CHAPTER 1

UNDERSTANDING THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS:
THE CHALLENGE OF ADAPTATION

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Power is the capacity to direct the decisions and actions of others. Power derives from strength and will. Strength comes from the transformation of resources into capabilities. Will infuses objectives with resolve. Strategy marshals capabilities and brings them to bear with precision. Statecraft seeks through strategy to magnify the mass, relevance, impact, and irresistibility of power. It guides the ways the state deploys and applies its power abroad. These ways embrace the arts of war, espionage, and diplomacy. The practitioners of these three arts are the paladins of statecraft.²

Chas. W. Freeman, Jr.

Introduction.

The war colleges of the United States are a unique national asset. They are centers of academic excellence for preparing military and civilian officers for higher positions in the national security system. They are also living laboratories for studying how to use power for strategic purposes. The authors of this book joined in a common mission convinced that there was a critical piece missing in such study: the vast area known as the interagency, the process that makes the development and implementation of policy and strategy possible in a pluralistic decisionmaking system. This book is the result of a multiyear effort among scholars and statesmen who came together to develop a series of papers that analyze various parts of the interagency,
recommend improvements, and add to the literature so that scholars and statesmen will be wiser in performing their responsibilities. Common to all the chapters is a passion to improve what is perceived to be a system that needs repair. But repair will not be possible unless we understand how it works, and what its strengths and weaknesses are.

The succeeding chapters present a remarkable set of perspectives by seasoned professionals. Each one is a rich case study that combines recent history, theory, international relations, and profound reflections from up close by diplomats, civil servants, and military officers who have spent careers working abroad and in various agencies in Washington, DC. They literally carried the banner for learning and adaptation for their departments and agencies, working to improve strategic integration. Their papers have priceless insights that cannot be easily replicated. Moreover, the various chapters lend themselves well to use in classes dealing with the integration of the instruments of national power.

**The Imperative of Strategic Integration.**

The United States is the only fully equipped, globally deployed, interagency superpower. It is the indispensable anchor of international order. Nothing quite like it has ever existed. Indeed such great powers as Rome, Byzantium, China, Spain, England, and France achieved extraordinary sophistication, enormous institutional and cultural influence, and longevity, but they never achieved the full articulation of America’s global reach. Today the United States deploys some 250 diplomatic missions in the form of embassies, consulates, special missions, and membership in international organizations. It possesses a unified
military command system that covers all regions of the world, the homeland, and even outer space. It is the leader of an interlocking set of alliances and agreements that promotes peace; open trade; and the principles of democracy, human rights, and protection of the environment. American capital, technology, and culture influence the globe. American power and influence is pervasive and multidimensional. All instruments are deployed. Yet the challenge of strategic integration, of bringing the instruments into calculated effectiveness, remains. Presidents and their national security staffs strive to achieve coherence, with varying levels of success through the “interagency process.”

The interagency decisionmaking process is uniquely American in character, size, and complexity. The process also reflects the constant tension between the reality of global commitments and the constraints imposed by America’s lofty values and its imperfect institutions, a concern shared by the founding fathers and enshrined in the system of checks and balances. Given ever expanding responsibilities, it is imperative that national security professionals master it to work effectively within it. The complex challenges to national security in the 21st century will require intelligent integration of resources and unity of effort within the government.

At the doorstep of the 21st century, there is a widely held consensus that our institutions of government need to be updated, reformed, and restructured. The failures of American intelligence and policy coordination evidenced by the disaster of September 11, 2001 (9/11), the failure to plan effectively for and the frustrations with the post-conflict phase of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the Katrina Hurricane disaster in New Orleans in 2006, as well as other events since
the 1990s, have called into question the efficacy of the process for handling national and international crises, from peace to war.

There has been a veritable cornucopia of writing that advocates reforming the interagency, whose foundation was the National Security Act of 1947 for a simpler time, for an emerging bipolar world, to meet challenges of a different order than those of today. Some have advocated a Goldwater-Nichols type of reform of the national security system, taking a cue from the creation of military jointness by Congress in 1986. But, because of the dispersal of authority, resources, expertise, and personnel among competing departments and because they are civilian, rather than military, the analogy to jointness is not appropriate to the rest of the government, which was designed by the founding fathers with the fear of concentrating power in the executive. Another proposal for improving performance in national security is Joseph S. Nye’s and Richard L. Armitage’s “smart power,” the “ability to combine the hard power of coercion or payment with soft power of attraction into a successful strategy.”

Still others, arguing that the president does not have a command and control structure over the government, advocate placing greater authority in the National Security Council, an organization which works directly for the president. There have been, to be sure, countless important successes thanks to the interagency process. For example, U.S. policy with respect to Colombia (counternarcotics, counterterrorism, democracy building) since the creation of Plan Colombia in 1999 is an excellent case study in getting it right, in getting all the agencies in Washington, DC, and in the field to work relatively well in integrating their respective contributions. Resolving the Central American crisis
of the 1980s was another success story. But when all is said and done, the current interagency process is inadequate.

Learning and Adaptation.

How the nation and the government learn from experience and adapt their institutions for the future are keys to understanding the interagency process. The large and complex interagency system is a recent innovation, with war being the most important stimulant to its growth, especially World War II. Indeed, many of the recent proposals for interagency reform originate from the defense community, which has seen its commitments multiply globally. The United States first faced the challenge of strategic integration in an embryonic interagency process during World War II. Mobilizing the nation, the government, and the armed forces for war and winning the peace highlighted the importance of resources and budgets, of integrating diplomacy with military power, gathering and analyzing enormous quantities of intelligence, conducting joint and combined military operations, and managing coalition strategies and balancing competing regional priorities, for example, the European versus the Pacific theater in national strategy. From World War II and the onset of the Cold War emerged a number of institutional and policy innovations. Among them: the modern Department of State, Department of Defense (DoD) (from the old War and Navy Departments), a centralized intelligence system, the Marshall Plan for European reconstruction, the unified military command system, the Air Force, the predecessor of the Agency for International Development (Point Four), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and other
alliances, military assistance pacts, military advisory groups, and the U.S. Information Agency. In essence, an extensive national security system emerged, whose complexity and size would grow.

There is no period in American history like the late 1940s and early 1950s that is so full of national and institutional learning that John P. Lovell calls it "purposeful adaptation." He defines it as "the need to develop and pursue foreign policy goals that are sensitive to national needs and aspirations and to the realities of a changing world environment." The evolution of the interagency process parallels America’s purposeful adaptation to changing global realities of the last 6 decades. But it is not an orderly evolution because of structural and cultural impediments, such as discontinuities from one administration to another and poor institutional memory. Prominent historical markers along the path of learning and adaptation include such documents as National Security Council (NSC) 68, the intellectual framework for the containment strategy against the Soviet Union. Though not a policy document, the Weinberger Doctrine articulated criteria for the use of military power that dramatically influenced the shape of American strategy in the 1980s and 1990s.

