CHAPTER III
ORGANIZING FOR SUCCESSFUL INTERAGENCY, INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION, AND NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION COORDINATION

“We must recognize that the Department of Defense contribution to interagency operations is often more that of enabler (versus decisive force, a function we are institutionally more comfortable with). For example, in Rwanda, the military served as an enabling force which allowed the NGOs and PVOs to execute their function of humanitarian relief. A key component to our success in Rwanda was the fact that we consciously stayed in the background and withdrew our forces as soon as the enabling function was complete.”

General George A. Joulwan, USA
Commander, US European Command
21 October 1993 – 10 July 1997

1. Organizing for Success

a. When campaign, deliberate, or crisis action planning is required, the degree to which military and civilian components can be integrated and harmonized will bear directly on its efficiency and success. To the extent feasible, joint planning should include key participants from the outset. The combatant commander through his strategic concept builds the interagency, IGO, and NGO activities into Annex V of the OPLAN. Subordinate JFCs build interagency, IGO, and NGO participation into their operations. Within the AOR and the JOA, appropriate decision-making structures are established at combatant command, JTF HQ, and tactical levels in order to coordinate and resolve military, political, humanitarian, and other issues. This chapter will suggest meaningful tools for the commander to organize for successful interagency coordination, whether in domestic or foreign operations, and focus on the operational level and below.

b. In concert with the NSC, DOD, and Joint Staff, combatant commanders should:

(1) Recognize all USG agencies, departments, IGOs, and NGOs that are or should be involved in the operation. In most cases, initial planning and coordination with USG agencies will have occurred within the NSC, DOD, the Military Services, and the Joint Staff.

(2) Understand the authoritative interagency, IGO, and NGO hierarchy, to include the lead agency identified at the national level, and determine the agency of primary responsibility. Understand the differences between roles and responsibilities of DOD, the CJCS, the Joint Staff, and the Services in domestic and foreign operations. Understand the different command arrangements in domestic and foreign operations.

(3) Define the objectives of the response. These should be broadly outlined in the statement of conclusions from the relevant NSC, NSC/PC, or NSC/DC meetings that authorized the overall USG participation. Within the military chain of command, they are further elaborated in tasking orders that include the commander’s intent.
“In Operation SUPPORT HOPE, the US military and the UN and NGO community in-theater literally ‘met on the dance floor.’ Given that a JTF commander’s concern will be to ensure unity of effort (not command!), too brief a time to establish relationships can exacerbate the tensions that exist naturally between and among so many disparate agencies with their own internal agenda and outside sponsors. The commander, therefore, will find that, short of insuring the protection of his force, his most pressing requirement will be to meet his counterparts in the US government, UN, and NGO hierarchies and take whatever steps he thinks appropriate to insure the smooth integration of military support . . .”

Lieutenant General Daniel R. Schroeder, USA
Commander, JTF SUPPORT HOPE

(4) Define COAs for the assigned military tasks, while striving for operational compatibility with other USG agencies.

(5) Cooperate with each agency, department, or organization and obtain a clear definition of the role that each plays. In many situations, participating agencies, departments, and organizations may not have representatives either in theater or collocated with the combatant command’s staff. It is then advisable for the combatant commander to request temporary assignment of liaison officers (LNOs) from the participating agencies, departments, and organizations to the combatant command or JTF HQ. In some cases, it may be useful or even necessary for the military to send LNOs to selected other organizations.

(6) Identify potential obstacles arising from conflicting departmental or agency priorities. Early identification of potential obstacles and concurrence as to solutions by all participants is the first step toward resolution. Too often these obstacles are assumed to have been addressed by another agency, department, or organization. If the obstacles cannot be resolved they must immediately be forwarded up the chain of command for resolution.

(7) Military and civilian planners should identify resources relevant to the situation. Determine which agencies, departments, or organizations are committed to provide these resources in order to reduce duplication, increase coherence in the collective effort, and identify what additional resources are needed.

(8) Define the desired military end states, plan for transition from military to civil authority, and recommend exit criteria.

(9) Maximize the joint force assets to support long-term goals. The military’s contribution should optimize the varied and extensive resources available to complement and support the broader, long-range objectives of the local, national or international response to a crisis.
(10) **Coordinate the establishment of interagency assessment teams** that can rapidly deploy to the area to evaluate the situation. These can include ad hoc multilateral teams or teams organized under the auspices of an IGO such as the UN or OSCE.

(11) **Implement crisis action planning (CAP)** for incidents or situations involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, and possessions or vital interests that may require interagency coordination to achieve US objectives.

2. Interagency and Nongovernmental Organization Crisis Response: Domestic Operations

   a. Military operations inside the US and its territories, though limited in many respects, fall into two mission areas HD — for which DOD serves as the LFA and military forces are used to conduct military operations in defense of the homeland; and CS — for which DOD serves in a supporting role to other agencies by providing military support to civil authorities at the federal, state, and local level (see Figure III-1). The President and SecDef define the circumstances under which DOD will be involved in the HD and CS missions.

   (1) For HD missions the President, exercising his constitutional authority as Commander in Chief, authorizes military action to counter threats to and within the United States.

   (2) When conducting CS missions, DOD will be in support of an LFA. The domestic operating environment for military CS presents unique challenges to the JFC. It is imperative that commanders and staffs at all levels understand the relationships, both statutory and operational, among all federal agencies involved in the operation. Moreover, it is equally important to understand DOD’s role in supporting these other federal agencies. **DOD will provide military assistance to the LFA upon request by the appropriate authority and approval by SecDef.** There are various national level plans, such as the Initial National Response Plan (INRP)/FRP, which detail the roles and missions of various federal departments and agencies in the event of a domestic crisis. [Note: the provisions of the FRP continue to provide guidance for all activities not specifically subsumed in the INRP but will eventually be integrated into a NRP.]

