

Strategic Planning by the Chairmen Joint Chiefs of Staff 1990 to 2005

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This article describes how four Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) used a strategic planning system to help enable them meet their leadership challenges from 1990 to 2005. It uses materiel from the author's doctoral dissertation, *Strategic Planning Through An Organizational Lens*, that was updated through 2005 to reflect Chairman Myers' strategic planning. It reflects the views of the author and does not reflect the official policy or positions of the U.S. Army War College, the Department of the Army, or the Defense Department.

INTRODUCTION

Military leaders at many levels have used strategic planning in various ways to position their organizations to respond to the demands of the current situation while simultaneously focusing on future challenges. This article examines how four Chairmen Joint Chiefs of Staff -- Generals Powell (1989-1993), Shalikashvili (1993-1997), Shelton (1997-2001) and Myers (2001-2005) -- used a strategic planning system to enable them to meet their statutory responsibilities specified in Title 10 US Code and respond to the strategic environment. As the 1990s progressed, the first three Chairmen were faced with responding to a strategic environment that was highlighted by the Gulf War and an increasing number of regional military operations across the spectrum of conflict, while accommodating slowly declining financial resources and a one-third decline in force structure. Since 2000, and particularly after September 2001, the last two Chairmen were faced with entirely different strategic challenges dominated by the focus on terrorism and the wars in Afghanistan and in Iraq, while simultaneously transforming by developing future capabilities to achieve full spectrum dominance.

In focusing on how these four leaders used a strategic planning system, this article briefly describes the Chairman's responsibilities as well as the Joint Staff's key organizational characteristics. Both the leader's focus and the organization's characteristics will influence how a strategic planning system is used. The paper then examines how the strategic planning system evolved to better meet each Chairman's needs. This planning system produced many products related to environmental assessment, vision, strategy, resources, and plans. These products will be described for their broad impact and influence. Because many of these products are classified, the assessments will necessarily be brief. This article then summarizes the more significant ways each Chairman used this strategic planning system, which is part of his leadership legacy.

While this comprehensive assessment of each Chairman's use of strategic planning has historical relevancy, its main value is that today's leaders can learn from how these four leaders used systems and processes differently to respond their complex global environment and varied strategic challenges. During this assessment, specific leadership concepts are illustrated throughout that include: how leaders use vision; how leaders balance flexibility and structure in strategic planning processes and products; how leaders use strategic planning to respond to

different types of global environment challenges; and how leaders use systems to influence an organization's climate and culture. Hence, this article concludes with identifying five key leadership concepts that future leaders should employ when using strategic planning.

CHAIRMAN'S RESPONSIBILITIES

Congress specified the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff's formal leadership responsibilities in Title 10 US Code, Section 153 under the following descriptive subheadings:¹ (1) Strategic direction; (2) Strategic planning; (3) Contingency planning and preparedness; (4) Advice on requirements, programs, and budget; (5) Doctrine, training, and education; and (6) Other matters. These increased responsibilities were a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (GNA), which is considered the most significant piece of defense legislation since the National Security Defense Act of 1947 established the Defense Department.² The GNA was the result of almost four years of contentious dialogue and debate among Congress, military leaders, the defense intellectual community, and the Reagan administration on how best to fundamentally organize the Defense Department to strengthen civilian authority, improve military advice to civilian leaders, provide for more efficient use of resources, and better execute in the field to respond to the nation's security challenges.³

Since the US Code was changed to incorporate the GNA's provisions, the major functions and the broad wording describing the Chairman's key responsibilities have fundamentally remained the same, but there have been a few additions. These additions are associated with reports required by Congress, which were not envisioned in 1986, to assist them with their oversight and resource responsibilities. For example, the Chairman must now produce an annual report on Combatant Command requirements about the time when a budget is submitted to Congress. Most significantly, the 2004 National Defense Authorization Act required the Chairman produce, by 15 February of every odd-numbered year, a detailed report that is a biennial review of the National Military Strategy to include the strategic and military risks to execute that strategy.⁴ This 2004 Act cleared up ambiguity that existed as to whether the Chairman actually needed to produce a National Military Strategy and what it should encompass. This change to existing US Code is an example where the Chairman's responsibilities were initially broad and identified "what" he had to do vice "how" to do it, but if Congress was not satisfied with execution or information, then the subsequent Code becomes more specific.

To help with executing his responsibilities, the Joint Staff now directly supports the Chairman, an important distinction emphasized in the GNA. The Joint Staff has a budget under \$700 million and consists of approximately 700 military officers, 210 enlisted members, and 195 civilians, which is about a 15 percent military reduction from 2000.⁵ Further, there are others, such as those in the Defense Intelligence Agency or contractors, who work alongside this staff to support directly their focused work. The Chairmen used a well-documented strategic planning system, which formally evolved four different times (1990, 1993, 1997 and 1999), to help them execute the first four formal responsibilities identified earlier.⁶ This planning system's importance is reflected by the words "primary" and "formal" that appeared in the beginning of all Joint Staff guidance that described the desired impact of its products and processes.