There are countless examples of how American statesmen codify in writing the patterns of "purposeful adaptation." The tragic events of September 11, 2001, had such an impact on American national security that the George W. Bush administration, urged by Congress, created the Department for Homeland Security. It also published a series of strategy documents on counterterrorism, homeland security, military strategy, cyber security, and infrastructure security. Bush’s National Security Strategy (NSS) dramatically
redefined the philosophical underpinnings of the U.S. role in the world. Because the attacks of 9/11 represented an assault on international order and exposed U.S. vulnerabilities to asymmetric warfare by nonstate actors, the NSS of September 17, 2002, spoke of the need to redefine the Westphalian concept of sovereignty for the purpose of reestablishing order and security in the international system, to include preemptive war.⁹

When the United States reluctantly inherited global responsibilities in 1945, its statesmen faced three challenges: forging a system of collective security, promoting decolonization, and building a stable international financial order. These and the next 4 decades of intense threat from the other superpower had a decisive impact on shaping the interagency process. With the end of bipolar ideological and geopolitical conflict, the foreign policy and defense agenda has been captured by globalization, free trade, democratization, subnational ethnic and religious conflict, failing and failed states, humanitarian contingencies, climate change and ecological deterioration, diseases, terrorism, ungoverned space, contraband, trafficking in humans, international organized crime, drug trafficking, proliferation of small weapons, as well as the technology for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and homeland security. The interagency process has not caught up to the extraordinary demands put on policy by this vast agenda of global challenges.

**National Security Council.**

To bring strategic coherence, consensus, and decisiveness to the burgeoning global responsibilities of the emerging superpower, the National Security Act
of 1947 created the National Security Council (NSC). Though the NSC will be treated extensively in the next two chapters, it is important to set it within the larger framework of the interagency. The statutory members are the President, the Vice President, and the Secretaries of State and Defense. By statute, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are advisors. Other advisors, including additional cabinet members, may be invited. The President chairs the meeting; but the Council need not convene formally to function. Formal NSC meetings are rare. There are alternatives to formal meetings, such as the ABC luncheons of Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Secretary of Defense William Cohen, and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Sandy Berger, or the Deputies’ breakfasts and lunches. The President himself may at any time meet informally with members of his cabinet. In recent years, teleconferencing facilitates such senior level consultations.

The “NSC system” of policy coordination and integration across the departments and agencies operates 24 hours a day. Today, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs typically directs the staff. The emergence of the modern “operational presidency” brought to the NSC greater authority over the development and implementation of policy, thus creating a new power center close to the president in the Old Executive Office Building that competes for jurisdiction with the Departments of State and Defense.

The NSC staff does the daily coordination and policy integration with all the departments. The Clinton NSC staff of 2000 had 100 policy professionals covering regional and functional responsibilities. The
Bush staff of 2008 grew back to 109 after an initial cut of 30 percent in 2001. Staffers are detailed from the diplomatic corps, the intelligence community, the civil service, the military services, academia, and the private sector. The staffing procedures are personalized to the president’s style and comfort level. The structure of the staff, its internal and external functioning, and the degree of control of policy by the president varies. Under President Bill Clinton, the day-to-day policy coordination and integration was done by the NSC staff, divided into the functional and geographic directorates depicted in Figure 1.

Dramatic changes came with the election of George W. Bush. Comfortable with a corporate style of leadership and surrounding himself with experienced statesmen like Secretary of State Colin Powell (former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and White House Fellow), Vice President Richard Cheney (former Congressman, Secretary of Defense, and White House Chief of Staff), and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld (former Secretary of Defense, Ambassador to NATO, and Congressman), President Bush centralized policy authority by establishing new structures and procedures.11
Figure 1. Clinton's National Security Council Staff.
The process began with new nomenclature for presidential directives. National Security Presidential Directive 1 (NSPD1), dated February 13, 2001, established six regional Policy Coordinating Committees (PCCs) and 11 (later 14) PCCs to handle functional responsibilities. In 2005 they were as follows:

Regional PCCs:
- Europe
- Western Hemisphere
- East Asia
- South Asia
- Near East and North Africa
- Africa

Functional PCCs (with department responsible in parentheses)
- Democracy, Human Rights, and International Operations (NSC)
- International Development and Humanitarian Assistance (State)
- Global Environment (NSC and National Economic Council [NEC])
- International Finance (Treasury)
- Transnational Economic Issues (NEC)
- Counter-Terrorism and National Preparedness (NSC)
- Defense Strategy, Force Structure, and Planning (Defense)
- Arms Control (NSC)
- Intelligence and Counterintelligence (NSC)
- Records Access and Information Security (NSC)
- International Organized Crime (NSC)
- Contingency Planning (NSC)
- Space (NSC)
- HIV/AIDS and Infectious Diseases (State, Health and Human Services)
Figure 2. Bush Administration Interagency Process.

The NSC Staff of mid 2008 had the following members and offices, with number of personnel in parentheses:

- Assistant to the President/National Security Advisor (APNSA) (1)
- Assistant to the President/Deputy National Security Advisor (DNSA) (1)
- Special Advisor for Strategic Planning and Institutional Reform (1)
- Special Advisor for Policy Implementation and Execution (1)
- Senior Directors for: Speech (1), Legal Affairs/White House Counsel (3), Legislative Affairs (3), Intelligence Programs and Reform (5)
- NSC Spokesman (1)
- Assistant to the President (AP)/Deputy National Security Advisor (DNSA) for Iraq and Afghanistan (14)
- Special Assistant to the President (SAP) for Iraq and Afghanistan (1)
• Deputy Assistant to the President (DAP)/DNSA for Strategic Communication and Outreach (6)
• AP/DNSA for International Economics (10)
• DAP/NSA for Democracy Strategy (1)
• DAP/NSA for Combating Terrorism (9)
• DNSA for Regional Affairs (1)
• Senior Assistant to the President and Director for International Trade and Economics (1)
• Senior Director for Democracy, Human Rights, and International Organizations (4)
• Senior Director for Combating Terrorism (1)
• Special Assistant (SAP) to the President and Senior Director for Defense Policy and Strategy (7)
• SAP/Senior Director for Counter-proliferation (6)
• SAP/Senior Director for African Affairs (4)
• SAP/Senior Director for European Affairs (6)
• SAP/Senior Director for Russia (2)
• SAP/Senior Director for South and Central Asian Affairs (3)
• SAP/Senior Director for Western Hemisphere Affairs (5)
• SAP/Senior Director for East Asian Affairs (6).