   (3) Within the CS mission area, circumstances may arise that fall into the realm of emergency and temporary non-emergency incidents. **In emergency circumstances, such as managing the consequences of a terrorist attack, natural disaster, critical infrastructure protection, or other events, DOD could be asked to provide capabilities that other agencies do not possess or that have been exhausted or overwhelmed.**

   b. **Command and Control Relationships and Responsibilities**

   (1) For HD missions, DOD is in the lead with other federal agencies in support. DOD’s capability to respond quickly to any threat or situation places a high demand on the same resources. For example, the same trained and ready force constituted to achieve strategic objectives
outside the homeland may also be required to execute HD missions within the homeland. Guidelines for C2, as depicted in JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Force (UNAAF)*, are equally applicable to HD operations.
(2) **Under certain circumstances, military commanders are allowed to take necessary action under immediate response authority.** Responses to requests from civil authorities prior to receiving authority from the President or chain of command are made when immediate support is critical to save lives, prevent human suffering, or to mitigate great property damage. Under these circumstances, support elements must advise the DOD EXECSEC through command channels by the most expeditious means available and seek approval or additional authorizations. The EXECSEC will notify SecDef, the CJCS, and any other appropriate officials.

(3) Principal and supporting DOD participants involved in the execution of HD or CS mission areas may include: SecDef, ASD(HD), Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict [ASD(SO/LIC)], Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs [ASD(RA)], CJCS, Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command (CDR NORAD), CDRUSNORTHCOM, CDRUSPACOM, Commander, US Strategic Command, Commander, US Special Operations Command, Commander, US Transportation Command, Commander, US Joint Forces Command, Commander, US Southern Command, and the Services. Reserve component forces and the USCG are included in this grouping when under Title 10 status.

(4) **Secretary of Defense.** SecDef has overall authority for DOD and is the President’s principal advisor on military matters concerning HS. Authority for the conduct and execution of the HD mission resides with SecDef. For CS missions, SecDef retains approval authority for the use of forces, personnel, units, and equipment. SecDef has the primary responsibility within DOD to provide the overall policy and oversight for CS in the event of a domestic incident.

(5) **Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense.** The Office of the ASD(HD) is established within the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. ASD(HD) is responsible for the overall supervision of all DOD HD and CS activities. ASD(HD) ensures internal coordination of DOD policy direction, assists SecDef in providing guidance, through CJCS, to combatant commanders for HD and CS missions and conducts coordination with the DHS.

(6) **Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict.** ASD(SO/LIC) provides civilian oversight for combating terrorism. This oversight includes supervision of policy, program planning, and allocation and the use of resources. ASD(SO/LIC) also represents SecDef on combating terrorism matters outside the DOD.

(7) **Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.** ASD(RA) is responsible for monitoring Reserve Component readiness. ASD(RA) provides policy regarding the appropriate integration of Reserve and National Guard (NG) forces into HS response efforts. In coordination with ASD (HD), the Joint Staff, the Services, and the National Guard Bureau, ASD(RA) ensures appropriate reserve and NG forces are integrated into HS response operations.

(8) **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.** CJCS has numerous responsibilities relating to HS. These include advising the President and SecDef on operational policies, responsibilities, and programs; assisting SecDef in implementing operational responses to threats
or an act of terrorism; and translating SecDef guidance into operation orders to provide assistance to the LFA. CJCS ensures that HD and CS plans and operations are compatible with other military plans. CJCS also assists combatant commanders in meeting their operational requirements for executing HD missions and for providing CS that has been approved by SecDef. In the CS area, CJCS serves as the principal military advisor to SecDef and the President in preparing for and responding to CBRNE situations, ensures that military planning is accomplished to support the LFA for CrM and CM, and provides strategic guidance to the combatant commanders for the conduct of counterdrug operations.

(9) **Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).** By international agreement (The NORAD Agreement and Terms of Reference, and the Canadian/US Basic Security Document 100/35), CDRNORAD leads a bi-national command composed of Canadian and US forces responsible for aerospace control and aerospace warning for North America. NORAD’s relationship with USNORTHCOM is unusual in that while they have separate missions defined by separate sources, a majority of USNORTHCOM’s AOR overlaps with NORAD’s operational area. NORAD and USNORTHCOM are two separate commands, and neither command is subordinate to the other or a part of the other, but they work very closely together.

(10) **Commander, US Northern Command.** CDRUSNORTHCOM has specific responsibilities for HD and for assisting civil authorities. USNORTHCOM’s mission is to conduct operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories, and interests within the assigned AOR and as directed by the President or SecDef, provide military assistance to civil authorities including CM operations. USNORTHCOM embodies the principles of unity of effort and unity of command as the single, responsible, designated DOD commander for overall C2 of DOD support to civil authorities within the USNORTHCOM AOR. CDRUSNORTHCOM takes all operational orders from and is responsible to the President through SecDef.

(11) **Commander, US Pacific Command.** CDRUSPACOM serves as DOD principal planning agent and supported commander for military HS activities in Hawaii, Territory of Guam, Territory of American Samoa, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, US administrative entities, and US territorial waters within Pacific Command. CDRUSPACOM is the supported commander within the designated AOR for HD missions. CDRUSPACOM is also responsible for combating terrorism actions, force protection (FP) and performing defense critical infrastructure protection. When directed by the President, CDRUSPACOM is responsible for conducting combat operations within the AOR to deter, prevent and defeat an incursion of sovereign territory. CDRUSPACOM is also responsible for planning for CS operations within the AOR.

c. **The appropriate geographic combatant commander is designated as the supported commander, depending on the location of the event.** As necessary, the supported combatant commander activates and deploys an initial C2 element and follow-on JTF to serve as the C2 node for the designated DOD CM forces responding to the event. The commander of the JTF exercises OPCON over designated DOD forces.
d. The DCO is likely the initial DOD representative on-site. The DCO coordinates DOD support to civilian agencies through the FCO or PFO at the disaster field office (DFO). FEMA sets up a DFO in or near the affected area to coordinate federal recovery activities with those of state and local governments upon federal declaration of a disaster. When the DOD C2 HQ is deployed, it accepts OPCON of the DCO. However, the DCO remains the POC for the FCO or PFO in accordance with the FRP. Once DOD forces have been deployed, requests from civilian agencies are coordinated through the DCO under the procedures delineated in the FRP.