The Chairman's strategic planning system produces products to integrate defense

processes and influence others related to environmental assessment, vision, strategy, resources, and plans.⁷ This planning system integrates the processes and documents of the people and organizations above the Chairman (President and Secretary of Defense) and the people and organizations he directly coordinates with (Services and Combatant Commanders). The Chairman has no control over any significant defense resources (Secretary of Defense and Services control resources) or direct control of operational military forces (Combatant Commanders control operational forces); however, orders to those forces flow through him. The Chairman formally influences his civilian leaders and those he coordinates with through this strategic planning system. In addition to influencing leaders, this system provides specific direction for many staffs that support these leaders. As such, this planning system is a key function that integrates the Nation's strategy, plans, and resources consisting of approximately 2.24 million active, guard, and reserve forces and total defense outlays of \$290B in 2000 that increased to \$465B by 2005.⁸

STRATEGIC CHALLENGES, CULTURE, AND STRUCTURE

Strategic challenges can affect both a leader's and staff's use of a strategic planning system. The major challenges the Chairmen faced in the 1990s are characterized by the following: global competition and regional instability; increased military operations across the spectrum of conflict; slowly declining financial and personnel resources; rising maintenance and infrastructure costs; Cold-War focused equipment; and a need to infuse new technology. Since 2000, with the Secretary of Defense's initial focus on transformation, followed shortly by the Global War on Terrorism and then the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, these challenges significantly changed in scope and character. To meet these new challenges there was an increase of financial resources and better integrated technology, but there was no military manpower growth.⁹

Each Chairman generally used a consensus and collaborative leadership style when dealing with civilian and military leaders, but there were differences in their style and focus.¹⁰ This style and focus can have important influences on their organization's climate and culture. What they pay attention to, what they say, and what organizational systems they use can embed and reinforce a certain culture within their organization.¹¹ The Chairman establishes his unique "joint" climate that has been shaped by years of Service culture and experiences. The other Joint Chiefs, who serve dually as their separate military Service Chiefs, may embrace that joint climate. But, they are also steeped in their Service culture and have specific Service interests and Title 10 responsibilities they must articulate and sometimes defend. Each Service Chief routinely identified unfunded needs to improve effectiveness. The officers on the Joint Staff, who have specific joint responsibilities among the eight Staff directorates, only serve in this joint climate between two to three years before returning to their respective Services. While, developing a joint culture was difficult, a strategic planning system can be an important reinforcing mechanism leaders can use to change existing culture.

In addition to these culture issues, there are multiple structural layers between the highest and the lowest levels of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A strategic planning system must integrate the focused interests within these levels. For example, to process a typical Joint Staff action there are between four and six layers where an issue will be scrutinized and revised to respond to these

focused interests. This occurs typically as the staff action flows from action officer to division chief to the first general officer to J-staff Director to Director Joint Staff and finally to Vice Chairman or Chairman. Within these structural layers there are the historic cultural influences officers bring with them when working on or with this staff for a short time. Hence a strategic planning system must be both inclusive and flexible enough to accommodate these staff structural realities, while being responsive to the leader’s needs. Table 1 summarizes these strategic planning challenges and decision-making influences.

Table 1: Key Challenge and Decision-making Influences

Joint Chiefs of Staff 1990 – 2005	
1990s Challenges	2000s Challenges
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A. Regional competition and threats B. Gulf War C. Greater number military operations D. Declining financial and personnel resources E. Need to integrate technology F. Well maintained Cold War Equipment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A. Global War on Terror B. Iraq and Afghanistan C. Continued global engagements D. Increasing financial resources E. Need to transform to capabilities F. Updated but worn equipment
Decision-Making Influences:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A. Chairman uses consensus and collaborative leadership style with little direct control B. Joint climate versus Service’s unique culture C. Financial focus on effectiveness D. Four to six structural layers to process actions 	

STRATEGIC PLANNING SYSTEM CHANGES

Having identified the leader’s challenge, culture, and structure as they influence strategic planning, this article now focuses on the changes to the planning system itself to give one insight into its use. There were four formal changes to the strategic planning system in 1990, 1993, 1997 and 1999. The 1999 version, while the official version in 2005, has not been completely followed, and it is currently being revised. These formal changes, along with the current system in use, will now be examined.

1989 STATUS: Prior to 1990 there was a realization that the strategic planning system, as specified in the 24 January 1989 *Memorandum of Policy No. 84*, was not accomplishing its purpose to enable the Chairman to execute fully his increased 1986 GNA responsibilities. This memorandum, the 17th revision since 1952, was described as “... unwieldy, complex, and bureaucratic and produced no less than 10 major documents every 2-year planning cycle.” Congress criticized the strategic planning process itself during hearings that led to passing the GNA.¹² Hence, the Joint Staff’s Director of Strategy and Planning was tasked to “... undertake an end-to end evaluation of the products which are created by the Joint Strategic Planning System ... to seek further opportunities in the cogency and timeliness of the process and products.”¹³ Such a comprehensive evaluation was the exception and not the norm.

1990 CHANGE: The outcome of this complete system overhaul culminated with *Memorandum of Policy No. 7*, dated 30 January 1990.¹⁴ This change streamlined the system by adding front-end leader’s guidance and eliminating or combining many other documents into

more concise products as 10 products were reduced to four. The front-end guidance was provided through a formal joint strategy review for "... gathering information, raising issues, and facilitating the integration of strategy, operational planning and program assessments,"¹⁵ that culminated in publishing its first product – *Chairman's Guidance*. This concise document (6 to 10 pages) was structured to provide the principal, initial guidance in support of developing the planning system's next three documents: the *National Military Strategy Document*, *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan*, and the *Chairman's Program Assessment*.

This system, although streamlined, still required that a classified *National Military Strategy Document* (NMSD) be produced under a rigid two-year cycle with several parts, one which was called *National Military Strategy*. In addition, there were several separate functional annexes added to this document, such as intelligence and research and development that totaled hundreds of pages. One annex alone had 11 chapters, 13 tables, and 15 tabs. The part of the NSMD called the *National Military Strategy* (also classified) was sent to the Secretary of Defense for review, forwarded to the President for approval, and then returned to influence defense resource guidance. As will be later described, only the *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan* was produced as specified in the memorandum; the other three documents were significantly changed during execution. These changes during execution enabled the Chairman to respond more nimbly to the strategic environment then dominated by the Soviet Union's demise and the Gulf War's quick completion.