Upon taking office in January 2001, the existing interagency working groups (IWG) that existed under Clinton were abolished by NSPD1. The activities of IWGs were transferred to the new PCCs. The PCCs were the most important structural changes made by the Bush administration. According to NSPD1, they were the “Day-to-day fora for interagency coordination of national security policy. They shall provide policy analysis for consideration by the more senior committees of the NSC system and ensure timely responses to decisions made by the president.” The centralization of authority over national security matters reached levels not seen for many years. In spring 2003, a senior
national security careerist who was intimately involved with policymaking referred to interagency relations as “the worst in 20 years.” An experienced foreign policy hand commented: “The interagency system is broken” and averred that “instead of centralization of authority, there is fragmentation.” Explanations for this state of affairs varied. They included the intrusion of group think dynamics among senior decisionmakers, the role of strong personalities, the bypassing of Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Condoleezza Rice, as well as the deliberate isolation of the Department of State. Others pointed to President Bush’s management style, and the unique power vested in Vice President Dick Cheney.

Another important interagency reorganization made by the Bush administration was the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and a unified military command, the Northern Command. The creation of DHS involved the transfer of responsibilities, people, and resources from existing agencies and departments to the new entity. DHS has over 170,000 employees and a budget of over 40 billion dollars. It constitutes the largest reorganization of the U.S. Government since the creation of the Defense Department. DHS combined 22 agencies “specializing in various disciplines,” such as law enforcement, border security, immigration, biological research, computer security, transportation security, disaster mitigation, and port security. Though it is a national security department, it will not be involved in power projection. Yet, it will use many skills and resources that reside across the agencies: military, diplomatic, law enforcement, intelligence, and logistics. Homeland security also involves the concept of federalism, whereby some 87,000 state and local jurisdictions share
power with federal institutions. The challenge that integrating federalism injects into national security planning will be immense. The poor performance of federal, state, and local authorities during the Katrina disaster verified this. The creation of the Department of Homeland Security has also spawned the Homeland Security Council, the analog to the National Security Council.

The NSC staff does the daily and long-term coordination and integration of foreign policy and national security across the government. There is a natural tension between the policy coordination function and policymaking. President Jimmy Carter’s Director of Latin American Affairs at the NSC, Robert Pastor, argues that:

. . . tension between NSC and State derives in part from the former’s control of the agenda and the latter’s control of implementation. State Department officials tend to be anxious about the NSC usurping policy, and the NSC tends to be concerned that State either might not implement the President’s decisions or might do so in a way that would make decisions State disapproved of appear ineffective and wrong.  

The NSC staff is ideally a coordinating body, but it oscillates between the poles, taking policy control over some issues while allowing State, Defense, Justice, Commerce, or Homeland Security to be the lead agency on most national security and foreign policy issues. On some key issues, such as the Kosovo crisis of 1998-99, the NSC staff may take over policy control from State. Similarly, policy towards Cuba and Haiti in 1993-95 was handled directly out of the White House because of domestic constituencies. As we have seen above in the 2008 NSC staff, the primacy of Iraq and
Afghanistan policy, as well as counterterrorism, made it imperative to nest these coordinating capacities in the George W. Bush NSC staff. In virtually all cases, however, major policy decisions must be cleared through the NSC staff and the National Security Advisor. In general, the clearance process involves a review by the appropriate NSC staff director to assure that the new policy initiative is consistent with the president’s overall policy in that functional or regional area, that it has been coordinated with all appropriate departments, and that political risks associated with the new initiative have been identified and assessed. This process makes the relevant departments stakeholders in the final policy. The Oliver North Iran-Contra caper created an autonomous operational entity in the NSC staff, an aberration that does not invalidate the general rule. The salient point is that proximity to the president gives the NSC staff clout in the interagency process. Such clout must be used sparingly lest it cause resentment and resistance or overlook the policy wisdom available across the executive departments.


The interagency is a process involving human beings and complex organizations with different cultures, and different outlooks on what is good for the national interest and what is the best policy—all driven by the compulsion to defend and expand turf. The process is political because at stake is power—personal and institutional—branch of government, and party. The “power game” involves the push and pull of negotiation, the guarding of policy prerogatives, the hammering out of compromises, and the normal
human and institutional propensity to resist change.\textsuperscript{19} Regardless of the style of the president and the structures developed for the management of national security policy, the interagency process performs the same basic functions: identifies policy issues and questions, formulates options, raises issues to the appropriate level for decisions, makes decisions, and oversees their implementation.

Policy exists at five interrelated levels: conceptualization, articulation, budgeting, implementation, and post-implementation analysis and feedback. Conceptualization involves the intellectual task of policy development, such as a presidential directive. Articulation is the public declaration of policy that the president or subordinates make.

Budgeting involves testimony and the give and take before Congress and its committees to justify policy goals and to request funding. Implementation is the programmed application of resources to achieve the policy objectives. Post-implementation analysis and feedback is a continuous effort to assess the effectiveness of policy and to make appropriate adjustments. It is conducted by all the agencies in the field. The General Accounting Office of the Congress makes extensive evaluations of policy effectiveness. Hearings and visits to the field by congressional delegations and staffers also make evaluations.
John Lovell’s ideal system (Figure 3) has perfect goal setting, complete and accurate intelligence, comprehensive analysis and selection of the best options, clear articulation of policy and its rationale, effective execution, thorough and continuous assessment of the effects, and perfect learning from experience and the ability to recall relevant experience and information.

Figure 3. Ideal Foreign Policy Process.\textsuperscript{20}
Such perfection is impossible. The reality is:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TASKS</th>
<th>CONSTRAINTS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Goal Setting</td>
<td>National interests are subject to competing claims; goals established through political struggle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>Always incomplete, susceptible to overload, delays, and distortions caused by biases and ambiguity in interpretation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Option Formulation</td>
<td>Limited search for options, comparisons made in general terms according to predispositions rather than cost-benefit analysis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plans, Programs, and Decisions</td>
<td>Choices made in accordance with prevailing mind sets, influenced by groupthink and political compromise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Declaratory Policy</td>
<td>Multiple voices, contradictions and confusion, self-serving concern for personal image and feeding the appetite of the media.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Execution</td>
<td>Breakdowns in communication, fuzzy lines of authority, organizational parochialism, bureaucratic politics, and delays.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring and Appraisal</td>
<td>Gaps, vague standards, rigidities in adaptation, and feedback failures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memory Storage and Recall</td>
<td>Spotty and unreliable, selective learning, and application of lessons.</td>
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Table 1. Policy in Practice.
Effective policy requires control, resources, and a system of accountability. The most compelling challenge for the executive is to retain policy control. Since presidents do not have the time or expertise to oversee policymaking in detail, they delegate responsibility. But “nobody is in charge” is an often-heard refrain of the interagency process. By delegating responsibility, control becomes diffused. Moreover, the quest for resources brings in another stakeholder, Congress, which has the constitutional responsibility to scrutinize policy initiatives and vote monies for foreign affairs and national defense. By then, a literal Pandora’s box of players and expectations opens. Congressional committees and their talented staffs have enormous impact on national security and foreign policy.