e. The JTF provides personnel, equipment, and supplies to a disaster area. Through the DCO, the JTF is oriented on identifying tasks, generating forces, prioritizing assets against requirements, assisting federal and private agencies, and providing disaster response support to the local government based on FEMA mission assignments.

f. Organizational tools that may assist interagency support of civil authorities include:

1) Interagency Planning Cell (IPC). The IPC is activated upon receipt of the CJCS warning or alert order or at the direction of the combatant commander. The **IPC is established to provide timely advice to the supported combatant commander about the resources of other agencies in the relief effort.** An IPC will enable a coherent and efficient planning and coordination effort through the participation of interagency subject-matter experts. Moreover, the burden of coordination at the JTF level could also be lightened. Consideration should also be given to establishment of IPCs on the staffs of supporting combatant commanders, such as Commander, United States Transportation Command.

2) Liaison Section. Liaisons provided to the LFA and other USG agencies, as necessary, act as spokespersons for the combatant commander, to clarify operational concepts and terminology, and to assist in the assessment of military requirements. The intrinsic capabilities of military units to perform in nontraditional roles are important in describing the military contribution to the Federal response. Conversely, agency liaisons working with the military can assist the commander to maximize agency core competencies and concentrate the resources of engaged agencies.

   a) Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers. EPLOs are directed by the Military Services and selected DOD agencies to coordinate the use of DOD resources to support civil authorities through the DCO during Presidentially-declared disasters and emergencies. **EPLOs serve in major civil and military HQs that have primary responsibility for planning, coordinating, and executing military operations during disasters.**

   b) Supported commanders, such as CDRUSNORTHCOM or CDRUSPACOM, are responsible for a liaison structure at the state level within their respective AORs.

3) Interagency Information Bureau (IIB). An IIB at each echelon of command provides information to the public. Emphasis should be placed on describing and promoting the federal effort. Any friction between agencies should be resolved internally.
(4) **Standing Joint Force Headquarters.** The standing joint force headquarters (SJFHQ) is a full-time, trained and equipped, joint C2 staff element. The SJFHQ is fully integrated into a combatant commander’s planning and operations. SJFHQ enhances the combatant command’s options to quickly deter or mitigate a crisis and reduces the time required to establish a fully functional JTF HQ within a combatant command’s AOR.

3. **Crisis Response: Foreign Operations**

   a. **The geographic combatant commander and staff should be continuously engaged in interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination by establishing working relationships with relevant organizations and agencies long before CAP and military resources are required.** As situations requiring CAP develop, the normal flow of the State Department and other agencies reporting from the field will increase significantly. This will be amplified by informal contacts between the combatant commander’s staff (including the POLAD and JIACG) and appropriate embassies as well as the relevant bureaus at the State Department. Such informal communications greatly facilitate the development of viable COAs, but should not be used to circumvent established, authoritative planning and direction processes (see Figure III-2).

   b. **Crisis Action Organization.** The combatant command crisis action organization is activated upon receipt of the CJCS warning or alert order or at the direction of the combatant commander. Activation of other crisis action cells to administer the specific requirements of task force operations may be directed shortly thereafter. These cells support not only functional requirements of the JTF such as logistics, but also coordination of military and nonmilitary activities and the establishment of a temporary framework for interagency coordination. When establishing a JTF, the combatant commander will select a CJTF, assign a JOA, specify a mission, provide planning guidance, and, in coordination with the CJTF, allocate forces to the JTF from the Service and functional component forces assigned to the combatant command and request forces from supporting combatant commands, as required. In contrast, NGOs in the operational area may not have a similarly defined structure for controlling activities. Further, many of these organizations may be present in the operational area at the invitation and funding of the host country. As such, they may be structured to conform with HN regulations or restrictions which may conflict with military operations. **Liaison and coordinating mechanisms that the combatant commander may elect to establish to facilitate the synchronization of military and nonmilitary activities include:**

   (1) **Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team (HAST).** Early in a developing CCO, an assessment may be required to determine what resources are immediately required to stabilize a humanitarian crisis. **The supported combatant commander may deploy a HAST to acquire information for operation order development, to determine the capability of the agencies and organizations already operating in the crisis area, and to what extent military assistance is needed until humanitarian relief organizations or peacekeeping elements can marshal their resources.** In addition to members of the combatant commander’s staff, HAST membership may include key US agency and NGO representatives. Before deployment, the HAST should be provided with the current threat assessment, operational intelligence, and geospatial intelligence. Upon arrival in country, the HAST should:
(a) Establish liaison and coordinate assessment efforts with the US Embassy or Consulate to help gain access to the appropriate HN officials and to facilitate additional interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination. Integration of the resources provided by these contacts
will reduce the potential for duplication of effort and enhance calculations of logistics required to support the collective effort.

(b) Establish liaison with the HN, NGOs, UN organizations, supported commanders or their representatives, and other national teams.

(c) Define coordinating relationships and lines of authority among the military, the embassy or consulate, USAID, and other USG and non-USG organizations. This action helps identify specific support arrangements required for the collective logistic effort.

(2) Agencies providing support services include USAID and its Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) disaster assistance response team (DART). DART provides rapid response field presence to international disasters with specialists trained in a variety of disaster relief skills. In concert with the country team, the DART can determine the full range of services necessary in cases of natural disaster. Figure III-3 depicts the organization of the DART.

![Figure III-3. United States Government Foreign Disaster Assistance Response Team](image-url)
For further guidance on FHA, refer to JP 3-07.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

(3) **Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC).** The supported combatant commander may establish a HACC to assist with interagency coordination and planning. The HACC provides the critical link between the combatant commander and other USG agencies, IGOs, and NGOs that may participate in an FHA operation. Normally, the HACC is a temporary body that operates during the early planning and coordination stages of the operation. Once a CMOC or civilian humanitarian operations center (HOC) has been established by the lead relief agency, the role of the HACC diminishes, and its functions are accomplished through the normal organization of the combatant commander’s staff.

