responsibilities for DOD components to assure DOD’s critical assets and infrastructures are identified and managed.

2. Domestic Incident Management Response Operations and Considerations

The NRP identifies prevention, preparation, response, and recovery as the four stages of incident management operations.

a. **Prevention.** CS missions require commanders to consider, within their legal limits, what prevention and preparation activities can be undertaken prior to an incident. Increasing public awareness of DOD countermeasures, elevating the national Homeland Security Advisory System, and assessing intelligence are some of the ways to help with prevention.

b. **Preparation.** DOD’s focus for CS missions is to prepare, as much as possible, prior to an incident occurring, and when practical, stage assets to facilitate a rapid response.

c. **Response.** DOD CS operations will normally be conducted during the response stage of domestic incident management. Response operations focus on those lifesaving and sustaining functions required by the population in the disaster area. Military forces normally redeploy as operations transition from the response to the recovery stage. Transition planning is based on completion of those CS tasks being accomplished by DOD forces, or unfinished mission assignments being transferred back to civil agencies at the federal or state level. This practice allows the military to return to its defense roles as soon as practicable.

d. **Recovery.** Recovery operations begin the process of returning the community infrastructure and services (both municipal and commercial) to a status that satisfies the needs of the population. The extent to which DOD CS operations remain involved in this process requires careful consideration.

3. Operational Phases

CS operations are generally conducted in five (5) phases: shaping, staging, deployment, civil support operations, and transition (see Figure III-4). During planning, the JFC establishes conditions,
objectives, or events for transitioning from one phase to another. Phases are designed to be conducted sequentially, but some activities from a phase may begin in a previous phase and continue into subsequent phases. A civil support operation may be conducted in multiple phases simultaneously if the JOA has

Figure III-4. Five Phases of a Civil Support Operation
widely varying conditions. For instance, the commander may begin the transition phase in areas where military support is no longer required, while remaining in the civil support operations phase in other areas.

a. Phase I, Shaping. Shaping is continuous situational awareness and preparedness. Actions in this phase include interagency coordination, exercises, and PA outreach. Shaping activities continue through all phases.

b. Phase II, Staging. Phase II begins with the identification of a potential CS mission, or when directed to provide CS by the SecDef. Actions in this phase include identifying force capabilities for response and placing them on increased alert, identifying materials and supplies (rations, medical items, tents, cots, etc.) for response and preposition, coordinating with OGAs for a mutually supporting response, and coordinating with NGB and state NG JFHQ elements to ensure DOD unity of effort. The Staging Phase ends with the issuance of a prepare to deploy order.

c. Phase III, Deployment. Phase III begins with response force deployment. However, force deployment can occur at any time in any phase, except phase I (Shaping). Forces are phased into and out of the JOA based on requirements to meet federal agency requests for federal assistance, the changing operational focus (crisis response to stabilization, then to sustainment operations), and as specialized capability requirements are identified. The deployment phase ends when response forces are ready to conduct operations in the JOA.

d. Phase IV, Civil Support Operations. Phase IV begins when the CS response commences. This phase includes the rapid employment of DOD capabilities in support of civil authorities. There will be considerable overlap between this phase and the previous deployment phase as units arrive in the operational area and begin providing support. Phase IV ends when supported ESFs no longer require DOD support.

e. Phase V, Transition. This final phase begins when DOD support to ESFs is no longer required. The transition phase ends when DOD response forces begin redeployment and are transferred back to their respective parent organizations.

4. Civil Support Planning Considerations

a. Environmental Considerations. Environmental considerations are an integral part of the mission planning and operational decision-making process. All joint operations within the US and US possessions and territories shall be conducted in compliance with applicable federal, state, and local environmental regulatory guidance. Adverse environmental impacts should be avoided or mitigated when practicable, based on mission requirements and response to emergency situations. 