The president begins mobilizing the government immediately upon election. A transition team works closely with the outgoing administration. The cabinet, which must be confirmed by the Senate, must be nominated. Additionally, some 6,000 presidential level appointees will fill the subcabinet positions, staff the White House and the NSC, take up ambassadorships (though many are retained, serving ambassadors submit their resignation when the occupant of the White House changes), as well as second, third, and fourth level positions in the executive departments. The purpose of these nominations is to gain control and establish accountability to the president and his agenda. President Clinton faced difficulties because he never finished staffing his first administration.

Thus there is a high turnover and the injection of new talent and energy—at times inexperienced but equipped with new ideas—at the top echelons of American government every time the occupant of the White House changes. Continuity of government re-
sides in the nonpartisan professionals of the civil service, the diplomatic service, the military, and the intelligence community. The transition to a new administration is a period of great anticipation about the direction of policy. Consequently, the entire interagency produces transition papers to assist and inform the newcomers, and to also protect the institutional interests of the various departments from unfriendly encroachment.

The first months of a new administration are a period of learning. Newly appointed people must familiarize themselves with the structure and process of policymaking, including getting to know the essential people around town. This necessity invariably leads to a trial-and-error atmosphere. In anticipation of the passing of the mantle, think tanks and the foreign policy and defense communities prepare for the transition by writing papers recommending the rationale for policy. These will inform the new administration about the central commitments of U.S. policy and allow departments and agencies to stake a claim for resources. The new administration will also mandate policy reviews.

Making speeches and declaring policy and doctrines is another way for the president to mobilize the government. The National Security Strategy (NSS) document, which bears the president’s signature and is supposed to be produced annually, is eagerly awaited, though not with equal intensity across departments, as an indicator of an administration’s direction in national security and foreign policy. The NSS is eagerly awaited for another reason; it is the best example of “purposeful adaptation” by the American government to changing global realities and responsibilities. It expresses strategic vision, what the United States stands for in the world, its priorities, and a sensing of how
the instruments of national power—the diplomatic, economic, and military—will be arrayed. Since it is truly an interagency product, the NSS also serves to discipline the interagency system to understand the president’s agenda and priorities and to develop a common language that gives coherence to policy.

The first NSS in 1987 focused on the Soviet threat. The George H. Bush administration expanded it by including regional strategies, economic policy, arms control, transnational issues, and the environment. The Clinton document of 1994 proposed “engagement and enlargement,” promoting democracy, economic prosperity, and security through strength. The 1995 version added criteria on when and how military forces would be used. By 1997, the integrating concepts of “shape,” “prepare,” and “respond” for the national military strategy came into prominence. To the core objectives of enhancing security and promoting prosperity and democracy were added fighting terrorism, international crime, and drug trafficking, along with managing the international financial crisis. Homeland defense against the threat of mass casualty attacks and regional strategies completed the agenda.

Another instrument is the national security directives process. Administrations have titled these documents differently, and they have produced them in greater and lesser quantity. The two Clinton administrations produced 73 Presidential Decision Directives (PDD), and the George W. Bush administration issued 59 National Security Presidential Directives and 24 Homeland Security Policy Directives by June 2008. Other totals and titles are: George H. Bush, 79 National Security Decision Directives; Reagan, 325 National Security Decision Memoranda; Carter, 63 Presidential Directives; Nixon-Ford, 348 National Security Decision
National security directives are macro level documents, often classified, that take much deliberate planning to develop. The process begins with a presidential directive to review policy that tasks the relevant agencies to develop a new policy based on broad guidance. For example, Clinton’s PDD 14 for counternarcotics emphasized greater balance between supply and demand strategies. Because of the many constraints placed on the use of economic and military assistance to fight the “war on drugs” and to help Colombia, PDD 14 evolved into the Colombia-specific PDD 73. This, in turn, was superseded in the Bush administration by NSPD 18, which, thanks to 9/11 and the terrorism in Colombia, went further and provided support for both counternarcotics and counterterrorism activities in Colombia. The evolution
of policy documents over nearly 10 years nurtured the growth of significant institutional memory in the interagency with respect to the Colombian conflict.

The learning went both ways because Colombian officials had to adapt to the Washington policy process, while Washington had to learn Bogotá’s. Because of the global reach of American power and influence, such adaptation is becoming more necessary as the United States must learn to deal with very different “interministerial” arrangements in foreign countries. Clinton’s celebrated PDD 25 set down an elaborate set of guidelines for U.S. involvement in peace operations. It became so effective as a planning device that the United Nations (UN), as well as nations that conduct peace operations, adopted it in modified form for planning its own peace operations. This is an excellent example of the international transfer of American purposeful adaptation. Other nations also used the organizing principles for their strategic and operational planning in peacekeeping.

Another instructive example is Clinton’s Latin American PDD 21. Effective on December 27, 1993, it emphasized democracy promotion and free trade. It was addressed to more than 20 departments and agencies: Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of Labor, Director of the Office of Management and Budget, U.S. Trade Representative, Representative of the United States to the UN, Chief of Staff to the President, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Director of Central Intelligence, Chair of the Council of Economic Advisors, Assistant to the President for National Economic Policy, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Administrator of the Agency
for International Development, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, and Director of the U.S. Information Agency.

**Functional Interdependence: The Iron Law of the Interagency.**

The point of listing departments and agencies is to identify the interagency stakeholders, though the size of the stake will vary greatly among them according to the particular issue. The stakeholders are related by functional interdependence; they have different resources, personnel, and expertise that must be integrated for policy to be effective. It is an iron rule of the interagency that *no national security or international affairs issue can be resolved by one agency alone*. For example, the DoD needs the diplomatic process that the Department of State masters to deploy forces abroad, build coalitions, negotiate solutions to conflict, conduct noncombatant evacuations (NEO) of American citizens caught in difficult circumstances abroad, and administer security assistance. The Department of State in turn depends on the logistical capabilities of the DoD to deploy personnel and materials abroad during crises, conduct coercive diplomacy, support military-to-military contacts, and give substance to alliances and defense relationships. The Office of National Drug Control Policy, a new cabinet level position created under the Clinton administration in 1997, must rely on a range of agencies to reduce the supply abroad and consumption of drugs at home. Finally, all require intelligence input to make sound decisions.

The pattern of functional interdependence, whereby departments stayed within their jurisdictions, began to fray in the George W. Bush administration. Press reports
in the spring of 2003 focused on the Bush “policy team at war with itself.” Accordingly, there was a “tectonic shift” of decisionmaking power from the Department of State to Defense because of the strong personalities and neo-conservative ideology of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and subordinates, principally Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz. The shift was facilitated by the military emphasis put on the “war on terrorism,” and the marginalization of the Department of State. The prospect of the DoD dominating raised concerns about the militarization of foreign policy and the standing of the United States in the world. Inattention to functional interdependence was a contributing factor to the ineffectiveness of postwar reconstruction planning for Iraq in 2003. In October 2003 President Bush attempted to improve the Iraq reconstruction effort by placing his National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice, in charge. Earlier in the year the president had (via NSPD 24) given authority over the Iraq reconstruction to the Defense Department, thereby weakening the hand of State.