(4) **Logistics Readiness Center (LRC).** Combatant commanders exercise directive authority for logistics within the AOR. The combatant commander reviews requirements of the joint forces and establishes priorities through the CAP process to use supplies, facilities, mobility assets, and personnel effectively. The combatant commander may also be responsible for provision of supplies for certain interagency personnel. A LRC functions as the single POC for coordinating the timely and flexible logistic response into the AOR, relieving the JTF of as much of this burden as possible. Other actions that the LRC may perform or coordinate include:

- Continuous coordination with strategic-level providers such as the Defense Logistics Agency and the United States Transportation Command, the Services, and the combatant commander’s staff to ensure the required flow of support to the JTF.
- Determining the appropriate common-user logistic support responsibilities and organizational structure, to include the appointment of lead Service or agency support. Lead agents may include non-DOD agencies, HN, or multinational partners.

(5) **Liaison Section.** As in domestic operations, the liaison section in foreign operations is crucial to coordination with USG, nongovernmental, and intergovernmental organizations. A liaison section assists the combatant commander by providing a single forum for the coordination of military activities among MNFs, other USG agencies, engaged IGOs and NGOs, the HN and indigenous population. As in domestic operations, military forces, engaged agencies, and the HN should consider providing liaison personnel to the combatant commander’s staff in order to maximize information flow and interagency coordination. Alternatively, as in Albania during Operation ALLIED HARBOR, the HN may establish a coordination center around which the activities of external actors are organized and to which they provide liaison personnel.

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**CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION**

“The Albanian Government showed considerable vision in establishing an Emergency Management Group (EMG) to coordinate the activities of the key actors in resolving the humanitarian crisis. The Albanian Force (AFOR)”
was able to reinforce the EMG with staff at the shelter, medical, security and logistic coordination desks. This provided much needed assistance and developed a mutually supportive and trusting relationship, which proved most effective. In addition, an AFOR help desk was established in the NGO information center, based in the pyramid building in the center of Tirana, to provide advice to some 178 registered (and some 50-60 unregistered) NGOs.”

SOURCE: Operation ALLIED HARBOR: NATO’s Humanitarian Mission to Albania

c. USG Agencies and NGO Relationships. Interagency, IGO, and NGO preparation, planning, and participation in a CCO should occur at the earliest phases of an anticipated operation. Coordinating the actions of USG agencies, IGOs, and NGOs throughout all phases of an operation assists in the integration and coordination of the overall operation.

(1) The USG, via the NSC, NSC/PC, or NSC/DC, may develop and promulgate a POLMIL plan for CCOs. The NSC, either through the interagency committee system or via the POLMIL plan, designate a lead government agency for the mission to ensure coordination among the various USG agencies. Combatant commanders and subordinate JFCs participate in the development of the POLMIL plan through the Joint Staff.

(2) Within the theater, the geographic combatant commander is the focal point for planning and implementation of regional military strategies that require interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination. Combatant commanders may also (and on all CJCS approved plans are directed to) utilize Annex V, “Interagency Coordination,” of OPLANs to request/consider interagency, IGO, and NGO activities and to provide guidance for incorporating the interagency, IGO, and NGO community into military operations. Combatant commanders should coordinate Annex V with the relevant USG agencies via the Joint Staff. COAs developed by the combatant command staff should consider and incorporate relationships that have been developed with USG agencies, IGOs, and NGOs.

4. Forming a Joint Task Force

a. When it is necessary to engage the military instrument of national power, and to establish a JTF, the JTF establishing authority is normally a combatant commander. Figure III-4 outlines key JTF establishing authority responsibilities. The combatant commander develops the mission statement and concept of operations based upon direction from the SecDef as communicated through the CJCS. If developed, the NSC’s interagency POLMIL plan may affect the mission statement. The combatant commander appoints a CJTF and, in conjunction with the CJTF, determines the necessary military capabilities required to accomplish military objectives. A CJTF has the authority to organize forces and the JTF HQ as necessary to accomplish the objectives.

b. The JFC may establish a joint civil-military operations task force (JCMOTF) to meet a specific contingency mission or to support humanitarian, nation assistance operations, or
a theater campaign of limited duration. There may be a requirement for civil affairs representation because of their professional knowledge of the functional issues involved, as well as their expertise in dealing with other USG agencies, IGOs, and NGOs.
c. **JTF Attributes.** The JTF organization resembles traditional military organizations with a commander, command element, and the forces required to execute the mission. The JTF concept provides for organizational flexibility, is task organized, reflects the mission’s requirements and the unique and necessary capabilities of the Service and functional components, and provides for the phased introduction of forces and the rapid deployment of personnel and equipment. A JTF is normally designated when the mission has a specific limited objective and does not require overall centralized control of logistics. **The mission assigned to a JTF will require not only the execution of responsibilities involving two or more Military Departments but, increasingly, the mutual support of numerous US agencies, and collaboration with IGOs and NGOs.** Normally, a JTF is dissolved when the purpose for which it was created has been achieved. The JTF HQ commands and controls the joint force and coordinates military operations with the activities of other government agencies, MNFs, IGOs, NGOs, and the HN forces and agencies.

d. **JTFs in the Interagency, IGO, and NGO Process.** Unlike the military, most USG agencies and NGOs are not equipped and organized to create separate staffs at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, with the result that JTF personnel interface with individuals who are coordinating their organization’s activities at more than one level. The interagency, IGO, and NGO process requires the JTF HQ to be especially flexible, responsive, and cognizant of the capabilities of US agencies, IGOs, the HN, and NGOs. During CCOs, the JTF HQ provide an important basis for a unified effort, centralized planning and direction, and decentralized execution. **Depending on the type of contingency operation, the extent of military operations, and degree of interagency, IGO, and NGO involvement, the focal point for operational- and tactical-level coordination with civilian agencies may occur at the JTF HQ, the CMOC, or the HOC.** JTF personnel may also participate actively or as observers in a civilian-led functional coordinating group concentrating on a specific issue or project.