1993 CHANGE: The next revision to the organization's planning system culminated with publishing a change to the *Memorandum of Policy No. 7* in 1993.¹⁶ This change essentially codified what had been executed in previous years rather than designing a new system. Major revisions, which built on these practices, included the following: place more focus on long-range planning overall by requiring formal environmental scanning; issue the *National Military Strategy* as an unclassified document designed to communicate with the American people rather than providing internal military direction; and establish a *Joint Planning Document* to sharpen the Chairman's advice to the Secretary of Defense on budget issues. The process and product, called the *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan* that provided guidance to Combatant Commanders to develop plans to execute the strategy in the field, remained fairly constant.

1997 CHANGE: The next major revision to the strategic planning system occurred in 1997 and again reflected execution changes the Chairman instituted in prior years.¹⁷ The Chairman needed to provide better resource advice and long-range direction to enable defense leaders to make needed mission or weapon-system trade offs required by fiscally constrained defense budgets. His planning system did not provide him this ability.


To provide him this ability, in 1994 General Shalikashvili expanded the charter of the existing Joint Requirements Oversight Council.¹⁸ This council, chaired by his deputy and included the Services' deputies, was empowered to assess specific warfighting areas. This expanded charter created analytical rigor in an inclusive review process to shape mission or weapon system decisions among the Services. It provided recommendations that later appeared in a new leader-focused resource document called the *Chairman's Program Recommendation*. The older Chairman's assessment was retained. In 1996, General Shalikashvili published the first Chairman's vision, *Joint Vision 2010*, a 34-page document designed to provide the

conceptual template to channel the vitality of people and leverage technology to achieve more effective joint warfighting.¹⁹ These two new planning products were formally added to the planning system's guidance published in 1997 as a Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction was issued and Memoranda of Policies were phased out.

1999 CHANGE: The final formal change to the strategic planning system in 1999 was only minor.²⁰ It did not change any major processes or products. Instead, it placed more focus on Theater Engagement Plans to integrate the strategy's "shape component" and on implementing the 1996 Joint Vision, which was a priority General Shelton identified when he became Chairman. This decade's evolution is graphically illustrated in *Figure 1*.²¹ These changes incrementally evolved the strategic planning system from a rigid, Cold War focus at the decade's start to a more flexible, vision oriented, and resource focused system at the decade's end.

Figure 1

Evolution of strategic planning system




2005 SYSTEM: While there have been no official changes to the 1999 Chairman's operating instruction that describes the strategic planning system as of November 2005, it has not been completely followed during General Myers' tenure. Three strategic planning documents have been added, two were deleted, and four retained. The three new products added from the 1999 revision were: *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism*, *Chairman's Risk Assessment*, and the *Joint Operating Concepts* (changed to *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* in August 2005). The two strategic planning products deleted were the Joint Vision

(vision is now embedded in the strategy) and *Joint Planning Document* (staff resource advice). The unclassified strategy, two leader-focused resource documents, and the war planning guidance remained the same. As the 1999 operating instruction is currently under revision, the next one will be influenced by these practical changes and a recent study on strategic planning by the Institute for Defense Analysis. These just described strategic planning system changes as of June 2005 and integrating relationships are depicted in *Figure 2*.²²

Figure 2



Strategy: Foundation for all Major Processes



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STRATEGIC PLANNING PRODUCTS

The Chairman's strategic planning process just described created many products to provide formal direction to manage existing demands and respond to future challenges during this 16 year period. As mentioned, there were products related to environmental assessment, vision, strategy, resources, and plans; all subjects identified in the academic literature as what a strategic planning system should address. The key planning products in each of these major subjects are now discussed for their broad direction.

ASSESSMENT: The Chairmen's assessment of the strategic environment, called the *Joint Strategy Review*, became a constant strategic planning product beginning in 1993; however,

it was completed in different ways and with different focuses.²³ A separate classified report was frequently issued, but at other times the intellectual output from the review process was used to update this system's strategy or vision documents or prepare the Joint Staff to support the *Quadrennial Defense Review*. When a separate report was produced, it would often identify issues that needed more intense study or areas where existing strategic planning products needed updating. The Chairman directed what the strategy review would entail prior to its start, hence this review was responsive to strategic issues he needed examined. The strategy review process was not conducted within the Joint Staff alone but included representatives from the Services, Combatant Commands, and appropriate Defense organizations. The process was inclusive in design, allowing ideas to be initially input from an organization's lower levels, which helped ensure this strategy review had a broad perspective that resonated with those the Chairman influenced.

Another type of assessment, now called the *Chairman's Risk Assessment*, has been part of the strategic planning system since 2000. Earlier, the Chairman assessed strategic issues under the overarching construct of a net assessment, which was loosely defined in his planning instructions and did not always result in a formal product. In addition, Congress required the Chairman to write an assessment of the Secretary of Defense's *Quadrennial Defense Review*, which appeared at this document's end. The Chairman's current risk assessment started an annual assessment with the 2000 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA),²⁴ and this was modified with greater specificity by the 2004 NDAA.²⁵ The Chairman is now required to conduct a comprehensive examination of the *National Military Strategy* to include the strategic and military risk to execute that strategy. There are eight areas this report must address, along with a requirement that it must be routed through the Secretary of Defense if risk is determined significant.