The problems associated with post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq led to an upsurge of recommendations on how to improve the system for the future. The remarkable point about this upsurge was that there was a similar era of codifying lessons learned in post-conflict reconstruction: the early to mid-1990s. This time the House of Representatives and the Senate proposed the “Winning the Peace Act of 2003,” which created within the Department of State the Coordinator of Reconstruction and Stabilization. A comprehensive study published in November 2003 by Hans Binnendijk and Stuart Johnson of the National Defense University advocated transforming military institutions to perform “stabilization and reconstruction” operations. It also
recommended harnessing interagency capabilities via the creation of a rapidly deployable National Interagency Contingency Coordinating Group to meet the need of a national level group to plan and coordinate post-conflict operations. In July 2004 the Office of Coordinator of Reconstruction and Stabilization took form in the Department of State under the leadership of Ambassador Carlos Pascual. Yet, 1 year later the office was still understaffed and underbudget, an example of an unfunded mandate. The Congress, which legislated the office, by July 2005 had not provided funding for the Office to do its job properly. By December 2005, a new National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD 44) would give the Department of State the responsibility to manage interagency efforts to conduct reconstruction and stabilization.

Ideally in response to the promulgation of a presidential directive all agencies will energize their staffs and develop the elements that shape the policy programs. But this takes time and seldom creates optimum results, in part because of competing priorities on policymakers, limited time, constrained resources, and congressional input. For example, the Haiti crisis of 1992-94 and congressional passage of the North America Free Trade Act consumed most of the energy of the Clinton administration’s NSC staff and the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs of the Department of State during 1993-94 to the detriment of other Latin American policy. The Central American crisis of the 1980s also crowded out the broader agenda for Latin American policy. The war in Iraq similarly engaged resources and energies after 2003.

In theory, once the policy elements are put together, they are costed out and submitted to Congress for approval and funding. The reality is that a presidential directive is not a permanent guide to the actions of
agencies. Rarely is it fully implemented. The culture of the various executive departments will modify how directives are interpreted. For example, for the military oriented Defense Department, a directive is an order to be carried out. For State, a directive may be interpreted as the general direction a policy should take. Presidential policy can be overtaken by new priorities, new administrations, and by the departure of senior officials who had the stakes, the personal relationships, know how, and institutional memory to make it work. A senior NSC staffer, Navy Captain Joseph Bouchard, Director of Defense Policy and Arms Control, remarked in 1999 that one could not be sure about whether a directive from a previous administration was still in force because the government does not maintain a consolidated list of these documents for security reasons. Moreover, directives and other presidential documents are removed to presidential libraries and the National Archives when administrations change. A senior DoD official stated that directives are rarely referred to after they are final, are usually overtaken by events soon after publication, and are rarely updated. In this respect the interagency evaluation of PDD 56’s effectiveness published in May 1997 is instructive: “PDD 56 no longer has senior level ownership. The Assistant Secretaries, Deputy Assistant Secretaries, and the NSC officials who initiated the document have moved on to new positions.” The loss of institutional memory is not necessarily fatal. The permanent government retains much of the wisdom for the continuity of policy.
From PDD 56 to NSPD 44: Ephemeral or Purposeful Adaptation?

PDD 56, promulgated in 1997, was developed as a tool to improve the interagency process. Directives normally deal with the external world of foreign policy and national security. PDD 56 was radically different, for it went beyond that and attempted to generate a cultural revolution in the way the U.S. Government prepares and organizes to deal with these issues. PDD 56, The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations, is a superb example of codifying lessons of “purposeful adaptation” after fitful efforts by American civilian and military officials in the aftermath of problematic interventions in Panama (1989-90), Somalia (1992-94), and Haiti (1994-95). It tried to institutionalize:

- An Executive Committee chaired by the Deputies Committee (Assistant Secretaries)
- An integrated, interagency Political-Military Implementation Plan
- Interagency Rehearsal
- Interagency After-Action Review
- Training.

The philosophy was that interagency planning could make or break an operation. Moreover, early involvement in planning could accelerate contributions from civilian agencies that are often excluded from or are culturally averse to strategic and operational planning. An excellent Handbook for Interagency Management of Complex Contingency Operations issued in August 1998 contains in easy digestible form much wisdom about how to do it right. PDD 56 was applied extensively and adapted to new contingencies,
such as Eastern Slavonia (1995-98), Bosnia from 1995, Hurricane Mitch in Central America, the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict after 1998, and the Kosovo contingency of 1998-99. A March 1999 review commented: “PDD 56 is intended to be applied as an integrated package of complementary mechanisms and tools . . . since its issuance in 1997, PDD 56 has not been applied as intended. Three major issues must be addressed to improve the utility of PDD 56.” It recommended:

- Greater authority and leadership to promote PDD 56
- More flexible and less detailed political-military planning
- Dedicated training resources and greater outreach.

Reflected in the three recommendations were the recurring problems of the interagency: the need for decisive authority, contrasting approaches and institutional cultures (particularly diplomatic versus military) with respect to planning, and the lack of incentives across the government to create professionals expert in interagency work. PDD 56 was a noble effort to promote greater effectiveness. In late 1999, the PDD 56 planning requirement was embedded as an annex to contingency plans. Bush’s February 2001 NSPD1 tried to provide some life support to PDD56 by stating: “The oversight of ongoing operations assigned in PDD/NSC-56 . . . will be performed by the appropriate . . . PCCs, which may create subordinate working groups to provide coordination for ongoing operations.” The failures in post-conflict planning and reconstruction for Iraq underlined the importance of taking PDD-56 seriously.
As a result of the purposeful adaptation engendered by the Iraq experience, the Bush administration promulgated National Security Presidential Directive 44, on December 7, 2005: “Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization.” It speaks eloquently of the need for a coordinated U.S. Government effort for harmonizing interagency responses across the spectrum of conflict: complex contingencies, peacekeeping, failed and failing states, political transitions, and other military interventions. NSPD 44 states:

The Secretary of State shall coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts, involving all U.S. Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities. The Secretary of State shall coordinate such efforts with the Secretary of Defense to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations across the spectrum of conflict. Support relationships among elements of the United States Government will depend on the particular situation being addressed.29


The Operational Level: Ambassador, Country Team, and Combatant Commanders.

We have discussed the national strategic level of the interagency process, that is, what occurs in Washington. Actually, the interagency process spans
three levels: the national strategic, the operational, and the tactical. These can be visualized as three gears spinning simultaneously in an integrated way. In the field, policy is implemented by ambassadors and their country teams, often working with the regional combatant commanders (COCOMs) if the issue is principally security or political-military in nature. Ambassadors and combatant commanders are not only implementers, they frequently shape policy via their reporting to Washington through a continuous flow of cables, after action reports, and proposals for new policy initiatives, as well as personal consultations in Washington with senior officials and members of Congress.