For further information, see JP 3-34, Joint Engineering Operations.

b. Force Protection (FP). FP efforts in support of CS operations is central to achieving DOD mission assurance. It includes actions taken to prevent or mitigate dangerous conditions that could harm DOD personnel, resources, facilities, and critical information in an all-hazards environment. FP measures
can be defensive in nature, such as those used to reduce force and installation vulnerability to terrorist attacks or protect against CBRNE effects, or offensive, such as those taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. By conserving the force’s operating capabilities so that they can be applied at the decisive time and place, FP ensures the effective employment of the joint force in CS operations.

c. **Operations.** Ongoing military operations and HD requirements have priority over CS operations unless otherwise directed.

d. The duration and scope of DOD involvement will be related to the severity and magnitude of the event, and the requirements for DOD CS operations.

e. Facility requirements will first be met through existing local facilities, preferably government owned, organic portable or relocatable substitute facilities, or field construction.

f. DOD forces will rely on DOD facilities for support to the maximum extent possible. Short-term leasing may be a necessary option depending on location and duration. No occupation of private land or facilities is authorized without specific legal authority. Real property support may be obtained from the GSA, USACE, Naval Facilities Engineering Command, or other government agencies.

1. Key National Guidance

   a. **HSPD-5, Management of Domestic Incidents.** Assigns the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security as the principal Federal official for domestic incident management to coordinate the Federal government’s resources utilized in response to, or recovery from terrorist attacks, major disasters, or other emergencies. The Federal government assists state and local authorities when their resources are overwhelmed, or when Federal interests are involved. Nothing in the directive impairs or otherwise affects the authority of SecDef over DOD, including the chain of command for military forces. HSPD-5 directs that SecDef shall provide support to civil authorities for domestic incidents as directed by the President or when consistent with military readiness and appropriate under the circumstances and the law. SecDef retains command of military forces providing CS. Additionally, HSPD-5 directed the development of the NIMS to provide a consistent nationwide approach for federal, state, and local governments to work effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents. HSPD-5 also directs the development of the NRP, including classified annexes if required. The NRP, using NIMS, provides the structural mechanisms, national level policy, and operational direction for federal support to state and local incident managers.

   b. **HSPD-8, National Preparedness.** HSPD-8 established policies to strengthen the preparedness of the United States to prevent and respond to threats and actual domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies by requiring a national domestic all-hazards preparedness goal, establishing mechanisms for improved delivery of federal preparedness assistance to state and local governments, and outlining actions to strengthen preparedness capabilities of federal, state, and local entities.

   c. **The National Strategy for Homeland Security.** Prepared for the President by the Office of Homeland Security, this document lays out the strategic objectives, organization and critical areas for HS. The strategy identifies critical areas that focus on preventing terrorist attacks, reducing the nation’s vulnerabilities, minimizing the damage and recovering from attacks that do occur. These critical areas are compatible with the DOD framework for HS that is discussed in this publication.

   d. **The Homeland Security Act of 2002.** This Act established the Department of Homeland Security to coordinate all federal HS activities to protect the Nation against threats to the homeland. To better facilitate the overarching HS mission, Congress established DHS by merging numerous agencies into a single department.

   e. **The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act.** This Act set the policy of the Federal government to provide an orderly and continuing means of supplemental assistance to state and local governments in their responsibilities to alleviate the suffering and damage that result from major disasters or emergencies. It is the primary legal authority for federal participation in domestic disaster relief. Under the Stafford Act, the President may direct federal agencies, including DOD, to
support disaster relief. DOD may be directed to provide assistance in one of three different scenarios: a Presidential declaration of a major disaster, a Presidential order to perform emergency work for the preservation of life and property, or a Presidential declaration of emergency.

f. **The Economy Act (Title 31 USC, Section 1535).** The Economy Act permits one federal agency to request the support of another provided that the requested services cannot be obtained more cheaply or conveniently by contract. Under this act, a federal agency with lead responsibility may request the support of DOD without a Presidential declaration of an emergency as required by the Stafford Act.

g. **Posse Comitatus Act (Title 18 USC, Section 1385).** This federal statute places strict limits on the use of federal military personnel for law enforcement. Enacted in 1878, the PCA prohibits the willful use of the US Army (and later, the US Air Force) to execute the laws, except as authorized by the Congress or the US Constitution. Although the PCA, by its terms, refers only to the Army and Air Force, DOD policy extends the prohibitions of the Act to US Navy and Marine Corps forces, as well. Specifically prohibited activities include: interdiction of a vehicle, vessel, aircraft, or similar activity; search and/or seizure; arrest, apprehension, “stop-and-frisk” detentions, and similar activities; and use of military personnel for surveillance or pursuit of individuals, or as undercover agents, informants, investigators, or interrogators. Additionally, federal courts have recognized exceptions to the PCA. These common law exceptions are known as the “military purpose doctrine” and the “indirect assistance” exceptions. Exceptions and/or circumstances not falling under PCA include:

(1) Actions that are taken for the primary purpose of furthering a military or foreign affairs function of the United States.