*For further guidance on the forming and composition of a JTF, refer to JP 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures.*

5. **Joint Task Force Mission Analysis**

a. **Assessment Team.** A valuable tool in the mission analysis process is the deployment of a JTF assessment team to the projected JOA. The purpose of the assessment team is to establish liaison with the ambassador or COM, country team, HN, and, if present, multinational members, UN representatives, and IGO and NGO representatives. **The JTF assessment team is similar in composition to the HAST and, if provided early warning of pending operations, may be able to conduct assessment in association with the HAST.** The CJTF determines the composition of the assessment team and should include staff members who are subject matter experts and representatives from Service and functional components expected to participate in the actual operation. USG agency representation may include the USAID/OFDA DART for purposes of FHA operations. Special operations force personnel who possess necessary cultural,
Coordinated Operations. Operations by other USG agencies, the equivalent agencies of other national governments, IGOs and NGOs, in concert with or supplementing those of host country entities, will normally be in progress when US forces arrive in a JOA.

c. Priority Task. This may be a military action, a humanitarian task, or a combination of both. In certain situations, interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination must be a top priority of the CJTF. It is especially important to not allow the situation to deteriorate.

d. Regional Strategy. In further analyzing the mission, consider how the regional strategy will affect joint force planning and operations in the projected JOA. The NSC, DOS, and the combatant commander will provide the regional strategy and an appreciation for how the regional strategy affects the countries involved in projected operations. A well-defined regional strategy will legitimize the military mission and assist in determining force requirements and defining the end state.

e. Political Considerations. The assessment team should include sufficient expertise to realistically evaluate the political situation. The JFC should quickly establish a relationship with the US ambassador, the country team, and other USG agency representatives in country. To the extent that other USG agencies are not present, consideration should be given to placing representatives of relevant USG agencies on the assessment team.
(1) Situation permitting, the JFC and key staff members should meet with the regional and functional elements of the US agencies involved, the Joint Staff, and embassies of the nations involved. Establishing an effective working relationship with the US ambassador to the HN will help in any foreign endeavor. Each US mission, as well as the various State Department geographic and functional bureaus involved, will likely bring different concerns to light.

(2) Information-sharing relationships between the JTF, local and national authorities, the country team, USG agencies, IGOs, and NGOs must be established at the earliest stages of planning. One of the most important ways to facilitate mutually beneficial information exchange with non-USG agencies is to establish clear guidelines to avoid over-classification of information and to declassify information as early as operational conditions permit. Commanders should consider local and organizational sensitivities to information-gathering activities by joint forces — especially those that may be interpreted as ‘intelligence collection.’ Additionally, commanders may consider providing communication equipment to IGOs and NGOs to allow for better information sharing.

f. JTF HQ. The location of the JTF HQ, whether afloat or ashore, is important. Not only should it be defensible, it should be geographically positioned to work with the HN political and private sectors, relief organizations, the media, and MNFs, if present. Proximity to the American embassy or US diplomatic mission may enhance interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination. The JTF HQ requires a sufficient power supply and communication lines to support operations and should provide a secure site for storage of classified information.

6. Organizational Tools for the Joint Task Force

a. The CJTF should consider the establishment of C2 structures that take account of and provide coherence to the activities of all elements in the JOA. In addition to military operations, these structures should include the political, civil, administrative, legal, and humanitarian elements as well as IGOs, NGOs, and the media. The CJTF should ultimately consider how joint force actions and those of engaged organizations contribute toward the desired end state. This consideration requires extensive liaison with all involved parties as well as reliable communications. An assessment team’s mission analysis will assist the CJTF in the establishment of an executive steering group (ESG), CMOC, and liaison teams (see Figure III-2).

b. Executive Steering Group. The ESG is composed of senior military representatives from the JTF, principals of the embassy, the HN, IGOs, and NGOs present in the JOA. It is the high-level outlet for the exchange of information about operational policies and for resolution of difficulties arising among the various organizations. The ESG is charged with interpreting and coordinating strategic policy as defined by the POLMIL plan or other agreed POLMIL policy objectives. The ESG should either be co-chaired by the CJTF and ambassador or assigned outright to either individual, depending on the nature of the US mission. A commander at any echelon may establish an ESG to serve as a conduit through which to provide information and policy guidance to engaged agencies.
“Our relations with the UN/NGO community was furthered greatly by the operations of our three Civil-Military Operations Cells (CMOCs). A CMOC gives a deployed commander great flexibility. At Entebbe the CMOC became essentially a part of the JTF staff: in Kigali, the CMOC was a separate command, and in Goma it was a part of the JTF staff once more. A CMOC gives a US unit an invaluable asset in opening relations with the relief community, which, at least in our experience, is extensive. Parts of the NGOs, notably the World Food Program and the International Community of the Red Cross (and others) are well organized and experienced in working in this kind of environment. A CMOC gives the JTF commander the capability to coordinate and work with these agencies.”

Headquarters, United States European Command

c. Civil-Military Coordination Board. This board is the CJTF’s vehicle for coordinating civil-military support. Membership is typically restricted to key representatives from the JTF staff sections involved in CMO. Under certain conditions, the CJTF may include representatives from key IGOs and NGOs.

d. Civil-Military Operations Center. The ability of the JTF to work with all organizations and groups is essential to mission accomplishment. A relationship must be developed between military forces, USG agencies, civilian authorities, IGOs, NGOs, and the population.

(1) A CMOC is formed to:

(a) Carry out guidance and institute JFC decisions regarding CMO.

(b) Perform liaison and coordination between military organizations and other agencies, departments, and organizations to meet the needs of the populace.

(c) Provide a partnership forum for military and other participating organizations. Many of these organizations consider the CMOC merely as a venue for informal discussions.

(d) Receive, validate, and coordinate requests for routine and emergency military support from the IGOs and NGOs. Forward these requests to the joint force HQ for action.

(2) CMOCs are tailored for each mission. When a CMOC is established, the CJTF should invite representatives of other agencies, which may include the following:

(a) USAID/OFDA representatives.