There is a permanent conversation between the embassy and the respective regional bureau in Washington, which includes a broad distribution of the cable traffic to such agencies as the White House, DoD, the regional combatant command, Department of Treasury, Commerce, the Joint Staff, and the intelligence community, as well as other organizations, such as the Coast Guard, when there is a “need to know.” The “need to know” almost always includes other embassies in the region, or major embassies in other regions, and even at times, for example, the American Embassy to the Vatican, because of the unique global role of the Catholic Church. The ambassador and combatant commander often conduct one-on-one meetings over the multiplicity of security issues.

The embassy country team is a miniature replica of the Washington interagency. In the country team, the rubber proverbially meets the road of interagency implementation. Ambassadors and COCOMs rely on each other to promote policies that will enhance American interests in a country and region. COCOMs have
large staffs and awesome resources compared to the small staffs and resources of ambassadors. Moreover, their functions are different. The ambassador cultivates ties and is a conduit for bilateral communications through the art of diplomatic discourse. He or she promotes understanding of U.S. foreign policy, promotes American culture and business, and is responsible for American citizens in that country. The ambassador is the personal emissary of the president, who signs the ambassador’s formal letter of instruction. The letter charges the ambassador “to exercise full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all executive branch officers in (name of country), except for personnel under the command of a U.S. area military commander . . .” There is enough ambiguity in the mandate to require both ambassador and COCOM to use common sense and, in a nonbureaucratic way, work out issues of command and control over U.S. military personnel in the country. In effect, control is shared, the ambassador having policy control and the COCOM control over day-to-day military operations. Thus it is prudent that both work closely together to ensure that military operations meet the objectives of U.S. policy.

This is particularly the case in military operations other than war. Before and during noncombatant evacuations, peace operations, exercises, disaster relief, and humanitarian assistance, such cooperation will be imperative because of the different mixes of diplomacy, force, and preparation required. A successful U.S. policy effort requires a carefully calibrated combination of diplomatic and military pressure, with economic inducements added. The security assistance officer at the embassy can facilitate communication and bridge the policy and operational distance between the
ambassador and the COCOM. So can State’s Foreign Policy Advisor to the COCOM, a senior ranking foreign service officer whose function is to provide the diplomatic and foreign policy perspective on military operations.\textsuperscript{30} The personal and professional relationship between the Foreign Policy Advisor and the COCOM is key to success.

The COCOM represents the coercive capacity of American power through a chain of command that goes to the president. He and his sizable staff oversee the operational tempo, deployments, readiness, exercises, and training of divisions, brigades, fleets, and air wings—resources, language, and culture that are the opposite of the art of diplomacy. Since all military activities have diplomatic impact, it is prudent that ambassador and commander work harmoniously to achieve common purpose. Their interests intersect at the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) (also called Military Advisory Group, Military Liaison Office, and Office of Defense Coordination) level. The commander of the MAAG, which is an important arm of the country team since it provides training and military equipment to the host country, works for both the ambassador and the COCOM.

In the spectrum from peace to crisis to war, the ambassador will tend to dominate decisions at the lower end of the conflict spectrum. As the environment transitions to war the Commander assumes greater authority and influence. Haiti 1994 is an excellent example of how the handoff from ambassador to COCOM takes place. The American ambassador in Port-au-Prince, William Swing, was in charge of U.S. policy until General Hugh Shelton and the U.S. military forces arrived in September of that year. Once the military phase was completed, policy control
reverted to Swing, thus restoring the normal pattern of authority. In the gray area of military operations other than war, such as Latin America, disputes can arise between ambassadors and COCOMs about jurisdiction over U.S. military personnel in the country. The most illustrative was in 1994 between the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Southern Command, General Barry McCaffrey, and the U.S. Ambassadors to Bolivia, Charles R. Bowers, and Colombia, Morris D. Busby. The dispute had to be adjudicated in Washington by the Secretaries of State and Defense, something the system would rather not do. The fact is that ambassador and COCOM must work closely together to coordinate U.S. military activities. The exception cited here proves the rule of harmony between ambassadors and regional military commanders.

A very promising innovation at the regional command level is the creation at the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) of an entirely new staffing system. It is a creative concept for strategy and American civil-military relations. Accordingly, the COCOM remains a four-star officer, while the deputy COCOM will be a State Department ambassador. At the same time, some of the directorates are headed by civilian Senior Executive Service Officers. In addition, there is a new Partnering Directorate, which works to build bridges with the interagency community in Washington, with the private sector, and with Latin American governments. The adaptations at USSOUTHCOM (and also at the new African Command) respond to the changed security environment in Latin America and the consequent need to address the broad spectrum of human security needs. Poverty, crime, environmental degradation, illegal narcotics, natural disasters, and contraband call for an integrated policy approach that
harnesses all the partners in the U.S. Government and the private sector. In the USSOUTHCOM region, various offices of the Agency for International Development (Transition Initiatives, Conflict Management and Mitigation, Democracy and Governance); the Department of Justice; the Department of the Treasury; the Army Corps of Engineers; the Department of State’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance; the Office of Population, Refugees, and Migration; the Bureau of International Narcotics and Labor; and the Office of Reconstruction and Stability are the main partners to DoD. This partnership works especially well with the Colombian government in integrating rural communities in Colombia to the national polity through the Coordination Center for Integrated Action.33

Another example of interagency creativity is State’s Project Horizon. Started in 2005, the Project engages the interagency community to postulate future global scenarios that require integrated strategic planning across the many departments and agencies. The purpose is to develop a common intellectual framework within which the various players can identify their stakes and therefore the capabilities they will need to meet their departmental and agency responsibilities. A shared effort of this kind builds synergies for interagency cooperation and integration.34

Continuing Challenges in the Interagency.

The tensions generated by cultural differences, turf, and competition for limited resources will always be part of the interagency process. The diplomatic and the military cultures dominate the national security system, though there are other cultures and even subcultures. The former uses words to solve problems while the latter uses force packages. Cultural differences are
large, but communicating across them is possible. Table 2 compares the cultures of military officers and diplomats.

The principal problem of interagency decisionmaking is lack of decisive authority; there is no one in charge. As long as personalities are involved who work well together and have leadership support in the NSC, interagency efforts will prosper, but such congruence is not predictable. The world situation does not wait for the proper alignment of the planets in Washington.