(2) Federal troops acting pursuant to the President’s Constitutional and statutory authority to respond to civil disorder.

(3) Actions taken under express statutory authority to assist officials in executing the laws, subject to applicable limitations.

(4) CD operations authorized by statute.

The PCA does not apply to NG forces operating in state active duty or Title 32 USC status, nor to the USCG, which operates under Title 14 USC authority.

h. **Title 10 USC (Armed Forces).** Title 10 USC provides guidance on the Armed Forces. Guidance is divided into 5 subtitles. One on general military law and one each for the US Army, US Navy and US Marine Corps, the US Air Force and the RC. Chapter 18 (sections 371-382) of Title 10 USC is entitled and governs Military Support for Civilian LEAs.

i. **Title 32 USC (National Guard).** Title 32 USC authorizes the use of federal funds to train NG members while they remain under the C2 of their respective state governors. In certain limited instances, specific statutory or Presidential authority allows for those forces to perform operational missions funded
by the Federal government, while they remain under the control of the governor. Examples of those exceptions include the employment of WMD-CSTs, CD missions, and operations authorized by the President or SecDef under 32 USC 502(f) (i.e., Airport Security Mission in 2001 and Southwest Border Security Mission in 2006).

2. Key Department of Defense Guidance

   a. **Unified Command Plan (UCP).** The UCP provides basic guidance to all unified CDRs; establishes their missions, responsibilities, and force structure; delineates the general geographical AORs for GCCs; and specifies functional responsibilities for functional CDRs.

   b. **Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG).** The CPG reflects SecDef’s written policy guidance to the CJCS for contingency planning. It is issued with the approval of the President after consultation with the CJCS, provides the focus for the guidance in the NSS and Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG). The SPG is the principal source document for CJCSI 3110.01, *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan*.

   c. **Strategic Planning Guidance.** The SPG provides direction for DOD components to develop the future years defense program and the President’s budget submission. The four defense policy goals are to assure, dissuade, deter, and decisively defeat. The goals are articulated in a planning construct of deterring forward and winning decisively while defending at home. The SPG additionally lists the priorities of SecDef: winning the Global War on Terrorism, strengthening combined/joint warfighting capabilities, transforming the joint force, optimizing intelligence capabilities, counterproliferation, improving force manning, developing and implementing new concepts for global engagement, strengthening our ability to fulfill our responsibilities in HS, streamlining DOD processes, and reorganizing DOD and USG to deal with prewar opportunities and postwar responsibilities.

   d. **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Concept Plan 0500, Military Assistance to Domestic Consequence Management Operations in Response to a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or High-Yield Explosives Situation.** This plan provides SecDef with a wide range of military options to assist in the domestic CM operations in response to a CBRNE incident. It also informs GCCs of the full range of their CM responsibilities and it provides information and guidance for the conduct of domestic CM operations.

   e. **CJCSI 3110.16, Military Capabilities, Assets, and Units for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management Operations.** This instruction identifies and describes specific military capabilities, assets, and units potentially available to support military CM operations in response to CBRNE incidents. Although an actual CBRNE incident would involve a large array of DOD assets, this instruction primarily focuses on CM technical support and capabilities that are not generally found throughout the force. This instruction lists selected CBRNE CM capabilities, assets, and units by Service.

   f. **CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces.** SRUF provide operational guidance and establish fundamental policies and procedures
g. **CJCSI 3125.01, Military Assistance to Domestic Consequence Management Operations in Response to a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or High-Yield Explosives Situation.** This instruction provides operational and policy guidance and instructions for US military forces supporting domestic CM operations in preparation for responding to a CBRNE situation. This instruction only applies to domestic CM operations. This instruction is of specific importance to the geographic combatant commands with domestic CBRNE responsibilities.

h. **CJCSI 3710.01B, DOD Counterdrug Operational Support.** This instruction promulgates SecDef delegation of authority to approve certain CD operational support missions. It also provides, IAW each fiscal year’s national defense authorization act, instruction on authorized types of DOD (Title 10 USC) CD support to the federal agency with lead responsibility, other government agencies, and foreign nations.