VISION: The strategic planning system's first two vision documents, *Joint Vision 2010* in 1996, and *Joint Vision 2020* in 2000, each consisted of about 35 pages.²⁶ They were used to identify joint warfighting requirements 10 to 15 years out and directly influence Service programs to meet those requirements. In organizational terms, this was a way the Chairman was trying to embed a joint climate within the Services' culture through resource decisions. The first vision was centered on four operational concepts of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full-dimensional protection. It served to focus attention and leverage technology to achieve better joint interoperability and warfighting. The second vision directly built upon the first, as it kept the same four operational concepts. But it placed more emphasis on innovation, information, and interagency to transform the force to be "fully joint;" now defined as "intellectually, operationally, organizationally, doctrinally and technically."²⁷ Both visions had broad acceptance as Service leaders spoke positively about each vision's influence in shaping their decisions or in influencing their Service visions. These two visions were the most mentioned strategic planning product in the Chairman's annual posture statements to Congress during this time frame, which indicates its importance.²⁸

The current joint vision is now embedded in three pages of the 2004 *National Military Strategy*. This vision built upon the previous joint vision, as it is focused on the goal of full spectrum dominance, which is defined as "the ability to control any situation or defeat any adversary across the range of military operations."²⁹ While the Chairman's vision is still

specified, its purpose to influence Service resource decisions was replaced by the Secretary of Defense's transformation guidance documents in the 2000s, and Services developed transformation plans to execute this guidance. However, the vision of full spectrum dominance is in conceptual agreement with the more detailed transformation guidance.

Vision can be operationally focused in addition to being strategic. The Chairman's *Joint Operations Concepts* in 2003 and now the *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* in 2005 provided an operational warfighting focus to develop a capabilities-based joint force.³⁰ This capabilities focus was described in the 2001 *Quadrennial Defense Review* and later in other defense guidance. The focus of the 28-page *Joint Operations Concepts* was to articulate the overarching concept for future joint military operations. It broadly defined the construct for robust subordinate operating, functional, and enabling concepts to create joint capabilities. The 2005 *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* incorporated lessons learned from operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, while looking to the future to develop capabilities to fight tomorrow's wars. These operationally-focused vision documents, and the substantive complex processes and products developed to implement these concepts, are encouraging military personnel to think and act joint. The earlier joint visions, along with these operational-focused concepts, will complete the joint journey that began with Service de-confliction in the early 90s, to interoperability in the mid 90s, to now emerging interdependence. This is a journey to create a joint military culture.

STRATEGY: The Chairman's unclassified *National Military Strategy*, the key strategic planning system product, was produced in 1992, 1995, 1997 and 2004.³¹ These four strategies: broadly outlined the military's global challenges; identified the objectives to be achieved; specified the foundations and principles of military power; and described the force structure or capabilities to achieve those objectives. This was essentially an *ends, ways, and means* paradigm to respond to the ever-changing strategic environment. In the first three strategies the Service's force structure was defined broadly (carrier battle groups, divisions, and wings), but with greater specificity as the decade continued. For example, the 1997 strategy identified the numbers of Army regiments and brigades, Navy attack submarines, Coast Guard cutters, and Special Operations people. In the 2004 strategy there was no reference to specific force structure. Instead, joint force attributes and capabilities were broadly identified, along with a need to size the force in a 1-4-2-1 construct to accomplish the following: defend the homeland (1), deter forward in and from four regions (4); conduct two overlapping defeat campaigns (2); and win decisively in one campaign (1). This latest approach was designed to provide flexibility for force structure changes in concert with a capability vice a threat-based military focus.

When the 1990s began, the strategy was focused on Global war, and the enemy was the Soviet Union. The 1992 strategy changed the focus to the core mission of fighting regional wars. The 1995 strategy more broadly encompassed global engagement across the spectrum of conflict from peacekeeping, to peacemaking, to war. In 1997, the strategy provided a balance between shaping the environment, responding to the multiple missions, and preparing now for the uncertain future. The words *shape, respond, and prepare* and their concepts appeared in many other strategic documents, such as the 1997 *National Security Strategy* and 1997 *Quadrennial Defense Review*. As these strategies changed in the 1990s, the force structure to accomplish these strategies was reduced by about one-third. In 2004, the strategy was simply articulated along three "P" words – "*protect* the United States against external attacks and aggression;

prevent conflict and surprise attack; and *prevail* against adversaries.”³² Its success rested on the three priorities of wining the War on Terrorism, enhancing the ability to fight jointly, and transforming the Armed Forces through a combination of technology, intellect, and cultural adjustments.

In addition to the unclassified national military strategies, there were two classified strategies produced that were focused on the War on Terrorism. In October 2002, Chairman Myers and the Secretary of Defense issued a *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism* to provide guidance to the military services and regional commanders to focus their efforts.³³ Later in March 2005 they issued an update to that plan. This update, which went through many revisions, was described in an news article as “... a multipronged strategy that targets eight pressure points and outlines six methods for attacking terrorists networks.”³⁴

RESOURCES: The Chairman’s three resource documents (*Joint Planning Document*, *Chairman’s Program Recommendation*, and *Chairman’s Program Assessment*) expanded in the mid-1990s as strategic planning processes were developed to influence resource decisions.³⁵ These resource documents, along with the Defense documents they were intended to influence, were classified. As the decade progressed these documents were focused to enable the Chairman to provide more resource influence and specificity, a requirement emphasized by the GNA.

The staff-focused resource document, *Joint Planning Document*, was produced bi-annually starting in 1993. It went from separate chapters developed by Joint Staff directorates or separate agencies to a fully integrated resource document in 1997 that used the Chairman’s vision and warfighting assessments to produce integrated resource advice. However by decade’s end, this document was no longer published, which perhaps was an indicator of its ineffective influence.