Asymmetries in resources are another impediment. The Department of State, which has the responsibility to conduct foreign affairs, is a veritable pauper. Its diplomats may have the best words in town in terms of speaking and writing skills and superb knowledge of foreign countries and foreign affairs, but it is a very small organization that has been getting smaller budget allocations from Congress. In 2008, the foreign service officers corps comprises some 6500 people, which is less than the U.S. Army has in military bands. Compare DoD’s budget of nearly $500 billion (not including the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan) to State’s puny $36 billion (which includes economic and military assistance). The military maintains a personnel float of 11 percent for very good reasons, such as schooling and the need for redundancy. In contrast, State in 2008 had a negative personnel float. State’s information technology was, until recently, primitive, and officer professional development of the kind that the military thrives on is not promoted. Moreover, unlike the military, State lacks a strong domestic constituency of support. Curiously, the military has more money to conduct diplomacy than does State. Secretary of State Colin Powell began to improve State’s budget. But the inability to hire personnel during the lean years of
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military Officers</th>
<th>Foreign Service Officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mission: prepare for and fight war</td>
<td>Mission: conduct diplomacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training a major activity, important for units and individuals</td>
<td>Training not a significant activity. Not important either for units or individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extensive training for episodic, undesired events, to think the unthinkable</td>
<td>Little formal training, learning by experience in doing desired activities (negotiating, reporting)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncomfortable with ambiguity</td>
<td>Can deal with ambiguity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plans and planning—both general and detailed—are important core activities</td>
<td>Plan in general terms to achieve objectives but value flexibility and innovation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctrine: important</td>
<td>Doctrine: not important</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focused on military element of foreign policy</td>
<td>Focused on all aspects of foreign policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focused on discrete events and activities with plans, objectives, courses of action, endstates</td>
<td>Focused on ongoing processes without expectation of an “endstate”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrequent real-world contact with opponents or partners in active war fighting</td>
<td>Day-to-day real-world contact with partners and opponents in active diplomacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer corps commands significant numbers of NCOs and enlisted personnel</td>
<td>Officers supervise only other officers in core (political and economic) activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCOs and enlisted personnel perform many core functions (war fighting)</td>
<td>Only officers engage in core activity (diplomacy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership: career professional military officers (within the military services and in operations)</td>
<td>Leadership: a mix of politicians, academics, policy wonks, and career Foreign Service professionals at headquarters and in field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All aspects of peace operations, including civilian/diplomatic, becoming more important</td>
<td>All aspects of peace operations, including military, becoming more important</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Writing and written word less important, physical actions more important</td>
<td>Writing and written word very important. Used extensively in conduct of diplomacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teamwork and management skills are rewarded, interpersonal skills important internally</td>
<td>Individual achievement and innovative ideas rewarded, inter-personal skills important externally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understand “humma-humma” and “deconflict”</td>
<td>Understand “demarche” and “non-paper”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accustomed to large resources, manpower, equipment, and money</td>
<td>Focus meager resources on essential needs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Comparing Military and Foreign Service Officers.
the 1990s, because of previous budgetary constraints, affected hundreds of positions in the middle ranks of the diplomatic service. State is so short of personnel to staff its various missions abroad that in 2008 there was an initiative in Congress to approve the hiring of 1,100 foreign service officers and add 12 percent to the State budget.

In a role reversal that was becoming habitual, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates in June 2008 requested money for State, warned against the “creeping militarization” of foreign policy, and lamented that: “America’s civilian institutions of diplomacy and development have been chronically underfunded for far too long relative to what we spend on the military, and . . . the responsibilities our nation has around the world.” He added: “Our diplomatic leaders—be they in ambassadors’ suites or on the seventh floor of the State Department—must have the resource and political support needed to fully exercise their statutory responsibilities in leading American foreign policy.” Something’s amiss when the Secretary of Defense has to request money for the Department of State. Such role reversal indicates that the arsenal of American power is dangerously imbalanced, and the default response is to look to the Pentagon. The United States is increasingly a one-dimensional power. In peace and war the entire government should contribute to protect the wide range of U.S. national interests. These include defense, economic prosperity, safety of U.S. citizens, humanitarian aid, health, environment, climate, refugees, border security, and others.

The resource barons, those with people, money, technical expertise, and equipment, reside in DoD and the military services. Consequently, the military, especially the Army, is constantly being asked to provide resources out of hide for nation-building
purposes, for example in Haiti, Panama, and Iraq. It is tempting to reach out to it because it is the only institution with an expeditionary capability and fungible resources and expertise. It can get there quickly, show the flag, bring significant resources to bear, stabilize a situation, and create an environment secure enough for other agencies to operate. On a much smaller scale, the Agency for International Development is a baron, because it has money and technical expertise to promote development and institution building. Other baronies exist, such as intelligence, Department of Justice, Commerce, and the Office of National Drug Control Policy.

Finally, the personnel systems of the various agencies of the U.S. Government do not promote professionalization and rewards in interagency jobs. What is needed is a systematic effort to develop civilian and military cadres that are experts in interagency policy coordination, integration, and operations. Some of this takes place. Military officers are assigned to various departments. For example, until 2002, 35 officers from all military services worked in the regional and functional bureaus of the Department of State. Senior diplomats, often of ambassadorial rank, are also allocated to military and civilian agencies, such as Foreign Policy Advisors at the regional unified commands, the Special Operations Command, to peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, various key positions in the Pentagon, and the war colleges. These programs must be expanded. Unfortunately, the opposite was occurring in 2003. To convert military personnel slots to warfighting positions, the DoD recalled most of its officers from the civilian agencies, to include the State Department, which in turn reduced to 30 the number of diplomats posted to military organizations. Accordingly, an
important element for interagency integration and harmony was weakened.

Moreover, there ought to be incentives for national security professionalism, as there are for joint duty in the military. For civilian agencies, incentives are needed to encourage interagency service, to include the Department of State. Promotions should be based not only on performance at Foggy Bottom and in embassies, but on mandatory interagency tours as well. Similarly, professional development incentives should apply to civil servants that work in the national security arena. Responding to this need, the *Quadrennial Defense Review* of 2006 recommended strengthening interagency operations by establishing a new National Security Officer career track. It also recommended creation of a “National Security Planning Document” to: “direct the development of both military and nonmilitary plans and institutional capabilities.” Moreover, to win the peace, DoD issued guidance to “place stability operations on a par with major combat operations.” This should help engender cultural change in the military and promote interagency integration.

Admittedly, mandatory interagency tours would require significant changes in personnel systems and career tracking. The Report of the National Defense Panel of 1997, *Transforming Defense: National Security in the Twenty-first Century*, recommended creating “an interagency cadre of professionals, including civilian and military officers, whose purpose would be to staff key positions in the national security structures.” The Report also recommended a national security curriculum for a mix of civilian, military, and foreign students. The Defense Leadership and Management Program of the DoD, a Master’s level initiative in national security studies for civilian personnel, is an im-
portant step in this direction. The Department of State, under Colin Powell’s guidance, began to invest in educating its personnel in strategic planning. Accordingly, the Department published *The Department of State and Agency for International Development Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2004 to 2009*. The document sets forth directions and priorities and supports policy positions enunciated in the President’s *National Security Strategy*. This is another breakthrough for strategic integration.