(b) DOS, country team, and other USG representatives.

(c) Military liaison personnel from participating countries.
(d) Host country or local government agency representatives.

(e) Representatives of IGOs and NGOs.

(3) The CMOC is the way US forces generally organize for this purpose (see Figure III-5). Despite its name, the CMOC is a coordinating body and generally neither sets policy nor conducts operations. The organization of the CMOC is theater- and mission-dependent — flexible in size and composition. During large scale FHA operations, if a HOC is formed by the host country or UN, the CMOC becomes the focal point for coordination between the military and civilian agencies involved in the operation. When possible, the CMOC should collocate with the HOC to facilitate operations and assist in later transition of any CMOC operations to the HOC. A commander at any echelon may establish a CMOC to facilitate coordination with other agencies, departments, organizations, and the HN. More than one CMOC may be established in an AOR or JOA (such as occurred in Rwanda), and each is task-organized based on the mission.

(4) During Operation SUPPORT HOPE in Rwanda, the UN deployed an organization called the On-Site Operations Coordination Center, which had essentially the same functions as a CMOC and provided a clearinghouse for exchanging information between agencies and with the UN.
(5) **The CJTF must carefully consider where to locate the CMOC.** Security, FP, and easy access for agencies and organizations are all valid considerations. The location must be distinct and separate from the joint force operations center, regardless if geographically collocated. If security conditions permit, every effort should be made to locate the CMOC “outside the wire” in order to maximize participation by IGOs and NGOs that want to minimize the appearance of close association with military operations.

(6) **Political representatives in the CMOC may provide the CJTF with avenues to satisfy operational considerations and concerns, resulting in consistency of military and political actions.** Additionally, the CMOC forum appeals to NGOs because it avoids guesswork by providing these organizations a single point of coordination with the military for their needs.

(a) To obtain the necessary interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination and international cooperation needed to meet mission objectives, CMOC players must rely upon trust, shared visions, common interests, and capabilities.

(b) **A JFC cannot dictate cooperation among engaged agencies.** However, working together at the CMOC on issues of security, logistic support, information sharing, communications, and other items, can build a cooperative spirit among all participants.

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**CMOC IN PROVIDE COMFORT**

Humanitarian relief organizations operating in southern Turkey and northern Iraq coordinated their activities with those of the JTF through the CMOC. The CMOC was collocated with the Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) that coordinated the activities of the UN and other humanitarian relief organizations. The CMOC was coequal with the traditional J-staff sections. CMOC military officers coordinated activities with both State Department officials and relief workers. The CMOC in Turkey demonstrated the efficiency and effectiveness of the concept. It provided a focal point for coordination of common civil-military needs and competing demands for services and infrastructure, rather than relying on random encounters between relief workers and staff officers.

**SOURCE:** Operations Other Than War, Vol. 1, Humanitarian Assistance, Center for Army Lessons Learned, December 1992

(7) **A CMOC conducts meetings as required** to highlight requirements — especially humanitarian requirements of the population — and to identify organizations able and willing to meet these needs. Validated requests go to the appropriate JTF or agency representative for action. Figure III-6 depicts some of the CMOC functions.

*For further guidance on CMOC, refer to JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations.*
Liaison Teams. Once established in the JOA and operating primarily from the CMOC, or HOC, if established, liaison teams work to foster a better understanding of mission and tactics with other forces, facilitate transfer of vital information, enhance mutual trust, and develop an increased level of teamwork.

(a) Liaison is an important aspect of joint force C2. Liaison teams or individuals may be dispatched from higher to lower, lower to higher, laterally, or any combination of these. In multinational operations, liaison exchange should occur between senior and subordinate commands and between lateral or like forces.

(b) The need for effective liaison is vital when a JTF is deployed and operating in a CCO in conjunction with MNFs. The likelihood that a JTF may operate with not only
traditional allies, but also with nations with whom the US does not have a long history of formal military cooperation, requires the CJTF to plan for increased liaison and advisory requirements.

(c) **Qualifications of a JTF LNO assigned to a national or multinational operation** include a solid knowledge of doctrine, force capabilities, language proficiency, regional expertise, and cultural awareness. Civil affairs or coalition support teams may be available to serve as LNOs. The use of contracted interpreters to augment a liaison team may be another option.

(9) **Humanitarian Operations Center.** During large-scale FHA operations, when it becomes apparent that the magnitude of a disaster will exceed a HN’s capacity to manage it unilaterally, the HN may want to establish a HOC to facilitate the coordination of international aid.

(a) **Although the functions of the HOC and CMOC are similar, there is a significant difference.** The CMOC is established by and works for the CJTF. The HOC is normally established under the direction of the government of the affected country or the UN, or possibly OFDA during a US unilateral operation. HOCs, especially those established by the UN, are horizontally structured organizations with no command or control authority, where all members are ultimately responsible to their own organizations or countries. The US ambassador or designated representative will have a lead role in the HOC.

(b) The HOC membership should consist of representatives from the affected country, the US embassy or consulate, joint force (most likely from the CMOC), OFDA, UN, IGOs, NGOs, and any other major players.

(c) The HOC coordinates the overall US relief strategy, identifies logistic requirements for the various organizations, and identifies, prioritizes and submits requests for military support to appropriate agencies. Requests for military support may be submitted to the JTF through the CMOC.

(d) An end state goal of the HOC should be to create an environment in which the HN is self-sufficient in providing for the population’s humanitarian needs, and no longer requires external assistance.

*For further information on HOC, refer to JP 3-07.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.*

### 7. Other Joint Task Force Interagency Considerations

a. **Intelligence Gathering and Control.** Intelligence support provides the JFC with a timely, complete, and accurate understanding of the environment and potential adversaries.

(1) The combatant command’s staff, if required, should request a national intelligence support team (NIST) to support the JTF during a crisis or contingency operation. **NIST is a nationally sourced team composed of intelligence and communications experts from Defense Intelligence**
Agency, CIA, National Security Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and other intelligence community agencies as required. The interagency, IGO, and NGO support provided by a NIST allows JTF access to national-level databases and to agency-unique information and analysis.