The planning system’s two leader-focused annual resource documents, *Chairman’s Program Recommendation* and *Chairman’s Program Assessment*, increased in influence and specificity starting in the middle 1990s. For example, the *Chairman’s Program Assessment* went from a few pages in 1992 to an expanded assessment in 1995 that argued for shifting significant funds and pursuing different approaches for recapitalization that would readjust up to 12 percent of the defense budget.³⁶ These two leader-focused documents, which reflected the Chairman’s style and priorities, were considered personal correspondence between the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense. Hence, they had limited external review and were classified. The program recommendation was designed to influence the Secretary’s initial resource guidance to the Services. The program assessment was designed to enable the Chairman to assess the Service’s Program Objective Memorandums (POMs) and influence budget deliberations which converted the Services POMs to the defense budget submitted to Congress. These two documents, which were shaped by the JROC’s meetings, were vetted with the Service Chiefs and Combatant Commanders instead of being merely coordinated. They were a formal way the Chairman, in addition to other resource advice, directly advocated Combatant Commander’s requirements within Defense processes.

PLANS: The *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan* was the one constant among all the strategic planning changes during this 16-year period. It continued to have the same purpose,

which was to provide strategic guidance to the Combatant Commanders and Service Chiefs to develop executable plans based on resourced military capabilities to execute the military strategy.³⁷ More specifically, it identified the various types of plans that Combatant Commanders must develop, as this document integrated higher-level guidance from the President and Secretary of Defense into a family of executable plans and apportioned forces based on completed budgets. It identified the agreed assumptions upon which these plans were based and specified the numerous functional annexes required by specific plans, such as intelligence, logistics, and mobility.

The actual contents of the JSCP were classified, but it evolved during this 16-year time period, as the types of plans it tasked changed in response to the changing threats and the different military strategies. For example, in 1990 it specified global (Cold War focused) and regional plans. They were replaced in 1993 with Operational Plans (OPLANS), Concept Plans (CONPLANS), and concept summaries for global and regional contingencies. Later there was guidance to develop theater engagement plans, which are now called security cooperation plans. In the 1990s these products continued to be formally reviewed for currency within an overall 2-year planning cycle, and were republished or amended during this cycle. In the 2000s, the intent was to shorten this planning cycle to one year, and the process by which Combatant Commanders develop plans also received additional Secretary of Defense involvement.

CHAIRMAN'S LEGACY

GENERAL POWELL (1989-1993): General Powell greatly simplified strategic planning by reducing the number of formal planning products from 10 to 4 and increased the system's flexibility to respond to his direction by a concise leader-focused document called *Chairman's Guidance*. He short-circuited the system's processes, as he did not wait for a completed environmental assessment specified by his planning system, but issued this guidance based on a senior commander's meeting.³⁸ He did not wait for his planning system's structured processes and coordination cycles to produce another classified, voluminous military strategy document with hundreds of pages of annexes, but published an unclassified 27-page *National Military Strategy* in 1992 under his signature.

Considered the most significant strategy change since the 1950s, this strategy's content, overall coordination, and the force structure incorporated within it were more a result of his interpersonal skills than of a formal strategic planning process.³⁹ This strategy's focus on communicating with the American people and Congress, versus the internal staff advice it provided before, was an important legacy that remains today. In the resource area, while his planning system specified a detailed assessment of Service programs not to exceed 175 pages, his assessment was a very short memorandum.⁴⁰ While General Powell did not use many formal planning processes he kept some structure. For example, he used the *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan* and structured processes to keep the military in the field operationally focused.

While his strategic planning products clearly addressed the military's challenges as identified in the Chairman's annual Posture Statements to Congress, very few strategic planning products or processes (average five) were mentioned in his statements. In addition, the word "joint" was also not emphasized in his lexicon, as this word barely appeared in these same

statements.⁴¹ As the first Chairman fully under the GNA's direction, a joint climate had not yet evolved. Since he did not follow his planning system in producing three of its four products, either the system was not nimble enough to respond to fast-moving challenges or he preferred a leadership style where personal relationships dominated when providing formal advice.

GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI (1993-1997): General Shalikashvili used the strategic planning system markedly different than his predecessor. He kept the flexibility and simplicity his predecessor established by limiting the strategies' complexity, but he emphasized using the planning processes to develop them. For example, his two national military strategies in 1995 and 1997 were coordinated fully within the planning system's processes, and other strategic planning products were used in their development. He kept the same structure in war planning as his predecessor, but he expanded its focus by requiring new theater engagement plans to more fully implement his 1997 strategy's "shape" component.

General Shalikashvili went further in providing long-term strategic direction, when he published the Chairman's first Vision in 1996 and later included it in the planning system. He used considerable interpersonal skills, which included sending personal notes to his colleagues and personally reviewing every recommended change, to develop this Vision.⁴² He used this same strategic planning system to start an implementing process for the Vision. He also fostered a close relationship with defense officials using the strategic planning system through his consensus and process-focused decision style. For example, his Vision gained wide acceptance with civilian and military leaders, aspects of it appeared in Defense resource documents, and his environment assessment helped focus the initial work of the Defense's first *Quadrennial Defense Review*.⁴³

General Shalikashvili expanded strategic planning in the resource areas, as he added a short leader-focused document called the *Chairman's Program Recommendation* that continues today. He used his Vice Chairman to expand by roughly a factor of ten the amount of time spent by the JROC to analytically assess programs and provide resource recommendations that appeared in his two leader-focused resource documents.⁴⁴ Using outputs from this council, his resource advice to the Secretary of Defense grew in content and influence. He mentioned strategic planning products and processes in his annual Posture Statements to Congress an average of 15 times versus his predecessor's average of five. He also mentioned the word joint or derivatives of that word about 25 times during these posture statements, which is an indicator of his focus.⁴⁵ Perhaps his most important legacy was that his Vision, process-focused strategic planning system, and joint emphasis embedded a joint climate within his staff and those he influenced. This established the foundation for today's joint thinking.