**Implications for Warriors.**

The future use of power is likely to be more military operations other than war, requiring more mobile, flexible light forces, working in unison with civilians. Future deployments in peace and war will also require a more intellectual military officer, one who understands the imperative of working with the panoply of civilian agencies, nongovernmental organizations, the national and international media, and foreign armed forces. It is a commonplace of strategy that American forces will rarely fight alone again; they will do so in coalition. Thus, the strategic Clausewitzian trinity of the people, the armed forces, and the government now encompasses the global community. The implications are clear; the military officer will have to develop greater diplomatic and negotiating skills, greater understanding of international affairs, capability in foreign languages, and more than a passing acquaintance with economics.

Moreover, the warrior will likely work with civilian counterparts across a spectrum of activities short of war. These include strategic planning and budgeting, humanitarian assistance, peace operations, counternarcotics, counterterrorism, security assistance,
environmental security, human rights, democratization, civil-military relations, arms control, intelligence, war planning and termination strategy, command and control of forces, continuity of government, post-conflict reconstruction, technology transfer, crisis management, overseas basing, alliances, noncombatant evacuations, and homeland defense.

Therefore, the future officer will also need greater appreciation of the institutional diversity and complexity of government, because of the need to advise a diverse audience of civilians on the utility of military power in complex contingencies that are neither peace nor war. He or she will have to work in tandem with civilian agencies and nongovernmental organizations unaccustomed to command systems and deliberate planning, and that often do not understand the limits of military power. Lastly, instruction on the interagency system and process should be mandatory for civilians and military alike. Such education must have a sound theoretical foundation in national security decisionmaking, strategic planning, and organizational behavior, expanded by sophisticated case studies. Because the United States will be heavily engaged in the spectrum of activities entitled humanitarian intervention, stabilization and reconstruction, and the transformation of societies, the curriculum of senior service colleges must emphasize the strategic integration of the instruments of power to a much greater degree.

What attributes should the military officer bring? Above all, holistic thinking, the ability to think in terms of all the instruments of national power and respect for the functions and cultures of diverse departments and agencies. Communication skills are paramount. The effective interagency player writes and speaks well.
He or she will be bilingual, able to function in military as well as civilian English. Bureaucratic jargon is the enemy of interagency communication. The military briefing, though an excellent vehicle for quickly transmitting a lot of information in formatted style, is not acceptable. One must be less conscious of rank because ranks will vary among the representatives around a table. Someone of lower rank may be in charge of a meeting. A sense of humor, patience, endurance, and tolerance for ambiguity and indecisiveness will help. The ability to “stay in your box” and articulate the perspective of your department will be respected. The ability to anticipate issues, to consider the second and third order effects from the national level down to the country team and theater levels, will be invaluable. Finally, the interagency requires diplomatic and negotiating skills, the ability to network, and mastery of the nuances of bureaucratic politics and language.43

The most evolved democracy in the world has the most cumbersome national security decisionmaking process. Inefficiency is the price the founding fathers imposed for democratic accountability. But some of the inefficiency is the result of American strategic culture, with its multiplicity of players, plentiful but diffused resources coupled with the penchant to throw resources at the problem, and the propensity to segment peace and diplomacy from war and military power.

Democracy is defined as a process of mutual learning and adaptation. All institutions of government learn, adapt, and make appropriate changes. This is even more imperative for the national security agencies and personnel, where the stakes are high. The distempers in the interagency process evidenced since 2001 created new opportunities for learning and for adaptation. Fortunately, in time American democracy will make
those adaptations. The question will be at what price and how quickly.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 1

1. Special thanks for their insights to Anthony Williams, David Bennett, Frank Jones, Gary Maybarduk, and Dennis Skocz. They helped illuminate the labyrinthine ways of Washington. The project was generously supported by Erik Kjonnerod, Director of National Defense University’s Inter Agency Transformation Education and Analysis Program, and Robin Dorff, Chairman of the Department of National Security and Strategy, U.S. Army War College.


4. Peter Roman argues that Goldwater-Nichols intended to improve military advice to civilian leaders. Accordingly, a similar law would not promote greater interagency integration simply because, unlike the Pentagon, there is no one “who owns the interagency.” See Peter Roman, “Can Goldwater-Nichols Reforms for the Interagency Succeed?” Washington, DC: Stimson Center, April 19, 2007, www.stimson.org/print.cfm?pub=1@ID=431.


12. One of the least helpful aspects of the interagency system is precisely the differing nomenclature of the presidential directives. Every president has used different terminology, as will be seen below. Standardization of the title is in order.


17. On the challenges of establishing DHS, see U.S. General Accounting Office, *Major Management Challenges and Program*


21. Adapted from ibid., p. 32.


30. Excellent advice on how the ambassador and the regional unified commander should work together is found in Ted Russell, “The Role of the Ambassador, the Country Team, and Their Relations with Regional Commanders,” in Course Directive: Regional Appraisals, AY 97, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1997, pp. C1-C9. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Department of State and the Department of Defense covers the function of the Political Advisor, renamed Foreign Policy Advisor in 2004. The MOU recognizes the valuable role Political Advisors to Military Commands (POLADs) render to the Department of Defense and the Department of State in
assessing the political implications of military planning and strategy and in serving as the principal source of counsel on international issues to their respective Commanders-in-Chief—the deep level of commitment and cooperation acknowledged by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense in executing foreign and security policy established by the President. For how an embassy functions, see Shawn Dorman, ed., *Inside a U.S. Embassy: How the Foreign Service Works for America*, Washington, DC: American Foreign Service Association, 2003.

31. For specifics, see the telegrams dated June 6, 1994, from USCINCSOUTH; June 8, 1994, from Embassy La Paz; and June 9, 1994, from Embassy Bogotá.


33. Colombia established the Coordination Center for Integrated Action in 2003 with U.S. support to bring together interagency representatives from the Colombian government in order to expand its capacity and presence in areas liberated from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia.

34. U.S. Department of State, *Project Horizon: A Scenario-Based Approach to Future Oriented Interagency Strategic Planning*, Washington, DC, Fall 2006. Other initiatives across the government include: sympiosa and interagency planning conferences for counter-terrorism, and joint interagency coordination groups (JIACG) at the combatant commands.

Promoting National Security,” Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University, May 1998. Other impediments to sound decisionmaking are: groupthink, information overload, insufficient information, lack of time, faulty analogy, insufficient analysis of options, and the personal predispositions of the decisionmaker. The interaction of these factors are explored in the writings of Irving L. Janis, Alexander George, and Graham Allison.


38. These are variants of proposals made to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the study groups of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), directed by John Hamre. See Briefing: “Recommendations Under Consideration: Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Phase 2 Report,” April 25, 2005, CSIS, Washington, DC, April 5, 2005.


40. Ibid., p. 86.


43. Military officers contemplating assignment to the Pentagon or civilians wishing to understand how to work with counterparts there should read the advice in Perry Smith, Assignment Pentagon: The Insider’s Guide to the Potomac Puzzle Palace, 2nd ed., rev., Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1992.