(2) The method for collecting intelligence during a CCO is generally the same as that for any other military operation and is conducted in accordance with JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations. Managing the intelligence collection, analysis, production, and dissemination for a JTF may be complicated by non-USG civilians, especially members of IGOs and NGOs, who may be sensitive to the perception that they are being used to gather intelligence. This sensitivity may be based on the viewpoint that intelligence gathering is a provocative act and damages an individual’s claim to impartiality. However, general information provided by personnel from IGOs and NGOs may corroborate intelligence gained from other sources. Generally, the best approach to information sharing with the NGOs and international civilian community is to keep the focus on complete transparency in sharing operational information and developing a shared situational awareness and understanding of the objectives to achieve the mission. However, classified information will only be shared with or released to individuals with the appropriate security clearance and need to know.

(3) Procedures for control and disclosure of classified information, as practiced by DOD and other USG agencies, normally do not exist with IGOs and NGOs. Under United States Code, it is unlawful to disclose classified information to foreign governments without proper authorization. Classified military information shall not be disclosed to foreign nationals until the appropriate designated disclosure authority receives a security assurance from the recipient foreign government on the individuals who are to receive the information. Guidance for the disclosure of classified military information to foreign governments and international organizations is contained in DODD 5230.11, Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations.

(a) In most multinational operations, the JFC will be required to share intelligence with foreign military forces and to coordinate the receipt of intelligence from those forces. Release procedures should be established in advance, and the JFC participating in the coalition or alliance must tailor the policy and procedures for that particular operation based on national and theater guidance.

(b) Consideration must also be given to control of sensitive or classified information in fora such as the CMOC that include representatives of non-USG agencies.

b. Force Protection. FP planning considerations during complex contingency and multinational operations are similar to US-only operations. However, because of the specifics of the operation or area, the multinational nature of the operation, and the nonmilitary organizations operating in an operational area, there are certain aspects of FP that the CJTF must consider.

(1) Other nations do not necessarily execute FP in the same manner as the US military. If a joint force is under the OPCON of a multinational or coalition force, the JFC must still implement the appropriate force protection measures in accordance with combatant commander directives.
(2) **Special measures may be required for joint force personnel who must interact with local populations and NGOs.** Unfamiliar procedures, lack of a common language, and differing operational terms of reference increase the risk to these joint force personnel.

(3) Because US forces often assume the leadership role in multinational operations, joint force personnel can potentially be a greater target.

(4) In addition to actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against the joint force, the **JFC may provide security for other personnel and assets.** These requirements must be clearly stated in the mission, to include protection of:

(a) Personnel and equipment belonging to USG agencies, IGOs, and NGOs.

(b) Affected country personnel and assets.

(c) Relief convoys, supplies, and main supply routes.

(d) Relief distribution centers.

(e) Stocks of supplies.

(f) Ports and airfields.

*For further information on FP, refer to JP 3-07.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism.*

c. **Logistic Support.** Logistic requirements and resource availability coordination are vital to sustain a joint force operation.

(1) **The US military has unique logistic capabilities that are relevant to CCOs.** These include the rapid capability to plan, deploy, employ and redeploy; a robust C2 capability; a sustained logistic capability, and security throughout operations. US agencies, the UN, IGOs, NGOs, and MNFs provide for their own logistic support. However, US military logistic capabilities are frequently requested and provided to these organizations. **The JTF may be asked to assume all or part of the burden of logistics for these organizations after arrival.** This support may include intertheater and intratheater airlift, ground transportation of personnel, equipment and supplies, airfield control groups, and port and railhead operations groups.

(2) Unity of effort is essential to coordinate logistic operations in joint and multinational environments, requiring coordination not only between Services and US agencies, but also among all relief and humanitarian organizations in theater. **The JTF must establish movement priorities between JTF requirements and those of other USG agencies, the country team, coalition or UN forces, NGOs, and any international joint logistic center, e.g., United Nations Joint Logistic Center, that may be established.** The joint movement center is the primary organization
for coordinating movements, including that provided by HNs or MNFs, to support joint operations in theater. Close communications should be established with all elements to ensure that their movement requirements are fully understood by the JTF to enable effective planning and security for materiel movement.

(3) Normally, joint forces are supported through a combination of scheduled US resupply, contingency contracting, HN support, and UN logistic support.

(4) When joint forces participate in a UN operation, many of the costs incurred by the US are reimbursable by the UN.

(5) In a multinational, non-UN sponsored operation, a single nation may be responsible for planning and coordinating logistic support for all forces on a reimbursable basis.

d. **Meteorological and Oceanographic (METOC) Support.** The JFC must have access to accurate advance knowledge of METOC conditions to successfully conduct military operations. The effective understanding of meteorology and oceanography and the application of that knowledge could contribute significantly to the success of a JTF mission.

e. **Legal Issues.** Legal services are provided to the JFC and staff by the SJA. The SJA should possess a comprehensive understanding of the regulations and laws applicable to military forces and other agencies, both governmental and nongovernmental, domestic and international, and be a POC with IGOs and NGOs, a negotiator with foreign officials, and a draftsman for command policies, orders, and international agreements. The SJA must be an active participant in the interagency mechanisms to obtain the firsthand knowledge necessary to identify and resolve interagency and multinational legal issues involving:

(1) Legal authority for US military and USG agency participation and support.

(2) International law.

   (a) Dislocated civilians, refugees, immunity and asylum, arrests and detentions.

   (b) War crimes, status-of-forces agreements, law of armed conflict, military justice system, Geneva Conventions.

   (c) Environmental law.

(3) Intelligence oversight.

(4) Disaster relief and claims.

(5) Contract and fiscal law.

(7) Authorization for, and limitations on, use of military forces to support civilian authorities.

f. Public Affairs and Media Support. It is essential that all agencies of the USG work toward a common goal during CCOs by speaking with one voice and sending a consistent message to the audience. At the national level, OASD(PA) interfaces with USG agencies in the NSC/DC and passes the information down through PA guidance.