GENERAL SHELTON (1997-2001): General Shelton used the strategic planning system in a very process-oriented manner. No substantive changes were made to this system overall, but he focused on using it to promote evolutionary changes to the military and provide difficult resource recommendations. Similar to his predecessors, he kept the heavily structured war planning document and processes relatively untouched, but he more fully integrated theater engagement plans within planning processes. He defined a process to implement his predecessor's joint vision by identifying 21st century challenges and the desired operating capabilities to meet them, while providing direction to conduct vision-related experiments.⁴⁶ At

the later part of his tenure, he fully used the strategic planning processes to formally update the Joint Vision in 2000 to better incorporate concepts associated with leveraging the information component, encouraging more innovation, and using the interagency to help resolve strategic issues.⁴⁷

He also improved the process and timeliness of the leader-focused strategic planning resource recommendations to defense leaders. He elevated the work of Joint Requirements Oversight Council and the associated processes to be more strategic in nature.⁴⁸ He used his resources and leadership influence to more directly support quality of life programs for military people and their families, the importance of which was specifically covered in his Congressional Posture Statements.⁴⁹ For example, he mentioned strategic planning products and processes an average of 22 times and joint 44 times in these posture statements, which were indicators of his process and joint leadership focus.⁵⁰ Most importantly, he clearly continued the joint focus. He built on General Shalikashvili's work to more strongly embed that joint climate and perhaps establish the beginning of a joint culture within his Staff and the Services.

GENERAL MYERS (2001-2005): General Myers faced a more challenging strategic environment caused by the September 11, 2001 attack. His environment was dominated by the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, along with the Global War on Terrorism that continues today. If this was not enough, the need to transform in stride also occupied his and his staff's energy. These challenges caused him to significantly modify the strategic planning system he inherited. He referenced strategic planning processes and products more than any other Chairman, illustrating the importance he placed on this system.⁵¹ These modifications, which involved three new strategy-related products, have not yet been codified in a strategic planning Chairman's instruction. However, instructions have been published that specify the processes used by the JROC and new Functional Control Boards that shape issues before the JROC. The programs this council reviewed also greatly expanded, which provided greater joint inclusiveness in his resource advice.⁵² To illustrate this greater inclusiveness, the Functional Control Boards review all programs with a joint impact instead of those with large dollar criteria only, and members of defense agencies or even the agencies in the government such as Homeland Security attend meeting associated with these programs.

The strategy parts of his strategic planning system differed most from his predecessors. He and the Secretary of Defense produced a separate classified strategy focused on the War on Terrorism in 2002, and updated it in 2005 to better link the military element to the many other national strategies associated with combating terrorism. The Chairman's 2004 *National Military Strategy*, redrafted numerous times, was completed in May 2004 as the need for a Chairman's military strategy along with the need to assess the strategic and military risk to execute that strategy was clarified by Congress in the 2004 NDAA. He also succinctly identified the overall joint vision in this strategy.

Chairman Myers' identified the importance of a joint culture or being "born joint" in several of his Posture Statements.⁵³ His focus on operationalizing a vision with the additional joint concepts and inclusive processes resulting from the 2003 *Joint Operating Concepts* and 2005 *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* have the potential to create a remarkable legacy for transforming to a true joint force. He instituted a greater top-down and combatant commander

input on jointness to develop capabilities to create a synergistic joint end-state now called interdependency. It is too early to determine the result of his efforts as developing capabilities to achieve joint interdependency takes years; however, he not only enhanced the joint climate, but perhaps established a culture of real jointness among all the military services. Creating a culture is much more difficult than a climate, but it is so powerful once established.

CONCLUSION

Today's senior leaders can learn from examining how others used systems or processes to better enable their organization to respond to complex and ambiguous strategic challenges. There are five key leadership concepts today's leaders should employ from examining how four Chairmen of different leadership styles used an evolving strategic planning system to respond to the complex and ever changing strategic environment. These leadership concepts are organized along the five following areas: importance of a vision; key characteristics of an effective strategic planning process; the need to strike a balance between flexibility and structure within strategic planning system's products; understanding the magnitude of change needed; and using systems and processes to create a culture.

The first leadership concept is that leaders need to clearly articulate a vision, owned by the organization, as part of the strategic planning system to effectively influence long-term change. Chairman Shalikashvili clearly identified a need for a joint vision in 1996 and employed an inclusive leader-involved process to create that vision, which had wide acceptance among those he coordinate with and those above him. Chairman Shelton followed this and developed comprehensive processes to implement that vision, before he formally updated the joint vision in 2000 to place more emphasis on innovation, information, and interagency. Chairman Myers continued with a vision focus through his two concept guidance documents to transform the military to a higher level of jointness. Much of the joint warfighting progress to date can be traced back to the first two visions, and the current vision to achieve full spectrum dominance is being directed by the 2005 *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations*.

The second leadership concept is that a leader needs to ensure their strategic planning processes are flexible, inclusive, and integrated to improve effectiveness. The flexible aspect rests with the fact that in execution each Chairman modified to different degrees the strategic planning system they inherited. This was caused by the leader's style and the strategic environment. For example, Chairman Powell's modification of the planning system from ten classified, voluminous products into four of greater clarity and simplicity and developed more nimbly was influenced by the Cold War's demise and his personal leadership style. Chairman Shalikashvili's addition of leader-focused resource advice and joint vision was influenced by the tight fiscal environment and more of his process-oriented style. The inclusive aspect is supported by the diverse composition of the joint boards and councils that developed strategic planning products, which allowed divergent views to be heard, understood, and incorporated. Interviews with strategic planners identified that these inclusive processes educated and created important relationships, and many planners even considered planning processes more important than products.⁵⁴ The integrated nature aspect goes one step further than inclusiveness in that this system's planning processes directly influenced other Defense, Services, and Combatant Commanders leaders and their processes to ensure the end result was integrated.