(1) At the theater level, PA planning in a CCO or multinational operation includes coordination with USG agencies, NGOs, the ambassador, the country team (particularly the embassy public affairs officer), the HN, national and international media, and media elements of member forces. It is essential that a public affairs and media plan be in place before the operation begins and integrated into the overall OPLAN. The joint information bureau (JIB) is the focal point for the interface between the military and the media. When a JIB is established by the JFC to promote coordination and responsiveness, it is often appropriate to include representatives from the aforementioned organizations. The JFC’s PAO plays a major role in keeping USG agencies and NGOs informed on the capability and intent of the joint force.

(2) In the NATO or multinational environment, media consideration will be channeled through JIB equivalents designated as a press information center, combined information bureau, allied press information center, or coalition press information center.

8. Information Management

a. All military operations, including CCOs, are information intensive. Other USG agencies, IGOs, and NGOs on scene are an important source of information that may contribute to the success of the military operation or transition to a desired end state. However, the cultures of non-USG organizations, in particular, differ markedly from the military and there may be a desire on their part to maintain a distance from military activities. By attempting to accommodate these concerns and sharing useful information and resources, the CJTF can help encourage active IGO and NGO cooperation in resolving the crisis. Locally-stationed IGO and NGO personnel are usually well-qualified individuals who understand the local culture and practices and have a comprehensive understanding of the needs of the people. The relief community is an important source of information regarding the following:

(1) Historical perspective and insights into factors contributing to the situation at hand.

(2) Local cultural practices that will bear on the relationship of military forces to the populace.

(3) Local political structure, political aims of various parties, and the roles of key leaders.

(4) Security situation.

(5) Role and capabilities of the host-nation government.
Chapter III

THE INTERAGENCY BATTLEFIELD

The simulated conflict area was dotted with soldiers, civilians, and representatives from the same nongovernmental organizations that we have seen in Somalia and Bosnia. Representatives from the International Red Cross, Save the Children, the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, a USAID Disaster Assistance Relief Team, CARE, World Vision, media representatives, and others all went to Fort Polk, Louisiana. They were there to work with us, to simulate their roles in these kinds of operations, and to learn with us how we all can accomplish our missions as part of a team.


b. This kind of information is frequently not available through military channels. Therefore, it is important to not compromise the neutrality of the IGOs and NGOs and to avoid the perception by their workers that their organizations are part of an intelligence gathering mechanism. Handled improperly, the relief community can be alienated by a perception that, contrary to its philosophical ideals, it is considered no more than an intelligence source by the military.

9. Training and Readiness

“It is imperative that our Joint Forces also enhance their ability to operate in consonance with other US Government agencies, and with nongovernmental organizations (NGO) [and] international organizations (IO) . . . in a variety of settings. The specialized access and knowledge these organizations possess can facilitate prompt, efficient action to prevent conflict, resolve a crisis, mitigate suffering, and restore civil government upon conflict termination. Achieving interagency and civil interoperability through the continuing development of our doctrine and interagency participation in our training exercises is important to the unity of effort upon which success in many missions depends.”


a. While numerous humanitarian and complex crises during the previous several years have provided opportunities for military and civilian agencies to exercise their mission skills, there is a clear requirement for continuous integrated interagency, IGO, and NGO planning and training in order to synchronize all components of a US response to a CCO. Interagency, IGO, and NGO training should provide for individual military and civilian instruction, military unit and civilian agency instruction, and combined military and civilian agency training in a formal joint program.
b. **Combattant commanders should schedule interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination training** as a part of routine training and exercise participation and as training for a specific CCO. The training audience should include members of the HACC, CMOC, logistics operations center, the liaison section, NGOs, the UN, and USG agencies. This training before deployment will greatly enhance operational capability. Commanders may also avail their commands to the training offered by some government agencies, IGOs, and the FHA community. Interagency, IGO, and NGO training should focus on identifying and assessing military and agency capabilities and core competencies, and identifying procedural disconnects.

c. USAID is the USG agency that maintains the most direct relationship with NGOs, many of which receive USAID funding to carry out programs. First, it maintains an Advisory Committee of Private Voluntary Aid, established after WWII by Presidential directive to serve as a link between the USG and NGOs engaged in economic development or relief efforts. Also, with some exceptions, most NGOs must register to receive USAID funding to assure they meet certain standards; currently 514 US and 62 international NGOs are registered with USAID.

d. **Interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination is also available to US NGOs through a consortium called InterAction** which helps represent NGO interests at the national level. InterAction coordinates with various USG agencies and involves NGOs in realistic PO simulation conducted by the Joint Readiness Training Center. The military and participating NGOs benefit from this training by gaining a better understanding of each organization’s culture, capabilities, and procedures. InterAction has also briefed civil affairs units and US military schools to improve their understanding of NGO activities.

e. Increasingly, interagency, IGO, and NGO training is also available through the senior Service schools (including the State Department’s Foreign Service Institute) and other civilian institutions. Intergency training is also provided on the job through exchange programs between DOD and other USG agencies. National Defense University, as directed by the CJCS, is responsible for providing interagency, IGO, and NGO training for civilian and military personnel assigned or pending assignment to combatant command joint interagency coordination groups.

f. **The United Nations conducts training and education at various levels** to improve the responsiveness, effectiveness, and efficiency of international humanitarian relief operations. Training is available to leaders of the military, civil defense, and civilian relief organizations, or for personnel of countries and organizations with no prior experience in international emergency and disaster response situations. One example is the UN-Civil-Military Cooperation Course that trains individuals in interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination and how to effectively manage the employment of military and civilian resources.

g. **PDD-56 and its successor NSPD (not yet approved) recommend** that a POLMIL plan be developed as an integrated planning tool for coordinating USG actions in a CCO. The POLMIL plan will include a situation assessment and will specify the concept of operations for all agencies, synchronize agency actions, and provide a game plan for individual agencies to follow. DOD has designated the National Defense University as the lead agent for POLMIL planning education, training and after-action reviews (AARs) related to complex foreign crises.