The third leadership concept centers on the need for leaders to ensure their strategic planning products have the proper balance between flexibility and structure. The Chairman's strategic planning products related to strategy and vision had great flexibility in providing broad direction, which enabled staffs to use their intellectual capacities to develop a wide range of successful responses to complex issues. The Chairman's strategic planning products related to plans had a much greater degree of structure to provide the needed disciplined direction to execute those strategies. This disciplined direction in developing war plans is driven by the systems integration and overall synchronization that is associated with joint interdependence needed by the supportive and supporting Combatant Commanders. Disciplined direction in developing war plans then allows the creativity needed in execution, as disciplined planning considers various options that are vetted prior to execution.

The fourth leadership concept is that leaders need to understand the relationship between the magnitude and speed of change needed and how a strategic planning system can be used to influence that change. If change is needed quickly and is revolutionary in scope, then leaders should not use a strategic planning system but work outside that formal system. For example, when Chairman Powell created the 1992 *National Military Strategy*, a strategy revolutionary in substance when compared its predecessors, he did not follow the processes or product characteristics described in his strategic planning system. Similarly, Chairman Shalikashvili did not follow his strategic planning system but used extraordinary personnel interaction when creating the Chairman's first Joint Vision, a direction thought outside the Chairman's domain. However, in implementing both this strategy and vision, which would take a decade or more, the strategic planning system was heavily used. Hence, a strategic planning system is more valued to make the needed evolutionary changes over time that can lead to revolutionary results.

The last leadership concept is that leader can use a strategic planning system to help them create a climate and embed a culture within complex organizations. While there have been many other mechanisms which influenced a joint culture such as Congressional-required joint promotion, assignment, and educational criteria, the strategic planning system reinforced these mechanisms. While Chairman Powell was just starting to create a joint climate, Chairman Shalikashvili greatly reinforced that climate with his strategic planning's joint vision and inclusive planning bodies that developed the system's resource products. Chairman Shelton reinforced that joint climate and started the beginning of a joint culture through implementing the Joint Vision and more inclusive planning bodies. Chairman Myers focused on embedding a joint culture through his expansive joint operating concepts and more inclusive functional capabilities boards. It is this author's belief from working within and studying the effects of strategic planning during this period that a culture of jointness, envisioned in the heart and spirit of many of our nation's civilian and military leaders, has taken hold within the higher levels of the Joint Staff and the Services. The strategic planning system clearly assisted this joint cultural evolution

Leaders of complex organizations who embrace those concepts just mentioned will be able to better use a strategic planning system to respond to their strategic challenges and provide direction to their organization to meet the current demands while positioning for the future. History has shown that the Chairman's ever evolving strategic planning system comprised of inclusive and flexible processes along with the right combination of flexibility and structure in

products was important in enabling him to provide strategic advice and direction to our nation's civilian and military leaders during volatile and uncertain times.

¹ Robert H. Cole, et al., *The Chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff* (Washington D.C.: Joint History Office, 1995), 207-209.

² *Ibid.*, 30.

³ U.S. Congress House of Representatives, *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Conference Report (99-824)*, 99th Congress, 2nd session, September 12, 1986, Section 3 and Richard Meinhart, *Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff's Leadership using the Joint Strategic Planning System in the 1990s: Recommendations for Strategic Leaders* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003), 2-7.

⁴ House Report 108-354 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Section 903. “Biennial Review of the National Military Strategy by Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff,” available from <http://thomas.loc.gov/>; accessed 11 November, 2005.

⁵ The Joint Staff, “Fiscal Year (FY) 2004/ FY 2005 Biennial Budget Estimates,” February 2003 available from http://www.dod.gov/comptroller/defbudget/fy2004/budget_justification/pdfs/operation/Volume_1_-_DW_Justification/TJS_FY04-05_PB.pdf; Internet accessed 30 November 2005. Personnel reductions reflect 1999 defense reform initiatives and 2002 National Defense Authorization Act guidance.

⁶ Detailed strategic planning guidance was reflected in Memorandum of Policy (MOP) 7, 1990; MOP 7, 1993, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3100.01, 1997 and CJCSI 3100.01A, 1999.

⁷ Discussion that follows on relationships and integration of the leader with organizations above the Chairman and those he coordinates with is covered in the 2000 edition of *The Joint Staff Officers Guide* and in the memorandum and instructions that define the organization's strategic planning system.

⁸ Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), “*National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2006*” April, 2005 and “*National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2001*” March, 2000, 4 & 33 both sources.

⁹ Challenge discussion is author's assessment from reading the four national military strategies and attending Service Chiefs lectures while teaching at the Army War College.

¹⁰ Davis, 160 and Meinhart, 2003, 11-12. Some Chairman such as Powell had a more developed personal relationship with many leaders in the Washington DC based on past experiences than General Shelton, who was relatively new to this strategic arena. In addition, each succeeding Chairman used “joint” words with varying frequency in their annual Congressional Posture statements.

¹¹ Edgar H Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership* (San Francisco: Jossey Bass 1993), 231.

¹² Douglas C. Lovelace Jr. and Thomas-Durell Young, *U.S. Department of Defense Strategic Planning: The Missing Nexus*, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003), 10 and 35-36.

¹³ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *CJCS Memorandum of Policy No. 84 (CJCS MOP 84), Joint Strategic Planning System*, (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 30 January 1989), 3.

¹⁴ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Memorandum of Policy No.7 (CJCS MOP 7), Joint Strategic Planning System*, (Washington D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 30 January 1990). Discussed reflects materiel in this document.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 20.

¹⁶ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *CJCS Memorandum of Policy No .7 (CJCS MOP 7), Joint Strategic Planning System*, (Washington D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1st Revision, 17 March 1993). Discussion reflects materiel in this document.

¹⁷ Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3100.01 (CJCSI 3100.01), *Joint Strategic Planning System* (Washington D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff 1 September 1997). Note: Chairman's instructions replaced memorandum of policies during this time period.

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- ¹⁸ Office of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *JROC Planning in a Revolutionary Era* (Washington DC: The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1996), 4-5.
- ¹⁹ John M. Shalikashvili, *Joint Vision 2010* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office) 1.
- ²⁰ Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3100.01 (CJCSI 3100.01A), *Joint Strategic Planning System* (Washington D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 September 1999). Discussed reflects materiel in this document.
- ²¹ “Joint Strategic Planning System,” briefing slides for Joint Processes and Landpower Course 3, Lesson AY 05, Carlisle Barracks, U.S. Army War College, 28 October 2004, slide 5.
- ²² “National Military Strategy Linkages and the Joint Strategic Planning System,” briefing to Joint Faculty Education Conference, Washington, D.C., National Defense University, 22 June 2005, slide 12.
- ²³ Author read many classified strategy reviews, correspondence documenting the process, and interviews in May 2002 with military planners who worked on the vision and military strategies during the 1990s.
- ²⁴ House Report 106-162, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Section 1034, available from <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/uscode/index.html>; Accessed 4 Dec 2005.
- ²⁵ House Report 108-354 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Section 903 Biennial Review of the National Military Strategy by Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff,” available from <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/>; accessed 11 November, 2005.
- ²⁶ Shalikashvili, *Joint Vision V 2010* and Henry H. Shelton, *Joint Vision 2020*, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, June 2000). Discussion reflects materiel from these documents.
- ²⁷ Shelton, 2000, 2.
- ²⁸ Richard M. Meinhart, *Strategic Planning Through an Organizational Lens*, (ProQuest UMI Dissertation Services, 2004), 104-107. As analysis was performed on key words in the Chairman’s annual Congressional Posture statements to identify what was emphasized.
- ²⁹ Richard B. Myers, *National Military Strategy*, (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004) 20.
- ³⁰ Donald H. Rumsfeld, *Joint Operations Concepts*, (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 2003) available from www.dtic.mil/jointvision/secdef_approved_jopsc.doc; Internet accessed 1 December 2005 and Richard B Myers, *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff August 2005) available from http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/approved_ccjov2.pdf; Internet accessed 1 December 2005.
- ³¹ Discussions that follow reflect materiel in the following strategies: Colin L. Powell, *National Military Strategy of the United States*, January 1992; John M. Shalikashvili, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, 1995; John M. Shalikashvili, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, 1997; and Richard B. Myers, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, 2004.
- ³² Myers, NMS, 8.
- ³³ U.S. General Accounting Office, *Combating Terrorism: Observations on National Strategies Related to Terrorism*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, 3 March 2003), 5.
- ³⁴ Linda Robinson, “Plan of Attack,” USNews.com, August 1 2005, available from <http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/050801/1terror.htm>; Internet; Accesses 11 November 2005.
- ³⁵ Author’s assessment from listening to many lectures that described these documents from speakers at the Army War College from 1997 to 2005 and reading some of the 1990 documents.
- ³⁶ Office of the Vice Chairman, 23.
- ³⁷ These words describing the JSCP’s purpose remained fundamentally the same from the MOP 7 through CJCSI 3100.01A. The types of plans came from the strategic planning instructions and discussions with individuals who worked directly or taught this subject.
- ³⁸ Lovelace and Young, endnote 45, 37.
- ³⁹ Harry E. Rothman, *Forging a New National Military Strategy in a Post Cold War World: A Perspective from The Joint Staff* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992), 16 and Lorna S Jaffe, *The Development of the Base Force 1989-1992* (Washington D.C.: Joint History Office, 1993), 48-50.
- ⁴⁰ Meinhart, 2004, 132.
- ⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 104

⁴² Interview with joint staff planner on 9 May 2000 and Industrial College of the Armed Forces, *JV 2010 Case Analysis*, (Washington D.C.: National Defense University, 2002) 6.

⁴³ *Joint Vision 2010* was referenced in *Defense Planning Guidance* and the Defense's logistics strategic plan. Many Service leaders spoke positively on this vision's influence. For the QDR influence linkage see John Y. Schrader, Leslie Lewis, and Roger A. Brown, *Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Analysis*, (Santa Monica, CA, RAND, 1999), 19.

⁴⁴ Office of the Vice Chairman, 10-12.

⁴⁵ Meinhart, 2004, 104.

⁴⁶ Processes described in *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3010.02, Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan*, (Washington D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff: 9 December, 1998); and *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3010.02A, Joint Vision Implementation Master Plan*, (Washington D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 29 August, 2000).

⁴⁷ Interagency is a term used to identify when other government agencies under the President collectively work together to respond to our nation's challenges.

⁴⁸ "Statement of General Richard B Myers, Vice Chairman of The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee," 4 April, 2000. <http://armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/2000/e000404.htm>; Internet assessed 20 November 2005.

⁴⁹ Meinhart, 2003,

⁵⁰ Meinhart, 2004, 104.

⁵¹ Author analyzed Chairman Myers posture statements in the same way done for the other Chairman and he averaged the highest.

⁵² Author's assessment from reading the many CJCSIs that covered the Joint Requirements Oversight, Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessments and Functional Control Boards since the middle 1990s.

⁵³ Chairman Myers referenced joint in his 2004 and 2004 Posture Statements to Congress. In addition, and talked about the importance of a cultural change in his 2002 and 2003 Posture Statements to change mindsets. He was the first Chairman to do so.

⁵⁴ Meinhart, 2004, 187-188.